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This book has emerged as a result of two mini-conferences I 
organised at the Plymouth University: ‘Re-Industrialisation and 
Progressive Urbanism’ in 2013 and ‘Industrious Ecologies: Re-
claiming the Subjectivity of the City’ in 2014. The main inspira-
tion for these events (and subsequently the book) came from the 
work of the Master of Architecture programme I was leading 
from 2012 to 2015, and from discussions with professor Michelle 
Adams from Dalhousie University, who also gave me the idea 
for the structure of this book. I am also grateful to Eileen A. Joy 
who enthusiastically reacted to the book proposal and to Vin-




Urban Re-Industrialization  
As a Political Project
Krzysztof Nawratek
Urban re-industrialization could be seen as a method of in-
creasing business effectiveness in the context of a politically 
stimulated ‘green economy’; it could also be seen as a nostalgic 
mutation of a creative-class concept, focused on 3D printing, 
‘boutique manufacturing’ and crafts. These two notions place 
urban re-industrialization within the context of the current 
neoliberal economic regime and urban development based on 
property and land speculation. Could urban re-industrializa-
tion be a more radical idea? Could urban re-industrialization be 
imagined as a progressive socio-political and economic project, 
aimed at creating an inclusive and democratic society based on 
cooperation and a symbiosis that goes way beyond the current 
model of a neoliberal city?
In January 2012, against the backdrop of the financial crisis 
that began in 2008, Krzysztof Nawratek (leader of the Master of 
Architecture program at Plymouth University) published a text 
in opposition to the fantasy of a ‘cappuccino city’ arguing that 
the post-industrial city is a fiction, and that it should be replaced 
by ‘Industrial City 2.0’. 
The Master of Architecture program at Plymouth University 
has been working on a vision of such a city for the last few years. 
The idea of urban re-industrialization appeared, in some senses 
organically, when in 2009 they were invited to Riga, to look at 
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the Andrejsala peninsula, which is an area that Rem Koolhaas 
and his company OMA (Office for Metropolitan Architecture) 
prepared a master plan for. The plan envisaged the construction 
of luxury apartments for thirty thousand inhabitants (Riga dur-
ing this time had been losing 10,000 residents per year), supple-
mented by a modern art museum. However, the financial crisis 
of 2008 made this plan irrelevant. This was a typical ‘cappuccino 
city’ project, targeting the urban middle classes, and expecting 
them to magically appear in a post-socialist city. This type of 
thinking doesn’t bother to ask questions about where the middle 
classes (or indeed their money) are coming from; it just assumes 
that they are ‘somewhere out there’, and that they will come and 
spend their money and spare time indulging in expensive res-
taurants and a range of cultural activities. 
Industrial City 2.0 is an attempt to see a post-socialist and 
post-industrial city from another perspective, a kind of negative 
of the modernist industrial city. If, for logistical reasons and be-
cause of a concern for the health of residents, modernism tried 
to separate different functions from each other (mainly industry 
from residential areas), the Industrial City 2.0 must be based on 
the ideas of coexistence, proximity and synergy. A good exam-
ple of this is shown in a design by Jonathan Pickford, a former 
Master of Architecture student, for Riga. He proposed the cre-
ation of a state-funded ‘industrial think-tank’ connected with a 
small factory and a technical school that focused on timber pro-
cessing as catalysts for further development. On the one hand 
the project envisaged a use of timber, the only natural resource 
Latvia possesses, and on the other tied this in with the local tra-
dition of timber buildings and modern, timber-based industrial 
design, mainly developed in nearby Scandinavia. This concept 
was then developed in the coming years in Gdańsk, Zielona 
Góra, Warsaw and Cieszyn, and was based on a similar search 
for synergies between different urban processes and the idea of 
an inclusive city, a city for all its residents. These projects were 
located in a context of a post-socialist and neo-liberal city and 
were based on invitations from local institutions or organiza-
tions. But so far none of them has been developed any further. 
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Are they all just theoretical exercises? Is urban re-industrializa-
tion a valid concept at all? 
In this book Jeffrey T. Kruth’s chapter presents an example 
of the ‘Health-Tech Corridor’, which was developed in Cleve-
land, Ohio, proving that if cities are shrinking and neoliberal-
ism creates bankrupt companies and wastelands, progressive re-
industrialization could be a way towards an alternative, effective 
economic model. This does not happen by itself, of course: a po-
litical will is required to cut off (at least for a while) a fragment 
of the economy that supports the neoliberal logic of immedi-
ate profit at any cost. At the heart of the ‘Health-Tech Corridor’ 
is the Cleveland Clinic, which, like the university and several 
other key institutions, is a not-for-profit organization, which al-
lows considerable tax relief. Kruth discusses the importance of 
mechanisms to avoid land speculation and to base the economy 
on income and business taxation. Cleveland is not the only ex-
ample of a successful industrial cluster associated with a clinic 
and a university. Evergreen Cooperative is a cooperative enter-
prise, and owner of, amongst others, the Green City Grower, 
which is one of the largest hydroponic farms in the United States 
and plays a significant role in a development of the city. It is 
interesting that Evergreen is by no means a grassroots mobili-
zation model but is based on close cooperation with the most 
important local institutions and enterprises.
The Cleveland example is important because it shows two 
key aspects of contemporary, progressive re-industrialization: 
firstly, that re-industrialization becomes possible where the city 
is shrinking and neoliberalism is unable to sustain itself on land 
and property speculation (for it also proves that neoliberalism 
is not the most effective economic regime), and secondly, that 
contemporary re-industrialization should be closely linked with 
a progressive, social economy, one that tries to take into ac-
count the social and environmental costs of production. Such 
an economy requires a rebuilding of the social context in which 
it operates because it has to earn acceptance and support from 
the local community, and it also has to satisfy the material and 
ethical needs of that community. Similar issues are discussed in 
18
urban re-industrialization
the chapter by Karl Baker, which examines enterprises that al-
low the general public to ‘look inside’, and somehow to control 
the working conditions of employees and the environmental 
standards. The ‘Transparent factory’ could also put industrial 
production, as a kind of a spectacle, at the center of the social 
and cultural life of the city. 
Of course, urban re-industrialization does not have to be a 
progressive, emancipatory and inclusive political project. As 
Kate Royston shows in her chapter, it could still be adjusted 
by capitalist logic to increase productivity and diminish waste. 
Conditions which may allow for a radical paradigm shift are 
analyzed by Michael Edwards and Myfawny Taylor but also by 
Tatjana Schneider. In a similar way, Malcolm Miles connects 
re-industrialization with solidarity built on common activities. 
Krzysztof Nawratek uses Ernst Junger’s idea of ‘total mobiliza-
tion’ to argue for urban re-industrialization as a new universal-
ism. Alison Hulme examines the various phenomena of Chi-
nese industrial urbanization, existing parallel to the mainstream 
neoliberal strand, paying attention primarily to those that grew 
from the bottom up, mobilizing different parts of Chinese soci-
ety and Chinese culture in a multidimensional synergy. China 
is also the focus in the chapter by Kevin Lo and Mark Wang, 
who analyze the impact of the regulation of CO2 emissions on 
the economy of China, arguing that although in the short term 
adjustments reduce the possibility of the development of Chi-
nese industry, in the long term regulations stimulate innovation 
and the development of high-tech industry. John R. Bryson, 
Jennifer Clark and Rachel Mulhall consider the consequences 
of decentralized production mainly based on 3D printing for 
future cities and homes, and Doreen Jakob goes further to con-
sider the consequences of decentralized capitalism, pointing to 
the promises and weaknesses of crowd- sourcing projects. Jakob 
observes the non-democratic nature of these types of urban-
ization. Karol Kurnicki introduces a ‘loss’, as a third aspect, in 
addition to production and consumption, of the discussion of 
re-industrialisation. Loss is what opens up the production to a 
change, to innovation, to the unknown. Jonathan Vickery tracks 
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the progressive elements supporting cultural and material pro-
duction in the documents of the European Union.
The presented texts are attempting to create a framework for 
a better, more just and more democratic world, linking social 
progress closely to technological progress and industry. Urban 
re-industrialization could and should become an integral part 
of the chain of knowledge production and for fulfilling human 
needs. These texts argue that social progress must go hand in 
hand with technological progress and that urban re-industrial-





as Progressive Urbanism 
Why and How?
Michael Edwards and Myfanwy Taylor
Introduction
This book, like the conference which led to it, is part of an essen-
tial and expanding discussion which criticizes the fundamental 
structure of contemporary economy and society and examines 
the scope for long-term alternatives and worthwhile immedi-
ate interventions, demands and experiments.1 The context is 
partly a historical one. Over thousands of years, but especially 
since the emergence of capitalism a few centuries ago, we have 
moved away from forms of society where needs were almost 
always met locally, from local resources and with rather little 
division of labor or division of time between ‘production’, ‘dis-
tribution’, ‘consumption’, caring, nurturing, playing and all the 
other things people do to the elaborate divisions of labor out-
lined below. Although anthropologists, archaeologists and his-
torians continue to expose and refine our understanding of the 
1 There are intersections with the de-growth movements, research and prac-
tice in social innovations, many green movements, and Occupy and other 
emerging urban social movements. Some of these are discussed later in the 
chapter, while others are linked from the bibliography.
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actual course of events, it is very useful to think in terms of the 
progressive shifts from a stylized subsistence society in which 
exchange was highly localized, long-distance trade limited to 
rare materials (gold, spices) and products of extreme skill or art 
(scythes, ornaments, fine utensils, weapons).2 We can think of 
the settlements and architectural expressions of such societies 
as relatively un-differentiated buildings, with specialized build-
ing types emerging alongside specialization in manufacture 
(forges, grain mills, boatyards), in the reproduction of popula-
tion, collective services and social control (schools, hospitals, 
churches and mosques, prisons) and the infrastructure required 
(ports, canals, railways, water supply systems), all of which are 
profoundly influential in the formation of our cities. The coun-
terpart to that is evolution of non-residential built forms has 
been the dwelling, robbed of most of its earlier functions and 
now reduced — for most of us — to a box for sleeping, eating, 
child-raising and private, individualized consumption. Many of 
the physical structures we now take for granted are the distinct 
products of exploitative systems of supervision and control of 
‘work’ — the factory, the office building — systems which may 
now, for some, become obsolete through virtual control of dis-
tributed work and through casualized self-employment in which 
we manage our own exploitation.3Two other features of modern 
capitalism are relevant to this issue of ‘re-industrialization’: the 
growth of globalization, especially of trade and money-flows, 
and the dual role of buildings and land as having both use value 
and asset value. The explosive growth of international trade has 
tended to integrate previously-localized economies and at the 
2 Paul. Seabright, The Company of Strangers (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004) and David. Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years (Brooklyn: Mel-
ville House, 2011), are two outstanding long views.
3 Richard. Sennett, The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences 
of Work in the New Capitalism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998); Madeleine 
Bunting, Willing Slaves: How the Overwork Culture Is Ruling Our Lives 
(London: Harper Collins, 2011).
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same time transform them.4 Thus in recent decades the growing 
mass of profits accumulating in the world has tended dispropor-
tionately to be invested in manufacturing production, where la-
bor is cheap and authoritarian regimes can keep it so; elsewhere 
investment has focussed on extraction of hydrocarbons, metals 
and other minerals; and elsewhere again (strongly here in the 
UK) a major focus of investment has been in land and prop-
erty, driving up housing and premises values and costs as in-
vestors seek rents. This is profoundly important for settlements 
and buildings which increasingly are produced and managed 
as ‘assets’ to satisfy investment markets, rather than simply as 
what is useful or desired by citizens. All of this is both a conse-
quence and an engine of globalization. The availability of cheap 
container shipping and extremely cheap manufactured goods, 
mainly from Asia, has made it possible for wages in the global 
north to remain static or to decline in real terms, while work-
ers have been paying more for fuel and rent and profits grow. 
Meanwhile, money capital has been increasingly free to move 
to exploit these changing patterns of extraction of social surplus 
and support the credit-fueled maintenance of consumption. 
Many of these mechanisms are lucidly unpacked in the work of 
the geographer David Harvey and are linked with food and en-
ergy crises (and their related land grabs) by the economist Alain 
Lipietz.5 These social processes are large-scale, spanning the ge-
ography of the whole world and penetrating the most remote 
and previously autonomous regions. Meanwhile, marketized re-
lations penetrate into spheres of life previously outside the com-
modity economy — child and elderly care, recreation and sport, 
education — replacing reciprocity and free, collective provision 
and ratcheting up the charges for utilities and social housing.
4 Andrew Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globalization, and Welfare 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
5 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism (Lon-
don: Profile, 2010); Alain Lipietz, ‘Fears and Hopes: The Crisis of the Lib-
eral-Productivist Model and Its Green Alternative’, Capital & Class 37, no. 1 
(2013): 127–41.
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What might provoke change?
A variety of circumstances may start to reverse some of these 
trends, prompting what the organizers of this conference have 
termed ‘re-industrialization’. Reduction in world trade could 
come from (a) a general contraction of global activity in the 
crisis; (b) rising relative wages and production costs in China 
and other countries, reducing their competitive advantage; (c) 
increases in the cost of freight transport through rising oil pric-
es or through taxation, or even enforcement aimed at ending 
marine/aviation pollution; or (d) protectionist measures by na-
tional or EU governments. Some of these tendencies are already 
visible on a small scale and it’s worth reflecting on what could 
cause each to accelerate. These forces in combination could im-
pel economies like the UK’s towards greater self-sufficiency in 
raw materials, in manufacturing (and even in certain services, 
like tourism). Most of those factors don’t apply at a regional 
scale but affect whole nations. Rising transport costs, however, 
would be an important factor in redistributing activity within 
the country, fostering more localized production and compress-
ing supply chains, which means there are more local materials 
in construction, local brewing again and fewer Cornish potatoes 
going to be scrubbed in Lincolnshire and then sent to shops in 
Bristol. It’s worth taking great care with words in this discussion. 
In particular, the term ‘post-industrial society’ is to be avoided, 
because our society is just as dependent as it ever was on ‘in-
dustry’. Much of the production we depend on nowadays takes 
place abroad, so that fewer of us do factory jobs in Europe and 
many people under about thirty may never have entered a fac-
tory. But whether we use ‘industry’ in the sense of ‘hard work’ 
or loosely, as an approximation for manufacturing, we are ut-
terly dependent on it. Perhaps individual cities which have ex-
perienced dramatic deindustrialization can more accurately be 
called ‘post-industrial cities’, but it is important to recognize that 
even in a city such as London there remain significant portions 
of land currently labelled for industrial use and many workers 
still deal with physical goods. Groups such as Just Space and 
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the London Thames Gateway Forum are currently campaigning 
to prevent such spaces from being converted for office use or 
housing use. We therefore need to be careful that ‘re-industrial-
ization’ doesn’t blind us to the industry that already exists, even 
in primarily service economies. 
Re-industrialization as progressive urbanism?
This takes us to the issue of why re-industrialization might be 
something we want to propose or encourage. There are multi-
ple answers to this question, and we are not all coming from 
the same positions. In one corner, there are those who strongly 
reject today’s rampant capitalism — or capitalism of any kind. 
Another strand is the critique of the conceptualization of ‘the 
economy’ as just the money-traded part of social life, valuing 
output on a market basis and devaluing much of society’s most 
precious activities and skills. A third strand is the imperative to 
take full account of environmental impacts in measuring and 
valuing activity, and to reconfigure activity to stop or reverse 
environmental damage. A fourth strand will be the multiple 
demands to re-humanize work,6 reduce our alienation from 
what we ‘produce’ and ‘consume’, transform social relations in 
work groups and retain the full value of people’s labor under 
their individual, collective and/or local control.7 These are, of 
course not rival or competing arguments — they intersect and 
are mutually reinforcing. This conference has specifically asked 
us to consider re-industrialization as a route to a more progres-
sive urbanism. This takes us directly to the issue of the nature of 
urban growth which a re-industrialization strategy might gen-
erate, and whether this might be considered to be more or less 
progressive than present approaches, or indeed other alterna-
tive strategies. Presently, urban growth strategies tend to be in-
6 Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
7 Jamie Gough, ‘Neoliberalism and Socialisation in the Contemporary City: 
Opposites, Complements and Instabilities’, Antipode 34, no. 3 (2002): 405–
26.
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formed by powerful narratives that position a small proportion 
of the activities that go on in cities as productive and generative. 
We are all familiar with global cities, creative cities, high-tech cit-
ies, etc. As Doreen Massey’s work on London8 has shown, these 
perspectives imply that the interests of all lie in the performance 
of these sub-sectors of cities’ economies. In fact, as we know, 
urban growth strategies that privilege high-skilled and high-
income activities over all others tend to increase inequality, at 
the same time as they produce riches for the few. Researchers 
studying cities in the global South know this only too well,9 rec-
ognizing that the means by which the poor make cities work are 
at risk of being neglected or even destroyed through the appli-
cation of such narrowly-framed strategies. In this context, per-
haps the most powerful contribution the notion of ‘re-industri-
alization’ can make is to unsettle these dominant narratives by 
positioning a very different set of activities in the driving seat 
of future urban development. Even in a so-called ‘global city’ 
such as London, industrial activities play an essential role in 
making the urban economy work. Simple industrial surveying 
by the London Thames Gateway Forum has exposed clusters of 
specialist lift manufacture and repair companies, for example, 
which are able to respond rapidly and competently to lift break-
downs in London’s tubes and offices, as well as aggregate yards, 
whose central riverside location meant that aggregates could 
be transported by river and rail rather than road, minimizing 
air pollution. Re-Industrialization prompts us to look again at 
these neglected industrial activities and to ask how they might 
be connected to other urban activities. This is also important 
in light of the evidence that firms benefit from the co-presence 
of same-sector and different-sector firms,10 and that it is the 
collective coordination of urban activities amongst firms and 
8 Doreen Massey, World City (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
9 Jennifer Robinson, Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2006).
10 Gilles Duranton and Diego Puga, ‘Nursery Cities: Urban Diversity, Process 
Innovation, and the Life-Cycle of Products’, American Economic Review 91, 
no. 5 (2001): 1454–77.
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other economic actors that creates agglomeration economies.11 
If we are interested in progressive urbanism, however, we per-
haps ought to go further than ‘re-industrialization’. Some of the 
other contributors to this book and the associated conference 
are hopeful about a humanizing re-industrialization, in which 
engaged work as a maker, perhaps in the 21st-century industry 
of mass customization, transforms our relations of production. 
Others are hopeful about the potential of re-industrialization to 
drive the ecological changes we are concerned to see. What we 
are missing, perhaps, is a specifically feminist perspective, alert 
to the ways in which whole aspects of life have been ignored 
by mainstream approaches to cities and the economy. Feminist 
geographers have showed how cities rely on the unpaid work 
of women and men in connecting the realms of work and life,12 
while feminist economists have been at pains to demonstrate the 
value of unpaid work in conventional economic terms.13 What 
this work has shown us is that unless and until we re-think ‘the 
economy’, our efforts to achieve more progressive urbanisms 
will face some serious limitations.14 Re-Industrialization has 
much going for it as a starting point for thinking about progres-
sive urbanism. It offers the potential to re-connect with mean-
ingful and humanizing work in cities, and to begin to adapt the 
ways our cities work to avert ecological crisis. It moves in direct 
opposition to many of the recent developments towards globali-
zation and modern capitalism, as well as against the dominant 
11 Allen Scott and Michael Storper, ‘Regions, Globalization, Development’, Re-
gional Studies 37, no. 6–7 (2003): 579–93.
12 Linda McDowell et al., ‘The Contradictions and Intersections of Class and 
Gender in a Global City: Placing Working Women’s Lives on the Research 
Agenda’, Environment and Planning A 37 (2005): 441–61; Helen Jarvis, ‘Mov-
ing to London Time: Household Co-ordination and the Infrastructure of 
Daily Life’, Time & Society 14 (2005): 133.
13 Jenny Cameron and Julie Katherine Gibson-Graham, ‘Feminising the 
Economy: Metaphors, Strategies, Politics’, Gender, Place & Culture 10, no. 2 
(2003): 145–57.
14 Julie Katherine Gibson-Graham, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It): 
A Feminist Critique of Political Economy (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, 2006), first published in 1996 by Blackwell.
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narratives of how urban economies work and the narrow city 
strategies they inform. As such, it powerfully opens up the more 
important — and yet neglected — question of who or what cit-
ies and their economies are for.15 At the heart of a progressive 
urbanism would be a concern for life as well as work and for 
the ways in which they together make our urban lives possible.






Even without recalling the generalizing notion of ‘human na-
ture’, it is not excessive to suggest that human activity is creation. 
The delimitation in human life between work, learning, leisure 
or play is useful in as much as it allows for the analysis of differ-
ent segments of social reality. However, in spite of its conveni-
ence, this delimitation is artificial and problematic because it 
hides relations which are based on the production of new things 
on the level of everyday practices. These relations engage vari-
ous resources and link different levels of social life which always 
resist categorization and analytical simplification. Everything 
is — or can be — production. Everything is a social product.1
The ideologies of the post-industrial city,2 which are widely 
accepted in developed countries, induce a concentration on the 
maintenance of the privileges of a comfortable life that are far 
away from the real conditions of its reproduction. This situation 
is not only unaltered, but is reinforced by the demands imposed 
on people and the things that people demand of themselves: be-
ing creative at work, having fun, creating a pleasant personal 
1 Henri Lefebvre, Dialectical Materialism, trans. J. Sturrock (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 102–20.
2 See, for example, Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class (New York: 
Routledge, 2005); Charles Landry, The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban 
Innovators (London: Comedia, 2008).
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image for others (as consumers), undertaking constant efforts to 
prove oneself valuable for existing modes of production, etc. In 
this context, it is often seen as more important to make a good 
choice of colors on the custom-made Nike trainers than to be 
aware of the social and economic networks that made their ex-
istence possible. Production and creation go hand-in hand with 
consumer individualism.
Problems with re-industrialization
In the urban context of developed regions, the question of re-in-
dustrialization is entangled with two major issues. First are the 
overproduction of goods and the domination of consumerism, 
which can basically be seen as two sides of the same coin. The 
second issue regards an overtone of international competition 
and rivalry which is difficult to sustain in the globalized world.
Re-industrialization, as with any other economic process, 
raises questions about its entanglement with social relations. 
It is particularly so if we accept that re-industrialization is not 
only a way out of the recent economic crisis or about simply 
relocating factories, but is primarily a social activity, and that 
the restoration of industrial production is important for society. 
For a consumer, it is often irrelevant whether the product he or 
she purchases was made fifteen, fifty or five thousand kilometers 
away, especially if the price stays the same. To pose the question 
in a different way: is the geographical location of industry perti-
nent in a situation when it serves as a means to maintaining ex-
isting relations, defending old welfare states, reproducing power 
structures or supporting society as a consumers’ assembly? 
It seems that the problem here is again that of external con-
text, i.e. a set of criteria which can be used to evaluate social 
development or to choose a more or less pro-social political 
economy. Despite the impossibility of returning to the modern-
ist ideals of progress, which not so long ago supported beliefs 
in slogans such as the one adopted by German carmaker Audi 
(‘Vorsprung durch Technik’, meaning ‘Advancement through 
technology’), strong ideas should not be abandoned. Critique of 
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contemporary modes of production, with its center–periphery 
divide or its impossibility of negative judgement of seemingly 
free consumerism (manifest in modern-day proverbs such as 
‘the customer is always right’ and ‘the market is free’), is prob-
lematic. It is so not for the reason that it takes an extraneous 
position full of dignified superiority. It is rather because of its 
inability to create its own system of convincing ideas and solu-
tions, which would form a positive, adequate and viable prop-
osition. The fact that tools of social and political critique are 
widely known and available, does not translate to their usage. 
Luc Boltanski argues that there is a need to create an analytical 
framework which would integrate what he calls an ‘overarching 
programme’ with a ‘pragmatic programme.’3 The former pro-
vides an external and general picture of social order, including 
something which can be called ‘commensurability’ (or ‘princi-
ples of equivalence’, in Boltanski’s terminology). The latter turns 
its attention to the competences of actors and their actions as 
well as their own justifications for those actions.
Re-industrialization could be an ideology which has more 
widespread social meaning and influence, providing that it 
is defined as a tool for as precise as possible, and at the same 
time (auto-)reflexive, social operations. What we learned from 
historical social processes of de-industrialization was that the 
transformation of social models and breaks with development 
paths over a hundred years old is possible in a very short time.4 It 
means that new reconfigurations are possible, even more so since 
some elements of this possibility are already available. However, 
it should imply the rejection of a currently functioning, clear-cut 
division between production and consumption, producer and 
consumer. Instead of asking what and where something can be 
3 Luc Boltanski, On Critique: Sociology of Emancipation, trans. G. Elliott 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 48.
4 Such was the nature of neoliberal restructuring; see Neil Brenner and Nik 
Theodore, ‘Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing Neoliberalism”’, 
in Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and West-
ern Europe, eds. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, 2–32 (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2002).
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produced, we should be asking for what and for whom is a given 
thing valuable? Additionally, we should ask how to make con-
version between production and consumption at the same time 
smoother and more complicated? To put it differently, the issue 
here is about procedures linking economic transformation and 
material practices with conditions of existence on the level of 
individual actions and justifications. Moreover, in the wider so-
cial context it should be possible to relate the above- mentioned 
elements with ideas such as ‘for the common good’ or of ‘right to 
the city’, as defined by Lefebvre.5 Accordingly, and for the same 
reasons, referring to the ideals of universal and everyday social 
emancipation would be appropriate. Secondly, and only be-
grudgingly mentioned, the reason for re-industrialization is the 
economic success of countries and cities outside of Europe and 
North America, with simultaneous worsening of the situation 
in these two regions of the world, epitomized by post-Fordism6 
and the resultant reshuffling of welfare state systems.7 For some 
time now, it seems that developed countries are losing the ability 
to create their own history, not to mention to decide about the 
fate of the world. If we believe Wallerstein, it has to do with the 
general, and possibly long-lasting, crisis of the modern world-
system.8 Re-industrialization could be used as one of means of 
escaping this crisis. The question is, can it be used only in a re-
actionary way? It does not seem to be a big problem to re-estab-
lish industry as a pillar of developed countries, especially as it 
is still an important element of their economies and continues 
to form a significant share of their GDPs.9 However, for better or 
for worse, it would not mean returning to the era of bright and 
5 Henri Lefebvre, ‘Right to the City’, in Writings on Cities, trans. E. Kofman 
and E. Lebas, 147–59 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).
6 Krishan Kumar, From Post-Industrial to Post-Modern Society: New Theories 
of the Contemporary World, 2nd edn. (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
7 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
8 Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006).
9 World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.IND.TOTL.ZS.
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brave modernization. Thus, the more important issue is a crea-
tion of mechanisms of re-industrialization. These mechanisms 
could operate to facilitate and strengthen social relations, which 
would in turn enable the development of alternatives to the cur-
rent and existing mode of ‘creative destruction’, especially that 
it currently becomes less and less creative. Another issue is that 
the term ‘re-industrialization’ itself implies a certain geographi-
cal perspective. While Western countries were experiencing a 
dismantling of industry, many peripheral regions have started 
to industrialize and grow economically. In fact, (re-)industriali-
zation is constantly happening. Unfortunately, as it is controlled 
from London or New York and based on outdated Western pat-
terns, it usually produces or reproduces conditions which were 
shared by European or American workers in the past.10
Dialectics of loss/surplus
The dialectical relation mentioned above between producer and 
consumer is at once the strength, and also the biggest problem, 
of existing modes of production. Paradoxically, it is something 
that, in a new form and within a different context, should be 
retained for use in re-industrialization processes. Every per-
son and social institution can be perceived as both a creative 
producer of objects and other goods, and a consumer. The rela-
tion here is analogical between a human and space. Although 
we cannot determine the exact properties of this relation, it 
does not mean that the reciprocal influence is not real. The key 
problem of such a relation is that it does not enable change. Of 
course, we can accept that there is a margin of free choice. We 
can use one space but not another, go to work for a seemingly 
better company or buy a shampoo with conditioner or without. 
The fact remains that it is a closed system and that those free 
choices and the current social conditions are not transformed 
but reproduced. As observed by Lefebvre, “the opposition be-
10 Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Pine 
Forge Press, 2006).
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tween production and consumption […] cannot completely 
mask the dialectical conflict suggested by the term ‘productive 
consumption’”.11 Is there really nothing else to do but take the 
external position of critique and bring to light contradictions 
caused by the aforementioned opposition? There might be an-
other way which is related both to breaching the dialectics of 
production and consumption and to the possibility of a critique 
grounded in real, everyday human actions. 
Every instance of production and consumption comprise a 
loss. It might be a by-product, waste, trash, unused energy, an 
empty lot or even the opening of new possibilities which cannot 
be taken at the given moment. A loss can be a third element, 
supplementing production and consumption. In other words, a 
loss can be a surplus, an excess, a resource for further use. More-
over, in relation to production and consumption it can function 
as a correcting element, disrupting a simple binary opposition. 
Importantly, this three-way relation is not logical but dialectical, 
although by its character it is different from traditional linear 
dialectics, which dictate that the end of a workday means leisure 
and consumption, after which there is another day of work.
Using the most evident example of rubbish as a symbol of 
loss, we can notice how in some situations it is considered prob-
lematic, while in others it becomes a resource which enables the 
constitution of a third important element and a complication of 
the binary production-consumption duo. In the first instance, 
the loss resulting from production or consumption is managed 
by means which negate its value. The only solution for loss is 
then either its complete exclusion from circulation or — and this 
is a more contemporary capitalist (and ecological) way — its re-
introduction to the system as a part of production or consump-
tion. In the meantime, the qualitative difference of loss is gone. 
In many countries, rubbish is a property of those who create 
it until it is collected from the street or a backyard by (often 
private) cleaning services. Paying for rubbish collection means 
11 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D. Nicholson Smith (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2010), 354.
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that, even within the green and seemingly circular politics of 
recycling, waste is treated only as a part of a binary relation. The 
rubbish producer is compelled to become a consumer of waste-
management services.12 The other instance occurs when rubbish 
is not included in this binary relation and is instead treated as 
a resource. It is not surprising that many of the most advanced 
systems of recycling, innovative rubbish treatment and the abil-
ity to use a loss as a resource function in urban slums.13 Slum 
dwellers cannot afford to simply throw away things that can 
be preserved for further use. They cannot waste time or space 
if it can be made use of. Paying for organized rubbish collec-
tion would be a similar squander. People who live on resalable 
rubbish found in dumpsters in urban areas of developed coun-
tries are another example of this.14 They can virtually support 
themselves relying only on things (mainly recyclable materials) 
which other city dwellers deem disposable. These two cases are 
not presented here to glorify social exclusion or enchant indi-
vidual marginalization of a ‘poor man’. Instead it is about the 
fact that mechanisms of using a loss are already present on the 
level of everyday practices, and as such they could be put to 
wider use.
Connection attempts
Despite the two above-mentioned examples, general mecha-
nisms of utilizing loss and breaking with the production-con-
sumption paradigm are so far not available, partly because they 
would have to be locally reappropriated. However, conditions 
12 Garth Myers, African Cities: Alternative Visions of Urban Theory and Prac-
tice (London: Zed Books, 2011), 33–34.
13 Jac Smit and Joe Nasr, ‘Urban Agriculture for Sustainable Cities: Using 
Wastes and Idle Land and Water Bodies as Resources’, Environment and Ur-
banization 4, no. 2 (1992): 141–52; Diana Lee-Smith, ‘Cities Feeding People: 
An Update on Urban Agriculture in Equatorial Africa’, Environment and 
Urbanization 22, no. 2 (2010): 483–99.
14 T. Rakowski, Łowcy, zbieracze, praktycy niemocy. Etnografia człowieka zde-
gradowanego [Hunters, Gatherers, Practitioners of Feebleness: An Ethnogra-
phy of Degraded Man] (Gdańsk: Słowo/Obraz Terytoria, 2009).
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for a possible three-part relation can be provisionally deter-
mined. If we accept that re-industrialization is a tool, we need to 
think about the application of a loss/surplus in the urban con-
text. Additionally, we need to consider to what extent mecha-
nisms of loss have socially inclusive potential.
Getting access to traditional production processes on the 
level of organized creation (i.e. above the individual level, such 
as being an employee) is rather complicated and requires the 
overcoming of existing dependencies, e.g. technological, insti-
tutional or political barriers. Personal involvement in the pro-
duction process in the form of becoming a worker is also not 
relevant, because it does not transform the general situation. 
Opening a brewery in Camden or a cheese factory in Brook-
lyn is surely nice, but has it any wider impact on the capitalist 
mode of production based on the production-consumption du-
alism? The worker swiftly becomes a consumer, and the other 
way around, while being caught up in the reproduction of the 
conditions of his or her own dependency, which are constantly 
reinforced in colonized daily life.15 Exploiting resources gener-
ated by loss means breaking with this dialectical opposition and 
doing it with means already available. The worker/consumer is 
not compelled to struggle over traditional means of production, 
for his or her strength lies elsewhere — in the control over a loss/
surplus.
It is difficult to imagine a circular production system which 
on the one hand would be able to fully make use of the losses 
it produces and on the other maintain an entry gate allowing 
for the inclusion of external elements. Such a system would be 
doomed either to authoritarian subjection of all elements of cir-
culation or to a utopian (in the traditional meaning) and petri-
fied autarky.
Recognizing the value of a loss is a condition of its social 
control and responsiveness towards new circumstances and 
needs. This social control is a crucial and critical element, be-




cause it could form a mechanism preventing the seizure of loss 
by either production or consumption and by slipping to old di-
visions. It would also counteract the rule of internalization of 
profits and externalization of costs, which is essential for mod-
ern capitalism. This system is increasingly unable to manage 
surplus, understood both as consumer goods and as unwanted 
by-products. Mechanisms of loss, namely apprehension and so-
cial control of surplus, open possibilities for emancipation and 
for complication of capitalist functions.16 Therefore, possible 
change lies not in the policies which would, for instance, enforce 
high fees for dumping waste in peripheral regions. That means 
at most giving poor countries a choice about a preferred form 
of subordination.17 Recognition of the importance of loss for the 
socio-economic system and treating it as a manageable resource 
implies a shift in the power relations. The moment of power is 
relocated: hitherto weaker actors become decisive in the usage 
of loss/surplus. For instance, the development of digital technol-
ogies (mainly mobile phone applications, mobile banking and 
communication networks) in African countries is not a result 
of external capital or infrastructural investment, but innovative 
and productive ways of using computers and handsets deemed 
worthless by citizens of the developed countries.18 
In the urban context, re-industrialization equals reformula-
tion of spatial relations. Perhaps it is time now to think about 
something that could be called ‘the architecture of loss’? Prob-
ably in the perspective of social control over the space right in 
the city is also to be practically reformulated. The starting point 
would be a practical reformulation of the ‘right to the city’ con-
cept from the perspective of social control over space. On a low-
16 See the reconceptualization of city politics and policies in Edgar Pieterse, 
City Futures: Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development (London: Zed 
Books, 2008), 85–89.
17 Steven Graham and Simon Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: Networked In-
frastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 304–78.
18 Anon., ‘Press 1 for Modernity’, The Economist, April 28, 2012, http://www.
economist.com/node/21553510. 
38
part 1: why should we do it?
er and more important level, processes of industrial production 
are related to the material practices of people, their activities in 
and contacts with the environment. Possible social control over 
loss can be compared to the dominance over fragments of space, 
which, in spite of their crucial position for the functioning of 
the system, are currently understood as a burden, unless they 
can be subjugated and commodified. If the right to the city is 
a right to a social production of livable space, which in turn al-
lows the individual and communal creation of reality,19 then the 
key condition of its realization does not mean becoming a pro-
ducer or a consumer. Rather it means recreating and taking ad-
vantage of available resources, such as losses, remainders, voids. 
The dialectical overcoming of productive or consumptive loss 
means constant creation of renewable resources. Loss/surplus 
is continuously produced by both practices of everyday life (i.e. 
most of people’s activities in a city) and by industrial produc-
tion. Therefore, re-industrialization should be comprehended as 
a social process containing and being contained by totality, but 
one without a center20 It means going through different levels, 
understanding and inducing change which includes both gen-
eral systemic importance and even people’s minuscule material 
practices and their justifications.
It is not an attempt to determine the hard core of human 
identity (exemplified by the worker/consumer). It cannot be if 
we consider how inexhaustible the forms of people’s productiv-
ity can be. It is rather about facilitating individual and social po-
tential for shaping relations of production and consumption. By 
using existing resources and preserving the world as we know it, 
it is possible to change it completely.
19 Lefebvre, ‘Right to the City’, 147–59.
20 Jason Edwards, ‘The Materialism of Dialectical Materialism’, in New Mate-
rialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics, eds. D. Coole and S. Frost (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010), 286.
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Chapter 3
The Cultural Politics of  
Re-Industrialization  
Some Remarks on Cultural Policy 
and Urban Policy  
in the European Union
Jonathan Vickery
Cultural policy and urban policy in the European Union are 
two quite distinct policy fields. They overlap insofar as ‘culture’ 
is more often than not both urban and public culture, and the 
greatest density of publicly-funded cultural projects in Europe 
take place in cities. In this chapter I discuss how both cultural 
policy and urban policy are changing and are contributing to 
the ongoing need for re-industrialization, in part through pro-
viding the means to a new (or renewed) vision for the European 
city. 
Europe experienced the de-industrialization of its post-war 
economy in the 1970s, then emerged a partial re-industrializa-
tion through a rising service economy in the liberalization of 
trade and property ownership in the 1980s, then to be followed 
by the informational, communications or so-called ‘micro-chip 
revolution’ of the 1990s — giving us the digitally-mediated eco-
nomic world we today inhabit. And yet historical periodizations 
do not explain a great deal. How we conceptualize the meaning 
of ‘industry’ in the digital and so-called ‘knowledge economy’ 
40
part 1: why should we do it?
of the present time remains a matter of debate, if not confusion, 
We currently seem to be living through an endless recessionary 
re-scaling of national economies within a supra-national Euro-
pean economic framework that is attempting to re-negotiate its 
relation to the global economy at the same time as its manage-
ment of the grand political settlement of European unity, deci-
sively forged at Maastricht in 1993. This will no doubt play out 
through successive political negotiations in the next decade or 
more, as Europe struggles to recover from the global financial 
crisis that impacted it in 2007. 
In 2013, the EU arrived at the end of its last seven-year policy 
cycle (largely conceived before the European financial crisis 
fully emerged) and forthcoming strategic development frame-
works—‘Europe 2020’ being the ‘growth strategy’—are all con-
fronting challenges greater than anything the Union has hith-
erto faced.1 In this context, I will discuss the matter of policy 
with reference to ‘Creative Europe’ (the new cultural policy) and 
the somewhat less specific but equally significant policy term, 
‘integrated sustainable urban development’. 
Even though it legislates, the EU is not a government, and so 
its political will is heavily invested in its policy discourse. While 
the EU’s spectrum of competencies historically revolve around 
the governance of economy and trade, it now encompasses a 
range of rights and social values, supra-national political insti-
tutions and an increasing geo-political identity. ‘The European 
Spatial Development Perspective’ is, notionally at least, its larg-
est framework for geo-social planning. This ‘perspective’ em-
bodies related policy aspirations for territorial cohesion and 
regional integration, the cultural implications of which seem 
to contradict the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ enshrined at Maas-
tricht. In one sense, EU cultural policy and urban policy both 
fall victim to the principle of subsidiarity (a member state’s right 
to act outside the Union in certain areas), but in another sense, 
1 European Commission, europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable 
and Inclusive Growth (Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 
2010). 
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subsidiarity motivates an ever greater need for a convincing 
policy unity. As articulated in the two treatises of the European 
Union, (which along with various additions are now considered 
in one ‘consolidated’ document), subsidiarity in principle is ab-
solute but in practice must be interpreted within the priority of 
the ever expanding field of EU legal jurisdiction.2 
Arguably, the most visible and recent EU discourse of re-
industrialization revolves around the ‘knowledge economy’ 
concept, which can be understood less as a response to the 
rise of technology and the industrialization of science than as 
a permutation of the entrepreneurial city that emerged out of 
the widespread de-industrialization of the 1970s. The entre-
preneurial city, as Bob Jessop explains, is not just a city with a 
competitive industrial infrastructure.3 It is a city in which ‘com-
petitive advantage’ is a hegemonic political discourse, which has 
re-structured the political complexion of the State, its services 
and welfare, urban space and social institutions, civil society 
and markets. This re-structuring has taken place around nor-
mative assumptions on the fundamental role of ‘the economy’ 
and how only market-driven economies are possess the energy 
and developmental potential to provide a stable ground for, and 
productive means to, animate and perpetuate a healthy society. 
Further, the entrepreneurial city as manifest in Europe has con-
vincingly embodied a symbolic (and creative) articulation of 
2 See: European Commission, Committee on Spatial Development, European 
Spatial Development Perspective: Towards Balanced and Sustainable De-
velopment of the Territory of the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999). The two prin-
cipal treaties are Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (since 
1958) and Treaty on European Union (i.e. the Maastricht Treaty, 1993); they 
were last updated at Lisbon (2009), whereupon the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights became legally binding. See European Union, The Consolidated 
Treaties [and] Charter of Fundamental Rights (Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2010). This document cites ‘subsidiarity’ but 
also the ‘harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member States’ 
(Article 167, 121–122).
3 Bob Jessop, ‘The Entrepreneurial City’, in Transforming Cities: Contested 
Governance and New Spatial Divisions, eds. N. Jewson and S. MacGregor, 
28–41 (London: Routledge, 1997).
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civic identity, where even heritage or abandoned factories be-
come sites for aspirant innovative actors in the fast-changing 
global economy. Renewal, regeneration and innovation are the 
marks of the entrepreneurial city, whose techniques range from 
dissolving the public ownership of welfare services, land and 
property, to the use of the arts, culture and heritage to build a 
branded visitor economy with extensive corporate hospitality 
capability.4 
The challenge for a critique of the entrepreneurial city, is that 
its ‘entrepreneurship’ (and subsequent ‘neoliberal’ approach to 
development) has been startlingly effective in giving culture, 
arts and heritage a substantive socio-economic role in the urban 
economy of the European city. In most European countries, the 
so-called ‘cultural sector’ is now larger than it ever has been, 
with impressive facilities and routine public funding. There 
is little political solidarity among the European cultural elites 
against a neoliberal regime that offers culture a lucrative role in 
the contemporary city. For it does so without divesting it of its 
historic (and hard-won) social autonomy, at least immediately. 
This situation, however, is deceptive, and arguably retrenches 
‘autonomous’ cultural sectors in politically marginalized social 
spaces whose only function is to perpetuate a model of the city 
it has received by fiat, and not to which it has imaginatively con-
tributed. My argument, however, is that entrepreneurial neolib-
eral urban development has invoked a critical tension within 
policy development at EU level. For the EU policy imaginary 
must contend with the political conditions of its own legitimacy, 
emerging from its own historicity, as well as offer an economi-
cally pragmatic and viable future for all its member states. I will 
attempt to indicate how the EU’s changing policy frameworks 
articulate the political necessity of moving beyond the assump-
tions on the efficacy of corporate expansion and markets on 
which the entrepreneurial city is founded.. The EU cannot fa-
4 Graeme Evans, ‘Creative Cities, Creative Spaces and Urban Policy’, Urban 
Studies 46, no. 5–6 (2009): 1003–40; Anne Lorentzen, ‘Cities in the Experi-
ence Economy’, European Planning Studies 17, no. 6 (2009): 829–45.
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cilitate the propulsion of its member-state cities into the global 
economy and endure what it calls the ‘zero-sum’ game of unre-
strained competition between member state cities, between cit-
ies and regions, and city-regions with each other.5 
For both urban policy and cultural policy, the EU was only 
really met with substantive enthusiasm from independent or-
ganizations, associations and city municipalities themselves, not 
national governments—for example, since 1951 the Council of 
European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and since 1986 
EUROCITIES, have both played important roles in facilitating the 
credibility of EU policy. As by far the smaller of the two policy 
fields, cultural policy presides over a portfolio featuring educa-
tion and media as well as the arts, culture, heritage, (and increas-
ingly, the creative industries). Responsible for many high visibil-
ity projects (like the European Capital of Culture program) its 
success is largely judged by its central strategic funding project, 
formerly called the ‘Culture Programme (2007–2013)’.6 Having 
reached the end of its seven-year lifespan in 2013, the program 
had three objectives: cultural mobility, intercultural dialogue 
and the distribution of cultural goods (all geared to the central 
EU Treatises’ aim of promoting the European polity through cit-
izenship). It had a budget of €400 million and funded hundreds 
of projects, many of which had an urban dimension, such as the 
innovative project, House for Open Mobility Exchange (HOME) 
for ‘personal contact in public spaces’, and the BelBoBru ‘urban 
parade laboratory’.7 Impressive as the Programme was, its dis-
5 The phrase ‘zero sum’ is used in European Commission, Cities of Tomorrow: 
Challenges, Visions, Ways Forward (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2011), 22.
6 Culture is one of areas of the Directorate-General (DG) Education and Cul-
ture, the others include education and training, youth, sport, languages and 
media. The ‘Cultural Programme (2007–13)’ is one of seven programmes, 
some of which are relatively small (like the EU Culture Prizes, or the Euro-
pean Capital of Culture, which despite being a flagship programme has little 
funding attached). 
7 European Commission, Culture in Motion: The Culture Programme (2007-
2013) (Luxembourg: Communications Office of the European Union, 
2010); see also European Commission, Crossing Borders — Connecting Cul-
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crete range of projects and events (it did not fund individuals or 
places) only seemed to highlight the politically insular world of 
the European cultural elites, as if European cultural space is a 
parallel universe to national cultural sectors, and more so to the 
cultural life of rural and local communities. 
Since 2000 and the largely over-optimistic ‘Lisbon Agen-
da’—aiming to make the EU ‘the most dynamic and competi-
tive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010’ (a policy 
framework that exhibits the direct influence of Manuel Castells 
as well as Richard Florida)—cultural funding has been distrib-
uted outside the confines of the cultural sector, in industry and 
innovation schemes.8 These schemes, arguably like the UK’s 
‘culture-led regeneration’ phenomena, utilized culture as an ‘in-
strument’ within a broader set of non-cultural objectives. The 
new ‘European Agenda for Culture’ (2007), however, shifted the 
gear of cultural policy.9 While the initial ‘Communication on a 
European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World’ (2007) 
re-stated a commitment to national subsidiarity, it nonetheless 
asserted the historically international character of ‘European 
culture’ as a profound unity, and that economic growth now de-
pends on digital connectivity, globalized markets and the distri-
bution of cultural goods, which all now exceed national policy 
frameworks. There is a strong sense in which new urban and 
cultural policy is being bolstered in the face of intra-European 
tures: The eu Culture Programme (2007–2013) (Brussels: Publications Of-
fice of the European Union, 2011). For cited projects, see ‘Other Projects,’ 
lugd [website], http://www.ljud.si/slo/?page_id= 10&lang=en, and http://
newnostradamusofthenorth.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/celebrating-variety-of-
eu-taxpayer.html (original website now expired)
8 The ‘Lisbon Agenda’ action and development plan (2000), for the EU econ-
omy between 2000 and 2010. See Arno Tausch, Titanic 2010: The European 
Union and Its Failed Lisbon Strategy (Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 
2010).
9 European Commission, European Agenda for Culture in a Globalizing World 
(Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 2007), 2-3. See also 
the accompanying document on policy implementation: European Com-
mission, Working Document: The European Agenda for Culture — Progress 
towards Shared Goals (Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 
2007).
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competition and against member states’ particularist planning 
trajectories. 
The new cultural program is ‘Creative Europe’ (2014–2020). 
The budget was agreed upon in 2011, adjusted downwards due to 
recessionary pressures, but still now stands as an almost 10% in-
crease at a substantial €1.46 billion.10 It is structurally different to 
its predecessor in two crucial ways: it merges funding for culture 
and media (the previous Culture and MEDIA and MEDIA Mundus 
programs); and positions the commercial creative industries as 
co-extensive with ‘culture’, further opening cultural projects to 
industrial innovation and scientific funding collaborations. The 
first of these is significant in view of the established debate and 
frustrated pan-European attempts to develop a European public 
sphere.11 The second is significant in that culture has explicitly 
been positioned within economic development, and this seems 
to have come at the cost of the traditional aim of EU cultural 
policy—European citizenship. The new policy emphasis for cul-
ture as economic stimulus sees culture as the mobilization of 
a young, flexible, mobile and largely a-political workforce for 
either new enterprise or corporate expansion through innova-
tion. The new aims of cultural policy feature a repetitive use of 
the lexicon of economic growth — globalization, employment 
and markets. 
On the face of it, the new central policy program for culture 
may seem like an attempt to dissolve the hegemony of the tradi-
tional institutions of culture in favor of a new EU-wide dynamic 
culture industry, driven by ‘creative’ industries’ models of devel-
opment (itself driven by American models of business entrepre-
neurship). The culture program offers Bank Loan Guarantees 
10 European Commission, Creative Europe: The European Union Programme 
for the Cultural and Creative Sectors (2014–2020) (Brussels: Publications Of-
fice of the European Union, 2011), 786/2 
11 Of the many EU-sponsored studies of the so-called ‘European public sphere’, 
see: H.G. Sicakkan, Diversity and the European Public Sphere towards a Citi-
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for SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) managed by the 
European Investment Fund (EIF), and so for the first time the 
cultural and the banking sectors become interconnected. And 
yet, the 2010 European Commission green paper Unlocking 
the Potential of Cultural and Creative Industries (2010) did not 
appeal to the EU’s Enterprise and Industry policy field, but to 
cultural policy itself.12 Culture’s ‘autonomy’ is actually prized in 
the face of the apparent instrumentalist orientation of culture to 
economy. Creative Europe, it seems, indeed exhibits all the ele-
ments of New Economic Growth Theory, with its talk of cross-
sector partnerships and service-based administration methods, 
clusters and incubators, and a capitalization on so-called ‘cross-
over effects’. Yet again, it is assertive in valuing culture on its 
own terms and of artistic or aesthetic experience as a significant 
realm of meaning as much as social benefit. EU policies can-
not simply be understood as a series of statements or directives 
issued from discrete documents. Policy in the EU is a political 
imaginary, where a vision of a distinctive European society is 
required to safeguard the authority and legitimacy of the ‘man-
agers’ of this society (the EU as democratic polity). 
The inextricable interconnection of the cultural and the ur-
ban at the level of policy was made apparent by Richard Florida’s 
2004 study of European countries, Europe in the Creative Age.13 
Ironically, cities themselves did not feature large in his study, 
but Florida since remained a central figure in the development 
of the entrepreneurial city discourse across Europe. While os-
tensibly based on ‘data’, the 2004 study was tacitly animated by 
a demand that European policy makers reconcile themselves to 
a new ‘creative age’. This ‘age’ sustained itself through economic 
growth, and growth was maintained through individual profes-
sional success, and a success that emerged through specialist ed-
ucation, skills and competitiveness, resulting in new enterprises 
12 European Commission, Unlocking the Potential of Cultural and Creative In-
dustries (Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010).
13 Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli, Europe in the Creative Age (London: 
Demos, 2004).
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and cities bustling with enterprise-affected activity (more pro-
duction, but also intensified consumption). The many official 
EU events for the so-designated European Year of Creativity and 
Innovation in 2009 articulated this logic very effectively, but in 
two ways. The consequent and widely circulated European Am-
bassadors for Creativity and Innovation Manifesto (with Florida 
as an ‘ambassador’) was cosmopolitan and in a general way lo-
cated the conditions for such growth in the material-institution-
al environments of particular urban economies (which indeed 
require a cognitive infrastructure of actual cultural creativity). 
Other areas, like the ‘cluster’ discourse, emerged across Europe 
and presented a more narrow investment in business enterprise 
and innovation models (see the European Cluster Alliance, Eu-
ropean Cluster Observatory, and others). Related streams of the 
‘Europe 2020’ framework—like the ‘Innovation Union’—along 
with the new EU Small Business Act for Europe (2008), and EU 
Strategy on Intellectual Property, could have served either, and 
both strands could have complimented each other on the level of 
practice. In policy terms, the narrow version of Florida’s creative 
age thesis has become dominant in many European countries 
and for the most part simply promotes the economic agenda of 
the old entrepreneurial city.14 
And yet, the EU requires more than just operational effec-
tiveness on the economic register; it requires the perpetual le-
gitimacy of its increasingly complex governance, particularly in 
current times of crisis. Reading across the major policy decla-
rations and directives on the urban policy and cultural policy 
of the last two decades, one encounters the rhetoric of entre-
preneurial economic growth for sure, yet also something else. 
On the one hand urban policy is the locus of some of the most 
compelling problems in technology and engineering (security, 
renewable energy, transportation, and so on), and on the other 
it remains animated by, and continues to respond to, the social 
dilemmas that has faced European identity since its original 
14 European Commission, State of the Innovation Union 2012: Accelerating 
Change (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2013). 
48
part 1: why should we do it?
historic emergence (dilemmas of integration and a common 
culture, social welfare and equality). The same can be said for 
cultural policy.
Urban policy in the EU is a hybrid field with no actual basis in 
any treaty. There are relevant committees or representatives on 
urban matters in almost all of the EU’s institutions, and some of 
its investment projects (such as the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund: the ERDF). While managed in the broad context 
of Cohesion Policy, and as a specific investment arm of Regional 
Policy, the ERDF has played an increasingly significant policy 
role for culture — providing new spaces, places and facilities as 
part of broader urban development projects.15 One of the most 
important policy developments, however, is actually not a policy 
at all. The ‘European Acquis Urbain’ (sometimes just referred to 
as the EU Urban Agenda) is is like the term ‘Integrated Sustain-
able Urban Development’ and acts as a meta-theory of EU urban 
policy implementation. While in practical terms, it articulates 
an understanding of urban policy that presents itself in terms of 
a strategic pragmatism accumulated through decades of prac-
tice. Philosophically, the Acquis Urbain is a significant counter-
weight to the continued enthusiasm for the ‘Lisbon Agenda’ for 
a knowledge economy (2000) — which was not backed by much 
statutory power in any case, but which has maintained the en-
trepreneurial lexicon of terms for many an urban policy maker 
interested in culture and creative industries.16 
While the Cohesion Policy 2014–20 supports an ‘integrated 
sustainable urban development’ approach to all policy making 
15 The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Cohesion Fund and 
the European Social Fund are the three main financial instruments of EU 
Cohesion Policy (run by DG Regio). The Cohesion Policy for 2014–2020 
contains new regulations to set out common objectives for all structural 
intervention (under the new mantra of ‘smart, sustainable, and inclusive’).
16 Successive informal ministerial meetings on urban development (in Lille 
in 2000, Rotterdam in 2004, Bristol in 2005, Leipzig in 2007, Marseille in 
2008 and Toledo in 2010) shaped the common Acquis Urbain: the found-
ing document is the 2003 Declaration of Strasbourg, influenced in no short 
measure by the Council of Europe’s Urban Charter II in preparation at the 
time (ratified in 2008).
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in principle, in reality it is mandatory only in small and spe-
cific areas (parts of ERDF spending). There remains an appar-
ent problem: policies on urban life are a vast field for which a 
vision of a re-industrialized city is not a specific model of city 
planning.17 Nonetheless, the Acquis Urbain is as much a rejec-
tion of the economic instrumentalism of the UK model of ‘urban 
regeneration’ as it is the narrow Florida-style entrepreneurial 
economy (and its recent reincarnation in the ‘Smart City’). For 
while economy and business remain emphatic in EU urban pol-
icy, they are not internal to development itself, and not a con-
dition of sustainability as such. This can be seen in part in the 
adopted EU Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) of 2006, 
the 2007 ‘Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities’ and 
up to the brochure-style publications like Promoting Sustainable 
Urban Development in Europe (2009), and particularly the in-
spirational Cities of Tomorrow: Challenges, Visions, Ways For-
ward (2011).18 The elements of New Economic Growth Theory 
are present, but taken as ‘given’, albeit meaningless without a 
greater strategic European vision for social change. And this vi-
sion is articulated in a way that is ideologically incontestable, as 
it draws on the originary European Union political philosophy 
of equitable pan-national social welfare, where development is 
most fundamentally a form of socio-cultural participation, and 
sustainability is a non-negotiable ethic of everyday life. 
Of course, one could easily retort that this above vision is 
little more than the old traditional European statism, reliant on 
national monocultural allegiances, a heavy industrial base and 
high taxation, which were all the reasons for Europe’s economic 
decline. However, this is not the case; what I am identifying here 
is not a battle between two ideologies or state systems, but the 
17 See European Commission, Inter-Service Group on Urban Development: The 
Urban Dimension in European Union Policies 2010, Introduction and Part 1: 
European Commission (Brussels: Publications Office of the European Un-
ion, 2010).
18 European Commission, Promoting Sustainable Urban Development in Eu-
rope: Achievements and Opportunities (Brussels: Publications Office of the 
European Union, 2009); European Commission, Cities of Tomorrow.
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fact of a strategic contention between two complex discourses, 
both of which retain a profound dimension of necessity. The 
entrepreneurial neoliberal city and the historic (if evolving) 
‘European’ city are not exclusive. It is their perplexing mutual 
interconnection that has, at least in part, motivated the huge 
and increasing need for research, addressing an acute deficit in 
theoretical understanding. 
It is the Acquis Urbain that articulates this most vividly, 
with its call for knowledge. Required is the knowledge gen-
erated from actual practice — urban development itself is a 
knowledge-generating activity. Embedded knowledge gather-
ing (what it calls an ‘urban methodology’) can be generated out 
of actual place-based engagements, where these take place on 
the basis of the socio-cultural or ‘European’ orientation of the 
Acquis Urbain. This has been done to some degree in past ur-
ban development with the Urban Pilot Projects (1989–99) and 
the URBAN and URBAN II Community Initiatives (1994–2006) 
and the URBACT program (2002–13: the acronyms of EU such 
projects, which having their source in benign terms like ‘urban 
actions’, are now established and strategically managed cultural 
brands). The URBACT strategic funding instrument has been 
exemplary in its demonstration of the need to understand the 
complexity of urban culture as a prerequisite to infrastructural 
design and construction, and other forms of development. The 
seminal statement on integration, Towards an Urban Agenda in 
the European Union (1997), proclaimed that urban policy was to 
‘restore the role of Europe’s cities as places of social and cultural 
integration, as sources of economic prosperity and sustainable 
development, and as the bases of democracy.’19 
The term ‘integrated’, in Integrated Sustainable Urban De-
velopment, tacitly confronts the disciplinary basis of national 
urban policy practices in parochial town- or city-planning tra-
ditions, the hegemonic discourse of ‘planning’ over urban devel-
opment, and with it the domination of traditional civil engineer-
19 European Commission, Towards an Urban Agenda in the European Union 
(Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, 1997), 3.
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ing or industrial engineering ways of thinking over planning). 
If development emerges from knowledge construction, and not 
simply a hoped for ‘effect’ of market forces, then ‘sustainability’ 
is a means of activating an evolving historicity. Rescued from 
the political discourse of energy consumption and taxation so 
favored by national governments, ‘sustainability’ is becoming a 
marker for a vast realm of academic (and so, policy) ignorance 
on the relation between the urban and the natural environment. 
It is the visionary document Cities of Tomorrow (2011) that 
fleshes some of this out. The document approvingly reproduces 
a piece of Berlin graffiti, demanding we ‘stop gentrification’, yet 
the need for industry and business are no less rigorously un-
derstood. Both are positioned in this policy discourse within 
‘advanced social progress’, as ‘platforms for democracy, cultural 
dialogue and diversity’ and as participating in the creation of 
‘places of green, ecological or environmental regeneration’.20 
The term ‘smart’ is used frequently (to define specialized re-
search and technology-based innovations), but only in rela-
tion to its social conditions of ‘inclusive’ opportunity and eq-
uity. The European city of tomorrow will exhibit ‘limited urban 
sprawl through a strong control of land supply and speculative 
development’.21 It is driven by new political alliances of engaged 
independent representation, with legitimate roles for city-based 
civil society, NGOs and new urban actors. In short, in the Euro-
pean city of tomorrow, the economic — not the urban or cultur-
al — is burdened with the task of defining itself and delivering 
on the social and political demands of a new EU city polity. 
My purpose in this chapter was to indicate the changing 
complexion and interrelation of cultural policy and urban pol-
icy. The need for re-industrialization has demanded that each 
policy framework adopt the lexicon of, and orientation towards, 
economic development. This has generated a dilemma for these 
European Union policy fields, and this dilemma is manifest in 
a significant structural tension. While to define this structural 
20 European Commission, Cities of Tomorrow, 10.
21 Ibid., 12.
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tension in terms of a contradiction would be to collapse our 
understanding of a complex process into a reductive choice be-
tween opposites. Rather, the tension is the visible struggle of the 
EU policy imaginary that is undergoing a necessary intellectual 
as well as political negotiation. This negotiation is between the 
raison d’être of the historical European democratic polity and 
the requirements of prosperity in a market-driven global econ-
omy. It is a quest for an integrated sustainable development and 
it is hanging in the balance.   
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Chapter 4
‘Shrimps not Whales’ 
Building a City of Small Parts as 
an Alternative Vision for  
Post-Industrial Society
Alison Hulme
I was expecting the necessity of a protracted explanation on my 
part as to where exactly I wanted to go, but the taxi driver im-
mediately knew, despite the fact that 798 Art District is way up 
in the northeast of Beijing, adjacent to a nondescript business 
centre in what was a German military camp enclosure. It is no 
longer enclosed. It no longer needs to be. The government has 
long ago seen the sense in accessibility and careful encourage-
ment where art is concerned, as strategies to avoid secrecy and 
dissent by potentially counter-revolutionary artists and intellec-
tuals. 
Passing under the industrial, red iron gatepost into the plain, 
wide street, with its red-brick ex-military buildings on either 
side, an old, rusting, water-pipe juts out into the pavement, 
spluttering and spurting through its seams. It is tempting to 
think these industrial remnants have no function whatsoever 
and have simply been left to provide the effect of things being 
make-shift. The huge iron doors of the gallery spaces, rusting 
and squeaking on their hinges, are part of the same visual rheto-
ric, as is the content-less graffiti — all so carefully disheveled. 
There is nothing make-shift about 798 any longer, and the price 
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of the food in the various café spaces, complete with their dis-
tressed furniture, is proof that shabby-chic bo-bo1 style sells.
Later, a local Beijinger tells me that 798 is one of the most 
profitable local neighborhoods of Beijing — not far behind the 
central touristic areas containing Tiananmen Square and the 
Summer Palace, or the corporate business areas. This is not al-
together surprising; ‘bringing in the artists’ has long been a way 
to regenerate run-down urban areas in Western cities and neat-
ly fits the rhetoric surrounding ‘the creative city’ promulgated 
by the likes of Richard Florida.2 It is also almost immediately 
hijackable by neoliberal agendas (if not created with them in 
mind from the outset), whose concern is property prices and 
ABC1 consumers.3 Indeed, the ‘creative city’ has seemingly be-
come the only answer to post-industrial urban stagnancy — re-
industrialization is off the agenda. 
In many ways, utilizing the art world or ‘creatives’ to regen-
erate specific areas of a city can be seen as part of what Bren-
ner and Theodore call the ‘embedded-ness of neo-liberalism’, by 
which they mean the way in which neoliberalism is produced 
and defined by inherited frameworks, as opposed to simply us-
ing (allegedly) immutable market forces wherever they decide 
1 ‘Bourgeois Bohemian’.
2 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming 
Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (New York: Perseus Book 
Group, 2002); R. Florida, Cities and the Creative Class (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2005). Florida’s thesis states that there is a creative class who are a 
key driving force for economic development of post-industrial cities in the 
US. He breaks the class into a ‘super-creative’ core consisting of science, en-
gineering, education, computer programming, research, arts, design and 
media workers, and a group of ‘creative professionals’ who are the classic 
knowledge-based workers, including those in healthcare, business and fi-
nance, the legal sector and education.
3 This relates to the first three categories of the accepted social grade defini-
tions used by the market and social research industry in the UK. They aim 
to measure and classify people by income and earnings levels. The full scale 
of definitions runs from A to E, A being higher managerial, administrative 
or professional workers, and E being casual or lowest-grade workers.
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to unleash them.4 They draw upon the work of Peck and Tickell, 
who have emphasized the way in which neoliberalization is a 
process — an on-going movement of destruction and creation at 
the local, national and global level.5 The encouragement of art 
districts to gentrify run-down areas is precisely the utilization 
of neoliberal logic in order to re-appropriate an often alternative 
space into something that fits its own agenda whilst maintaining 
the outward appearance of being ‘different’ and ‘independent’. It 
is, perhaps without realizing it itself, ‘path-dependent’ in other 
words, and that path in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries has seen creative industries usurp traditional manu-
facturing as part of an increasingly embedded lineage of neo-
liberalism. The question then becomes, how to break the path?
***
Far from Beijing 798, lies the ‘small commodities’ city of Yiwu, 
in Zhejiang province. Via its prolific manufacturing of low-end 
goods (batteries, plastic-wear, decorative trinkets), it has gone 
from being a small village to a hugely successful driver of re-
gional growth. The ‘Yiwu model’ has even been copied and ex-
ported to other countries — Dubai, The Netherlands and Swe-
den, for example. Its raison d’être can most evidently be seen 
in its lay-out, which centers around the immense wholesale 
markets, housed in giant warehouses and zoned according to 
commodity. The Yiwu model was inspired by ‘Zhejiang Vil-
lage’ (Zhejiangcun), a migrant clothing manufacturing area in 
the Fengtai district of Beijing. Despite (or perhaps because of) 
its success, 1995 saw the complete razing of Zhejiangcun, caus-
ing a mass exodus of around 40,000 migrants. In its place the 
4 Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, ‘Cities and the Geographies of “Actually 
Existing Neoliberalism”’, in Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in 
North America and Western Europe, eds. Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, 
2–32 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002).
5 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalising Space”, Antipode 34, no.3 
(2002): 380–404, at 380. 
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authorities built an enormous modern plaza — deemed to be a 
more ‘suitable’ representation of the new China.
Zhejiangcun was characterized by four key features attrib-
uted to its migrants’ former practices in their native city of 
Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, and these characteristics have in-
formed and remained constant in Yiwu. They were: (1) that it 
consisted of numerous small-scale private enterprises, (2) that 
it specialized in wholesale petty commodity markets, (3) that it 
was built on tens of thousands of mobile traders who facilitated 
the flow of materials and (4) that it was made possible by vari-
ous forms of non-governmental financial arrangements.6 These 
characteristics had become known as the ‘Wenzhou model’, a 
phrase which was officially announced as a new economic para-
digm for China in 1986. Despite this, versions of the model that 
did not have the right ‘look’ were clearly unacceptable.
The fact that Wenzhou had created the model was not sim-
ply coincidence, but also a result of its historical ties with the 
Yongjia school of thought — a movement from Yongjia County 
in the Wenzhou region, whose roots lie in the Southern Song 
Dynasty. The school contested the view of mainstream Confu-
cianism, arguing that traders (as well as scholars and farmers) 
were the backbone of the country. So, unlike in other provinces 
where under Confucianism land was valorized and peoples’ at-
tachment to it revered, in Wenzhou commercialism had been 
celebrated historically. This all changed of course under Mao, 
who was specifically against small-scale enterprises, as he felt 
that industry at the level of the family unit was particularly 
open to ‘spontaneous capitalistic urges’. Deng Xiao Ping, how-
ever, under the rhetoric of re-appropriating neo-Confucianism 
to encourage small business start-ups, proclaimed the Wenzhou 
model as that which China should adopt. So, after a long and 
embattled history, the Wenzhou model gained official accept-
ance — as long, that is, as it cleaned up its act and started to con-
6 Li Zhang, Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social 




form to the ‘look’ deemed appropriate to a modern ‘civilized’ 
China.
***
My reason for drawing upon these two seemingly unrelated 
examples is to underline the way in which different Chinese 
authorities are drawing upon very different ‘answers’ — one 
borrowed from the West, the other entirely home-grown. The 
home-grown Wenzhou model can be seen, in some ways, as a 
modus operandi similar to (and this is certainly not to suggest 
that it is based on) Britain’s pre- or proto-industrial past. The 
798 Art District model is adapted directly from our own cur-
rent practices of urban regeneration. What I am arguing here 
is that it may be the model from the past, but in its current 
Chinese form it has the most to offer us when we think about 
how we can improve our own cities in a manner more able to 
avoid the usual neoliberal traps. ‘Returning’ to a form of proto-
industrialization, but one adapted to our current socio-political 
needs, has the added benefit of breaking the current processes of 
neoliberalization in place. It perhaps provides an answer to my 
earlier question — it is a path-breaker.
The feature of the Wenzhou model that is key here is its 
small-scale nature — the way in which it is based on numerous 
small-scale enterprises, rather than the ‘big capitalism’ we now 
have in the West. This is a phenomenon that Chinese entrepre-
neur Jack Ma7 once described as being concerned with ‘shrimps 
not whales’. It can usefully be compared to what we in the West 
7 Jack Ma is a famous business entrepreneur in China. He owns the highly 
successful business-to-business website, Taobao, the Chinese equivalent to 
eBay, and is the Alan Sugar figure on China’s version of the television show 
The Apprentice. In a 2000 interview for Time Asia magazine he explained 
the thinking behind Taobao, saying, ‘American B2B sites are whales. But 
85% of the fish in the sea are shrimp-sized. I don’t know anyone who makes 
money from whales, but I’ve seen many making money from shrimp’. See 
Time staff, ‘Jack Ma’, Time (February 28, 2000), http://content.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599,2054856,00.html.
58
part 2: political considerations and implications
call the ‘cottage industry’. Most importantly, the cottage indus-
try is specifically related to workers operating according to their 
own preferences, as independent entities who own their means 
of production. The era of the cottage industry, sometimes re-
ferred to as ‘proto-industrialization’, soon emerged into an era 
of industrialization in Britain, whereas in China it has had a far 
more continuous trajectory, finding form in all eras apart from 
the Maoist one. In addition, ‘small business’ was never the of-
ficial paradigm in Britain, nor was it given the legitimation of a 
cultural tradition such as neo-Confucianism was. Therefore, the 
means of organizing witnessed in the proto-industrial phase, i.e. 
‘cottage industries’, have a greater continuity in China and have 
found their way into the economic structures of the twenty-first 
century. China is in fact a country where a capitalism of many 
small parts exists alongside big capitalism (both domestic and 
international). 
With this in mind, it may indeed be worth considering re-
industrialization as an answer to the crisis we face in Western 
cities, but not re-industrialization as we tend to imagine it. This 
re-industrialization would need to be one which, from its incep-
tion and at its philosophical core, was of shrimps not whales. In 
order to be a progressive socio-political and economical project 
that could operate differently, or outside of, the neoliberal city 
as we know it, it would need to be committed to its parts re-
maining small-scale and not requiring high profit margins. Of 
course, it would also need to limit its reliance upon wider global 
economic machinations, which would probably mean imple-
menting a form of mutual finance amongst those involved. In 
addition, it would need to go beyond ‘boutique manufacturing’, 
using the same logic of production for everyday and creative 
(perhaps non-tangible) products. Re-claiming/claiming urban 
space would be a huge part of this initiative if the existing struc-
tural order were to be overcome. Mutual systems of space would 
be required which would enable life/work situations, both in 
run-down areas but also eventually in the centers of cities usu-
ally inaccessible as living spaces to all but the super-rich.
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It is the re-ordering of space and structures which makes a 
Western urban version of the Wenzhou model attractive. It is, 
indeed, a new model, not simply a creative industry being en-
couraged within the parameters of existing neoliberal capital-
ism. It can be seen as a re-invention of a form of production 
from our own past, but one that in learning from the Wenzhou 
model is able to operate in a way that does not mean we must re-
gress to the kinds of jobs and working situations associated with 
earlier forms of manufacturing economy. Crucially, though, it 
must be able to exist contemporaneously with big capitalism. 
This will require some impressive tactics and a stoic resistance 
on the part of those adopting the model if they are to prove 
that an alternative model of ‘shrimps not whales’ can affectively 








In the first chapter of The Urban Revolution, Henri Lefebvre 
shows the evolution of the city — from the political city, through 
the mercantile and industrial city, to its final form, the true ‘ur-
ban city’. For Lefebvre, industry is something that wasn’t born 
in the city. 
He asks: ‘Was industry associated with the city?’ And an-
swers: ‘One would assume it to be associated with the non-city, 
the absence or rupture of urban reality.’1 It was the industry that 
came to the city, lured by the scent of money, and the sweat and 
blood of its inhabitants. However, Lefevbre’s attitude towards 
the industrial city is dialectical. The industrial city destroyed the 
remnants of the mercantile city and the political city, but it was 
a ‘creative destruction’, which, in fact, elevated the city to a high-
er level of development, setting the stage for Lefebvre’s ‘critical 
zone’, the predicted moment in history in which urbanity be-
comes a meta-narrative aligning all other stories, and therefore 
also includes the politics and economics of the city.
1 Henri Lefebvre, The Urban Revolution (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 2013), 13.
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Chris Evans2 describes life in Merthryr Tydfil in the nine-
teenth century at the beginning of the industrial revolution, 
where the first workers’ strike broke out. Merthryr Tydfil was 
almost completely devoid of anything that is usually associat-
ed with the city — its only public building was a church, street 
lighting was installed only in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and the availability of goods and services was very poor 
(one store to 400 inhabitants, while the norm for British cities 
was about one to 100 and better). This un-urban city, which at 
that time was the centre of world industrial production, had no 
schools and no recreational areas or buildings. 
Does the Merthryr Tydfil example (and other cities of the 
Industrial Revolution) provide sufficient evidence to support 
Henri Lefevbre’s perspective of the non-urban character of in-
dustry? Let’s go back to ‘The Urban Revolution’, where he de-
scribes the mechanism of the transition from the political city 
to the mercantile city. Trade and traders were kept out of cities 
politics; the city was autonomous, and their success was associ-
ated with being seen as ‘free radicals’ with effective mobility. 
The position of trade and traders in the city brings to mind 
the distinction made by Carl Schmitt between ‘the orders of the 
land’ and of ‘the sea’.3 Schmitt associates ‘the order of the sea’ 
with liberal-democratic capitalism, mainly in the American edi-
tion, which involves both the freedom and the a-territoriality of 
trade, but even more so with the contemporary free movement 
of speculative capital.
Industry, which colonized and transformed the city, can be 
seen then as a free radical; however its existence was strongly 
associated with a particular spatial location. In a similar way, he 
mercantile city was founded when the trade was ‘grounded’ and 
traders became the townspeople/bourgeoisie). Industry and the 
2 C. Evans, ‘Merthryr Tyndif in the Eighteenth Century: Urban by Default’, in 
Industry and Urbanization in Eighteenth-century England, eds. P. Clark and 
P. Corfield, 11–18 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994).
3 S. Legg (ed.), Spatiality, Sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: Geography of the No-
mos (London: Routledge, 2011).
63
‘der arbeiter’
industrial city are (were) then a spatial entity, belonging to the 
land order.
This implies that the industrial city was conservative, but 
its conservatism is understood here as a kind of slow develop-
ment, providing predictability and a strengthening of the social 
structures, such as family or local community. This is the con-
servatism of Fordism and the welfare state (and thus the con-
servatism of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, but 
not the radical — especially contemporary — neoliberal right). 
This is the same conservatism which was first dismantled by 
the New Left movements growing from the heritage of the May 
’68 movement (Henri Lefevbre’s The Urban Revolution is obvi-
ously the result of May ’68 and an important part of its legacy), 
and then by the conservative revolution of the 1980s and the 
excesses of neoliberalism. But let’s go back to the first half of the 
twentieth century, to the time when the industrial city seemed 
to be the triumphant revolutionary change. Let’s follow a guide 
to this imaginary and never-realized world: Ernst Jünger’s Der 
Arbeiter.4
Der Arbeiter is an extraordinary book — one aspect of its 
uniqueness, for example, is the fact that it was never translated 
in full into English. Reading Der Arbeiter one may feel slight-
ly confused — on the one hand, this book is considered to be 
a prophetic vision of modern society; on the other hand, it is 
difficult to forget that it was published a year before the Nazis 
came to power and that Jünger himself was associated with the 
intellectual circles of the German ‘conservative revolution’ of the 
Weimar Republic.
Despite the fact that it is difficult to directly associate the au-
thor with the Nazi regime, it is also not easy to consider him as a 
declared anti-fascist. It is important, though, to considerJünger’s 
relationship with fringes of fascist ideas in the context of the 
4 Ernst Jünger, Der Arbeiter: Herrschaft und Gestalt (Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1941 [1932]). I have been using Polish edition: E. Jünger, Ro-
botnik: Panowanie i forma bytu (Warsaw: PWN, 2010). All quotations refer 
to this edition.
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industrial city, because the specificity of the economic structure 
of the Third Reich highlights crucial aspects of the industrial-
city phenomenon. It shows that in fact it doesn’t matter in what 
system the industrial city existed, whether it was the capitalist 
America or the communist Soviet Union. What distinguishes 
the industrial city is a kind of ‘transcendent organicity’.
In his classic work, ‘The structure of Nazi economy’, Maxime 
Y. Sweezy 5 shows a fully capitalist economic structure, which 
could even be described as neoliberal. The Nazi economy was 
focused on the strengthening of the private capital (the ‘Nazi 
privatization’ as a prototype for contemporary neoliberal poli-
cies is described by Germa Bel),6 and on the development of 
large-scale industry and agriculture at the expense of small fam-
ily farms and businesses.
In the context of Der Arbeiter, Gehrard Schultz’s opinion, ex-
pressed in the book Die nationalsozialistiche Machtergreifung is 
crucial: ‘Instead of a number of economic objectives, the state 
has adopted one — a total mobilization of the entire nation for 
the total war’.7 ‘Total mobilization’ is one of the key concepts 
thatJünger introduced to contemporary socio-political thought.8 
For the purpose of this text, the key observation concerns the 
location of the order-making and sense-giving structure to the 
industrial city which is external to the industrial city itself. I ar-
gue that the industrial city does not exist through industry only, 
but by giving it meaning beyond production.
5 Marine Sweezy, The Structure of the Nazi Economy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1941).
6 Germà Bel, ‘Against the Mainstream: Nazi Privatization in 1930s Germany’, 
The Economic History Review 63, no. 1 (2010): 34–55.
7 Quoted in S. Ratner, ‘An Inquiry into the Nazi War Economy, Review of 
Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in The Third Reich, by Bernice A. 
Carroll,’ Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 4 (1970): 466–72.
8 Ernst Jünger, ‘Total Mobilisation’, in Krieg und Krieger (Berlin: Junker und 
Dunnhaupt, 1930). Polish translation in: Wojciech Kunicki, Rewolucja kon-
serwatywna w Niemczech 1918–1933 (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 




It is this ‘transcendent’ sense that constitutes the industrial 
city, rather than a mere presence of the industry in the city. This 
transcendent order was present in the form of the totalitar-
ian structures of the Third Reich, the communism of war, the 
American New Deal and finally in the form of a welfare state as 
an attempt to build a truly inclusive and integrated society. The 
industrial city — similar to today’s neoliberal city — was a result 
of a particular political vision based on certain values and ideas. 
Jünger describes modern society as a work society, in which 
work is ‘a form of being’. There is nothing that is not work, and 
there is no one who does not work. Work eliminates all dif-
ferences and hierarchies: ‘All the decisive mobilization orders 
do not run from the top down, but emerge as a revolutionary 
goal, making it more effective’.9 Work eliminates democracy as a 
choice and replaces it with democracy as act — ‘Acceptance takes 
place through pure participation, and therefore through the 
participation in voting, regardless of which party wins’10 — and 
it challenges the privilege of individual freedom.
Interestingly, Jünger not only challenges the notion of the in-
dividual but also the mass (as a collection of individuals):
The movements of the masses have lost their irresistible 
charm wherever they encounter strong resistance — as in two 
or three old soldiers behind a working machine gun [who] 
were not concerned with a report that they are being charged 
by a whole battalion. Mass today is incapable of charging, it 
is incapable even of defence.11
The idea of the worker (Arbeiter) seems totalistic, but it is an 
inclusive totality (I would like to make a distinction between 
‘totalistic’ and ‘totalitarian’ and I would argue that Der Arbe-
iter does not praise totalitarianism): no one is excluded, because 
everyone is a part of the great totalistic machinery: ‘Man is the 
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source of natural wealth, and no state plan will ever be perfect 
unless it can draw from this source’12 (in this context, of course, 
the Third Reich, with its master race ideology and concentration 
camps, is not a realization of Ernst Jünger’s vision).
The world presented in Der Arbeiter is not the world of class 
or nation (although Jünger sees the Germans as the vanguard 
of the world), it is also not the world of profit and exploitation, 
asJünger writes, ‘Private initiative will be acceptable when it ob-
tains a status of a specialized type of work — in other words[,] 
when it is controlled within the broader process.’13 It is a world 
of ‘Plan’ and ‘Higher Purpose’. It is a world in which everything 
makes sense — control does not come ‘from above’, for there is 
no institutional Big Brother or any controlling authority — but 
it is through its very own logic of existence that this world gives 
itself meaning: ‘Every movement of his hand, even while clean-
ing the stables from manure, has its rank, if it does not feel as 
an abstract work, but fits within [a] greater and sensible order.’14
Historians such as Hugh Trevor-Roper and Bernice A. Car-
roll (the author of Design for Total War),15 conclude with sur-
prise the lack of total control in the Third Reich economy, re-
placed by a totalitarian socio-political formation. And it is this 
‘external’ control that appears to have the dominant role. So I 
agree with Lefevbre’s observation of ‘externality’ of the agent of 
change to the city (whether it was trade or industry), but I disa-
gree with the stipulated imminence of the ‘ultimate form of the 
city’ as something desirable. To some extent, the existing model 
of neoliberal urbanization is a nightmarish version of Lefevbre’s 
vision. It’s a nightmare because this vision is closed, and there-
fore dead.
Jünger’s book begins with a discussion of the bourgeois at-
tempt to suppress the Worker by shaping him in a bourgeois 




15 Berenice A. Carroll, Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third 
Reich (The Hague: Mouton De Gruyter, 1968).
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geoisie lost and the totality of work conquered all other logics. 
Our world is obviously not the world predicted byJünger — on 
the contrary, the Bourgeois defeated the Worker, debased and 
destroyed him. In this context, we can finally ask the question: 
Is the industrial city a dead idea too? Is re-industrialization just 
a fantasy of another time and another world?
The discussion about re-industrialization in Western Europe 
and the US began only a few years ago, when the 2008 crisis 
made obvious the bankruptcy of the model of urban develop-
ment based on property speculation and liquid capitalism. Re-
Industrialization can be defined in many ways and does not nec-
essarily apply only to cities. That is why I would rather talked 
about the industrial city 2.0 — the ‘comeback’ of the industry to 
the cities is not crucial in itself; what’s more important is the 
empowerment and embedding of the industry in the socio-eco-
nomic structure of the city.
Using New York as an example, Sarah Crean16 indicates the 
emerging networks between different actors involved in indus-
trial production — from representatives of the ‘creative class’, 
like designers and engineers, through producers and finally 
consumers. Also, at the institutional level new networks emerge 
linking manufacturers, suppliers, distributors and consumers.
This feature of industrial production — creation of relation-
ships — connects in an interesting way with today’s obsession 
with networking and the social network. Creating relationships 
and systems of mutual dependency is the most important fea-
ture of contemporary thinking about industry and production 
based on ‘industrial ecology’ and ‘circular economy’.
Production based on the idea of a ‘circular economy’ is not a 
simple process and, besides technological innovations, requires 
negotiation skills. In a circular economy, not all ideas can be 
applied directly without changes to production technology and 
the negotiation of legal obstacles. However, the effort seems to 
be profitable, and not only for financial reasons, but precisely 
16 Sarah Crean, ‘In the Shadow of Real Estate, Linking Designers and Manu-
facturers’, Progressive Planning 190 (Winter 2012): 24–26.
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because of forced innovations — technological, social and legal. 
But what is most important here is the anti-individualistic and 
inclusive perspective, changing not only the work relationship 
but, in fact, its power to reconstruct the whole society.
As I tried to show, the industrial city (as opposed to the city 
in which industry is merely present) is a coherent socio-eco-
nomic project, reinforcing (or even constituting) the city as a 
subject, understood as a coherent narrative binding residents, 
institutions, space, activities and everything material in the city. 
However, the industrial city cannot exist ‘by itself ’; it must be 
established and maintained by the outside socio-political and 
cultural frame, which is transcendent to the materiality of the 
city. I am not necessarily thinking here in terms of the exterior 
in the territorial sense (state or supra-state structure), but more 
about a vision that exceeds the city and gives it a non-immanent 
purpose.
The industrial city 2.0 is the opposite of the contemporary 
city, based on the extremely individualistic philosophy of com-
petition. So it is the city based on overcoming selfishness and 
on the construction of a new, inclusive community (inclusive, 
however, but not necessarily democratic in the sense that we are 
used to today). History has not ended, neoliberalism was only 
a temporary aberration, everything is still ahead of us — we just 
need to think and act to reach beyond here-and-now. Revolu-




Greening the Pit or Taking Over 
the Means of Production?
Malcolm Miles
In After London, published in 1885, naturalist Richard Jeffries 
describes the city abandoned to nature after an unexplained 
catastrophe. Within a year everywhere has become overgrown: 
grasses are overwhelmed by docks and thistles in a pseudo-Dar-
winian scenario of survival of the strongest. Brambles hide the 
roads, railway embankments are overgrown by trees. A lake cov-
ers much of central England, and London is submerged under a 
swamp forty miles long into which its buildings have collapsed:
There exhales from this oozy mass so fatal a vapour that no 
animal can endure it. The black water bears a greenish-brown 
floating scum, which for ever bubbles up from the putrid 
mud of the bottom. When the wind collects the miasma … 
it becomes visible as a low cloud which hangs over the place. 
[…] at such times when the vapour is thickest, the very wild-
fowl leave the reeds, and fly from the poison. […] It is dead.1
1 Richard Jeffries, After London (1885), cited in J. Carey (ed.), The Faber Book 
of Utopias, 276–78 (London: Faber, 1999), 278.
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Blue flames shoot periodically from the depths of the mire. Peo-
ple say devils live there. The bodies of the dead have dissolved 
into black mud but their skeletal hands still clutch coins. Jeffries 
was brought up in rural Wiltshire but moved to Surbiton to earn 
a living. He became ill, blamed it on putrid black water and a 
lack of proper drains, and wrote After London as his revenge on 




the city.2 But the swamp, and the skeletal hands clutching coins, 
might equally suggest an image of industrial capitalism, the ef-
fects of which are described by Friedrich Engels after visiting 
Manchester in 1844:
Everything which here arouses horror and indignation is of 
recent origin, belongs to the industrial epoch … [which] has 
built up every spot … to win a covering for the masses whom 
it has conjured hither from the agricultural districts and 
from Ireland; the industrial epoch alone enables the owners 
of these cattle-sheds to rent them for high prices to human 
beings, to plunder the poverty of the workers, to undermine 
the health of thousands, to order that they alone, the owners, 
may grow rich.3
The movement to the towns began with the agricultural revolu-
tion in the eighteenth century (which was also the beginning of 
organized labor). As machines replaced workers on farms, so 
families were driven from their homes and from the land, first 
to seek work at annual hiring fairs or, if unsuccessful, to wander 
the roads destitute and malnourished, and later to the towns for 
other forms of deprivation for low and often seasonal wages in 
the vile living conditions described by Engels. 
The scenario was well known among the educated middle 
class. Scenes of a lost rural life in the novels of Thomas Hardy, 
and Alfred Tennyson’s vision of a lost chivalric era, are both, in 
their different (realist and romanticized) ways, displacements. 
This oblique criticality appealed to the educated, reformist mid-
dle class but has become ingrained in English culture to the ex-
tent, today, that an idyllic countryside is constructed as a foil 
to a malodorous and corrupting city. Hence smoke-blackened 
terraces and smoking chimneys are the epitome of how indus-
2 Christopher Woodward, In Ruins (London: Vintage, 2002).
3 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1892), cited in James Donald (ed.), Imagining 
the Modern City (London: Athlone, 1999), 36.
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trial towns are represented for a mass public, from the novels 
of Charles Dickens to nineteenth-century prints and the mid-
twentieth-century paintings of L.S. Lowry. Since all that oc-
curred, industry itself has been encapsulated in the past as ma-
terial production has shifted to the global South to be replaced 
in the North by the immaterial production of culture, media, 
public relations and financial services. 
This move has left new swathes of built and social derelic-
tion. And just as a regression to an imagined rustic life was the 
displacing reaction of middle-class readers in the late nine-
teenth century, in the late twentieth century culture has again 
been central to the displacement of the concept of making 
(manufacturing) and to the histories of organized labor which 
occurred in locations such as London’s Docklands. Below the 
shiny towers of late capitalism in Docklands, the only visible re-
minder of a past of labor is a bronze likeness of three dockers; 
but this, far from celebrating the labor militancy for which the 
docks were known, depicts a foreman in a top hat standing over 
two workers in cloth caps grappling with a load — a social hier-
archy maintained. But this time, from the 1980s to the financial 
services crisis of 2008, culture did not magic a past image but 
became the future: cool Britannia as the erasure of work and 
its organization, designer-beer in place of solidarity, and — cru-
cially — a depoliticized culture in place of political contestation..
The standard response to urban deindustrialization, then, is 
to re-use redundant industrial sites for flagship cultural institu-
tions aimed at attracting tourism and investment (sometimes 
called the Bilbao effect). In place of soot and disease, the clean 
post-industrial capitalism of the cultural turn re-appropriates 
culture’s claim in classical thought to universal value, to replace 
urban blight — a term misleadingly likening a range of linked 
policy failures to a crop disease — with the new consumer de-
lights of Tate Modern, various Guggenheims, and so forth. 
Every city seems to seek a place on the globalized culture map 
by building or converting a new museum of contemporary art. 
Meanwhile, urban villages — another nostalgic term adopted 
now by developers for inner-city gated enclaves — house a cul-
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tural class whose lifestyle-consumption feeds malls and art gal-
lery shops in support of the wider project of gentrification. Art, 
subsumed in entertainment, is an aspirational commodity, and 
Tate a market leader. Esther Leslie writes,
Tate is a brand that niche-markets art experience. Its galleries 
are showrooms. However, this is still art and not just busi-
ness. The commodity must not show too glossy a face. The 
reclamation of an industrial space that provides the shell for 
Tate Modern lends the building a fashionably squatted aspect 
[…]. At Tate Modern a former industrial site becomes home 
to the new-style ‘accessibility rules’ culture industry.4 
Faced with the excesses of capitalism, George Monbiot advo-
cates a selective return to a pre-industrial economy: re-wilding, 
introducing wild species such as the lynx in forest areas of Brit-
ain, thereby reproducing the nineteenth-century search for a 
lost rural idyll (which never existed) in a new, post-industrial 
form. This is not to argue against such re-wilding, which Mon-
biot sees as applicable only in some places; more to point out 
that it is a response which distances the proposed solution to 
urban ills — an over-productive society with excesses of waste 
as well as wealth divides, and so forth — to the few more or less 
pre-industrial sites which remain. In fact, in any case, most of 
those forest and moorland sites are as carefully managed and 
protected, as reserves, as urban parks are cultivated for leisure. 
It seems, then, that the industrialized city has become an icon 
of all that is negative, to be replaced, or mediated by far-away 
images of, a new kind of wildness. But was industry bad? Indus-
try’s benefits were mismanaged and unevenly distributed; still, 
it produced work and many things which improved our lives. 
Factories polluted the atmosphere but were where a class seek-
ing to overcome the abuses of capitalism became organized. As 
the workers of an iron-rolling shop said in Russia in 1917:
4 Esther Leslie, ‘Tate Modern: A Year of Sweet Success’, Radical Philosophy 
109 (2001): 2–5, at 3.
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If Messrs Capitalists will not pay attention to our demands, 
then we … demand complete control of all branches of in-
dustry by the toiling people. Of you capitalists … we demand 
that you stop crying about devastation that you yourselves 
have created. Your cards are on the table. Your game is up.5
Something similar might be said now to bankers, commodity 
speculators and the political elite who have turned the nation-
state into an out-sourced provider of governmental services for 
trans-national capital. What is to be done? Among responses to 
deindustrialization, apart from cultural colonization, are:
•	 rehabilitation of ex-industrial sites for community purposes; 
•	 anti-capitalist protest and the evolution of second-hand or 
non-money economies; 
•	 grass-roots, localized, DIY re-industrialization.
5 Quoted in Stephen A. Smith, The Russian Revolution: A Very Short Intro-
duction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 29.
Fig. 2: Duisburg Nord Landscape Park, Germany.
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In the remainder of this chapter I look briefly at each of these 
(which are not exclusive options).
Rehabilitation
The Duisburg Nord Landscape Park rehabilitates redundant in-
dustrial structures for leisure purposes for the benefit of local 
communities: abseiling on the exterior and diving in the inte-
rior of towers in an old iron works, dog-walking, rambling, sim-
ply passing time (since the end of industry produces a time-rich 
class). Landscaping lends these structures the appearance of 
the picturesque, but there are also environmental benefits. The 
nearby Emscher Park, for instance, involved decontaminating 
the river Emscher and the surrounding land, with new plant-
ing and areas left to natural (succession) growth. At Essen, the 
Zolverein combined mine, coke plant and power station — once 
the most modern facility in Germany, designed by a Bauhaus 
architect and opened by Adolf Hitler — houses a design mu-
seum, a museum of regional history, changing art exhibitions, 
a café, and a restaurant in the old turbine hall. This is closer to 
a cultural project, not least because most of the attractions are 
indoors, but retains a strong regional emphasis. Again there are 
large areas of succession growth and the return of bird and in-
sect species. Zolverein does not seem to have caused gentrifica-
tion, perhaps because the site is on the city’s outskirts. But nor 
have these projects rehabilitated the Ruhr’s economy.6 
Taking a different approach, the German artist Herman 
Prigann worked in several brownfield sites in the Ruhr and 
ex-German Democratic Republic (East Germany in colloquial 
terms), again turning residual industrial sites into post-Roman-
tic ruins but emphasizing the role of succession growth. To take 
another but subtly different example, at an open-cast brown coal 
mine near Cotbus, Prigann employed unemployed workers to 
6 Karl Barndt, ‘Memory Traces of an Abandoned Set of Futures: Industrial 
Ruins and the Post-Industrial Landscapes of Germany’, in Ruins of Moder-
nity, eds. Julia Hell et al., 270–93 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
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build Die Gelbe Rampe (1993–94). On the edge of the vast exca-
vation, which is being allowed to flood, Prigann constructed a 
sloping earthwork topped by a set of concrete slabs as a monu-
ment to industry. And by this he meant a monument to cele-
brate industry and remember it after its passing, not to regret it. 
The slope is planted with broom which will, in time, spread to 
cover the ramp. Prigann wrote, 
Nature is neither a thing nor an accumulation of things. It is 
neither external nor internal, it does not surround us, it is not 
at our disposition, it cannot be destroyed nor can it be loved.7
He saw natural growth as a collaborating agent (an actor in 
Latour’s terms) and intended that it would overtake his work 
while, at the same time, his interventions would never be en-
tirely obliterated, some trace remaining in drainage patterns or 
visible in aerial photographs. Prigann was emphatic that indus-
try was not bad, and should not be dismissed; hence his use of 
discarded industrial material. Although his work is Romantic 
in a way (and he often cited German Romanticism in conversa-
tions), it refuses to be judgmental. I find this hopeful and impor-
tant. Perhaps a similar attitude could be applied more widely, for 
instance to international modernism as an intellectual salvage 
project rather than as a mistake which produced little beyond 
failed social housing and ring roads, and should be written off.
Protest
As the welfare state is systematically dismantled and radical arts 
groups lose their funding, creative energy turns to refusal in a 
growth of artists’ collectives and practices which subvert the art 
world from within. For instance, Liberate Tate, a London-based 
group linked to the arts, environment and human rights organi-
zation Platform, undertakes projects which could be described 
7 Hermann Prigann, ‘Prologue — Thoughts about Nature’, in Ecological Aes-
thetics: Art in Environmental Design, Theory and Practice, eds. Heike Stre-
low, Hermann Prigann, and Vera David (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2004), 74.
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as re-industrializing Tate. To remind Tate’s audiences of the 
link between oil — an industry characterized by human rights 
abuses and environmental degradation — and the arts through 
sponsorship, Liberate Tate organizes free events at Tate’s Lon-
don branches. In 2010 — the year of the Deepwater Horizon spill 
in the Gulf of Mexico — at a party celebrating 20 years of BP’s 
sponsorship, Toni and Bobbi, posing as guests, allowed an oil-
like substance (molasses) to spill from under their expensive, 
flower-patterned skirts and leather handbags. In April 2011, also 
at Tate Britain, in The Human Cost, a figure rolled on the floor 
of Tate Britain covered again in molasses (perhaps reminiscent 
of the direct materiality fused with a conceptual critique which 
follows from the work of Joseph Beuys). More recently, Liber-
ate Tate carried a wind turbine blade into the Turbine Hall at 
Tate Modern to request that it become part of Tate’s collection. 
The offer was refused despite support from many Tate members. 
Liberate Tate describes its work as ‘deliberately abject and some-
times foul … the shadow of an industry the reality of which arts 
organizations do not want to see on their doorstep.’8
diy re-industrialization
At Skinningrove, County Durham (a village written off in the 
County Plan in the 1960s), men have built pigeon lofts in what 
resembles an informal settlement on the hillside. They cannot 
now afford to keep pigeons — big money moved into the bet-
ting — but use the huts as extra living spaces and for black-
economy production such as fish smoking. Skinningrove needs 
no art — an art project there failed to engage the community in 
the 1990s — because it already has a distinct culture. This sug-
gests that local, tacit knowledge and skills can be used in a grass-
roots re-industrialization outside the regeneration industry and 
its ties to either regional bureaucracies or global capital. Such 
cases are always local and small-scale, hence easy to dismiss as 
8 Jo Clarke et al. (eds.), Not If But When: Culture Beyond Oil (London: Art 
Not Oil, Liberate Tate and Platform, 2011), 8.
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irrelevant in the big picture, but they are diverse and numerous 
as well. At some point, when disillusionment with and anger at 
top-down improvement schemes reach a peak, grass-roots re-
industrialization may produce a renewal of small, local and re-
sponsible industries meeting locally identified needs. This may 
fit in a wider scenario, too: asked about links between Occupy 
and workers’ campaigns, Noam Chomsky said — unexpectedly 
Fig. 3: Pigeon lofts, Skinningrove, County Durham, UK.
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perhaps — that he saw Occupy as an episode in a class war: a 
concentration of wealth had led to a concentration of political 
power and a vicious cycle of anger and frustration.9 While An-
dre Gorz argued in the 1980s that the working class had been 
co-opted to consumerism,10 Chomsky refers to worker-owned 
enterprises in de-industrialized zones as another kind of revolu-
tion, or taking over the residue of late capitalism by (literally) 
taking over the management and sites of production. This re-
minds me that French workers took over and occupied factories 
in May 1968, following a precedent from the anti-fascist cam-
paigns of the 1930s, not simply to demand better conditions but 
to demonstrate in practical ways that they could run the factory 
and organize their own welfare services. In effect, this was an 
ephemeral taking over of the means of producing society.
Another possibility, also growing, is self-build housing. At 
Ashley Vale, Bristol, a disused scaffolding yard was used as a 
self-build site, in an area already an enclave of alternative living 
with allotments and an urban farm. When the yard closed in 
2001 and a developer proposed housing on the site, the land was 
acquired instead by a local group. Mortgages were arranged for 
first-time buyers, and plots were sold either for complete self-
build or as shells for self-completion. An office block was con-
verted for communal and residential spaces. There are thirty-
one houses in various styles using a timber-frame and cladding 
system like that developed by Walter Segal in the 1970s, and 
the refurbished office block won the South West Green Energy 
Award for housing in 2000. A ‘Vote Green’ sign at the allotment 
entrance suggests that green living translates into political in-
tention here. Nearby in Stokes Croft, a supermarket was trashed 
in 2011 after local opposition to its opening. Nearby, a Free Shop 
denotes a non-money economy. This form of re-industrializa-
tion keeps resources in the local economy and creates a state 
9 Noam Chomsky, Occupy (London: Penguin, 2012).
10 André Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Post-Industrial So-
cialism (London: Pluto, 1982).
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within the state in which the values of mutual aid and solidarity 
are reclaimed amid neoliberal anomie. 
Conclusion
Geographer Erik Swyngedouw identifies an insurgent polis:
Rethinking […] the ‘Right to the City’ as the ‘Right to the 
production of urbanisation’. Henri Lefebvre’s clarion call […] 
urges us to think of the city as a process of collective codesign 
and coproduction.11
Lefebvre’s theory of moments of liberation comes to mind — the 
idea that sudden, unannounced moments of clarity occur for 
anyone amid the dulling routines of capitalism — but Lefebvre 
wrote during the industrial period, when workers’ solidarity 
was a real presence. Today, new kinds of solidarity are needed, 
and — as the state is as abandoned to capital’s excesses as Jeffries’ 
London was abandoned to a swamp — a re-possession of the 
political and intellectual spaces of the state is necessary, as the 
protector of the commonwealth (a wealth produced commonly, 
for common use to meet common needs, rather than the wants 
manufactured by consumerism): a state of codesign and copro-
duction applied and adapted on a national scale. This may seem 
far-fetched, or as Romantic as, say, Tennyson’s Arthurian Brit-
ain; yet major changes in social values have occurred in modern 
history. Among them were the abolition of slavery throughout 
the British Empire in the 1830s, and women’s suffrage in Britain 
in the 1920s. Things do change, all the time. The problem is how 
to inflect history in the direction of a better world.
11 E. Swyngedouw, Designing the Post-Political City and the Insurgent Polis 




The Maker Revolution and the 
Creative City 2.0
Doreen Jakob
Cutting the ribbon at the opening of the new Shapeway factory, 
New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg proclaims that the 
3-D printing company will form ‘a critical bridge between the 
tech and manufacturing centers [… and] help us bring the city’s 
industrial sector directly into the twenty-first century’.1 He an-
nounces: ‘this is the future of our city’.2 According to Anderson, 
today’s maker movement is the newest, third industrial revolu-
tion.3 Rifkin argues that ‘like every other economic revolution 
that preceded it, The Third Industrial [Revolution] will recast 
many of our assumptions about how the world works’.4 Thus 
what future and what city does the maker movement create? 
This book questions whether urban re-industrialization can be 
1 Kelly Faircloth, ‘At a Ribbon-Cutting for Shapeways’ “Factory of the Fu-




3 Chris Anderson, Makers: The New Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown 
Business, 2012).
4 Jeremy Rifkin, The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power Is Trans-
forming Energy, the Economy, and the World (New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2011), 189.
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imagined as a progressive socio-political and economical pro-
ject leading to an inclusive and democratic society based on 
cooperation and symbiosis. Many of the conference’s presenta-
tions offered examples of how to envision urban re-industrial-
ization. In this short chapter, however, I argue that urban re-
industrialization as part of a third industrial revolution is not a 
distant futuristic concept but a reality in the making. Driven by 
the maker movement, green energy, crowdsourcing and crowd-
funding, the third industrial revolution comes along dressed in 
the flowing robes of collaboration, participation, democratized 
manufacturing and ‘distributed capitalism’.5 It iterates the prom-
ises of the ‘Creative City’.6 Yet unlike its predecessor, it show-
cases tangible, three-dimensional products instead of intangible 
soft location factors, crowd financing instead of public-private-
partnerships.7 The Creative City 2.0 features applicability and 
dispersion. However, its practical and distributive appeal simul-
taneously allows for additional and more effective ways to hide 
its entrepreneurial and non-democratic nature. The Creative 
City characterizes a form and process of urbanization in which 
creativity stands at the forefront.8 However, more commonly it 
is seen as a set of policy and planning mechanisms that, once 
applied, result in a Creative City. According to Landry, the Crea-
tive City ‘describes a new method of strategic urban planning 
and examines how people can think, plan and act creatively in 
the city. It explores how we can make our cities more livable and 
vital by harnessing people’s imagination and talent’. 9 Landry and 
Bianchini10 advocate for a more holistic understanding of crea-
5 Jeremy Rifkin, ‘The Third Industrial Revolution: How the Internet, Green 
Electricity, and 3-D Printing are Ushering in a Sustainable Era of Distrib-
uted Capitalism’, World Financial Review, 1 (2012): 4052–57.
6 Charles Landry, The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators (London: 
Comedia, 2008). 
7 Doreen Jakob, ‘Constructing the Creative Neighborhood: Hopes and Limi-
tations of Creative City Policies in Berlin’, City, Culture and Society 1 (2010): 
193–98.
8 Ibid.
9 Landry, The Creative City, xii. 
10 C. Landry and F. Bianchini, The Creative City (London: Demos, 1995).
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tivity that also includes social and political reform in addition to 
artistic and technological innovation. In many ways, their ideas 
answer positively to the conference organizers’ question of im-
agining urban re-industrialization ‘beyond the current model 
of a neoliberal city’. In practice, however, the real ‘creativity’ of 
the Creative City model tends to be its ability to reframe and 
repackage an entrepreneurial model of urban governance and 
development geared towards attracting highly mobile capital 
and professional elites with environments to live and work in, as 
well as to consume and invest in, that are lively yet safe, diverse 
yet controlled, artistic yet profit-driven. While much of the past 
Creative City and Creative Class11 debates centered on individ-
ualized lifestyles, now comes a second generation of Creative 
City-making policies that focuses on shared production: the 
Creative City 2.0. Formerly lacking democratic participation, 
the Creative City 2.0 features ‘democracy’ and ‘participation’ in 
the form of crowdsourced and crowdfunded urbanism. Often 
called ‘Kickstarter urbanism’,12 in reference to one of the most 
prominent crowdfunding companies, Kickstarter, crowdfund-
ing provides an effective appearance of collaborative decision-
making. Overall, there are more than 450 crowdfunding plat-
forms worldwide that supported over 100,000 projects in 2012.13 
Kickstarter was founded in 2009 in New York City and soon be-
came the ‘world’s largest funding platform for creative projects’ 
with more than 4.4 million people having funded over 44,000 
creative projects with more than US$685 million. The company 
provides an online fundraising platform that simultaneously 
functions as a marketing as well as opinion-polling tool. It is 
often praised by members of the maker community as a ‘game 
11 Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It’s Transforming 
Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life (New York: Perseus Book 
Group, 2002).
12 A. Lange, ‘Against Kickstarter Urbanism’, The Design Observer Group, May 
2, 2012, http://designobserver. com/feature/against-kickstarter-urban-
ism/34008/.
13 Brian Boyer and Dan Hill, Brickstarter (Helsinki: Sitra, 2013), http://www.
brickstarter.org/Brickstarter.pdf.
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changer’ 14 for the development of prototypes and first manu-
facturing runs of design products. Yet, the Kickstarter versus 
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA)15 debate illustrates16 the 
company’s success is not without perils and criticism. As I have 
pointed out elsewhere, arts and cultural funding in the United 
States is much more diverse and dispersed, and characterized 
by much lesser relative government support compared to many 
European countries.17 Hence, the possibility of Kickstarter fund-
ing being equal to or surpassing the NEA not only shows the 
strength of the former but also the weakness of the latter. The 
main issue, however, is not numbers but the idea that companies 
like Kickstarter represent a ‘people’s N.E.A.’18 
Crowdfunding as currently practiced is not democratic. It 
creates an illusion of democracy. Kickstarter staff review all 
submitted projects favoring ‘creators who think through the re-
wards for backers, get the word out and engage an audience. 
In other words, the process doesn’t shape the aesthetic. It is the 
aesthetic’19. Curatorial emphasis is not on the final product but 
on how well its creators will market and sell their fundraising 
campaign. 
14 Anderson, Makers.
15 The NEA is the US government’s federal arts and cultural funding body.
16 E.g., Ian Moss, “Art and Democracy: The nea, Kickstarter, and Creativity 
in America,” Createquity, April 9, 2012, http://createquity.com/2012/04/art-
and-democracy-the-nea-kickstarter-and-creativity-in-america.html. See 
also Carl Franzen, ‘NEA Weighs In On Kickstarter Funding Debate’, Talking 
Points Memo, February 27, 2012, http://talkingpointsmemo.com/idealab/
nea-weighs-in-on-kickstarter-funding-debate.
17 Doreen Jakob, Beyond Creative Production Networks: The Development of 
Intra-Metropolitan Creative Industries Clusters in Berlin and New York City 
(Berlin: Rhombos, 2009); D. Jakob, ‘“To Have and to Need”: Reorganizing 
Cultural Policy as Panacea for Berlin’s Urban and Economic Woes’, in The 
Politics of Urban Cultural Policy: Global Perspectives, eds. C. Grodach and D. 
Silvereds, 110–21 (New York: Routledge, 2013).
18 Rob Walker, ‘The Trivialities and Transcendence of Kickstarter’, The New 





This is most problematic for urban and neighborhood devel-
opment projects. As Lange writes, with Kickstarter urban devel-
opment loses out to industrial design: 
You wouldn’t Kickstart a replacement bus line for Brooklyn, 
but you might Kickstart an app to tell you when the bus on 
another, less convenient line might come. You can’t Kickstart 
affordable housing, but the really cool tent for the discussion 
thereof. […] [W]orthy goals have to be dressed up in com-
plex geometries for Kickstarter. […] [However, t]he park is 
going to require a lot more doing than $5 and ‘Great idea!’20
Many urban development projects are not only more expensive 
than the production of a music album or a new video game; they 
also require a much larger timeframe from the initial idea to 
completion. They are place-specific and fixed, and hence much 
more dependent on local support and less able to generate the 
broad, worldwide support needed for large capital projects. 
Moreover, successfully securing funding does not automatically 
mean that projects will pass local zoning regulations and per-
mits. Once a project is approved and on-site development starts, 
‘what happens when the project runs over budget, as many capi-
tal projects do? Are donors obligated to chip in for overages?’21 
Once it is completed, ‘who is responsible for it? Who bears re-
sponsibility in 60 years? Whereas consumer products can be re-
cycled or discarded, it’s not as simple to do the same with pieces 
of the city’.22 
Companies like Kickstarter do not own the final products 
that are fundraised for on their websites, nor do the funders. 
Kickstarter collects a 5% fee on successfully funded projects. 
Supporters receive numerous gifts depending on how much 
money they pledge. Now Fundrise, a new urban development 
20 Lange, ‘Against Kickstarter Urbanism’.
21 Brian Boyer, ‘Pools are Expensive (Thoughts about the Long Tail and 
Crowdfunding)’, Brickstarter, March 26, 2012, http://brickstarter.org/pools-
are-expensive-thoughts-about-the-long-tail-and-crowdfunding/. 
22 Boyer and Hill, Brickstarter, 27. 
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company, is setting an example to change that system so that 
the funding crowds can become real estate investors and collect 
returns. Aiming to reform urban financing, Fundrise’s founders 
believe they have found a way that is ‘really potentially a radical 
transformation of urban planning, of development, of invest-
ment, of local government’.23 The company utilizes Regulation 
A of the US Securities and Exchange Commission that permits 
small offerings to unaccredited investors, as well as the April 
2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act that eases vari-
ous securities regulations. Fundrise has received much attention 
within the past few months, including a presentation in front of 
the US House subcommittee on finance innovation in June 2013, 
and is hailed by supporters as a way to democratize finance and 
‘remak[e] the very places where we live’.24
Yet the praise for democratization is treacherous. Surely, 
companies like Kickstarter and Fundrise enable project financ-
ing that moves beyond the wealthy patron and foreign real estate 
investor, respectively. They provide opportunities for more peo-
ple to finance interesting projects. But more is not everybody, 
equally, democratically. Kickstarter’s focus on selling ideas and 
designing enticing marketing campaigns makes humble yet 
realizable neighborhood development projects bid—and often 
lose—against pretentious yet less attainable ideas.25 Fundrise’s 
projects are not about investing in basic services in disadvan-
23 B. Miller, quoted in E. Badger, ‘The Real Estate Deal That Could Change the 
Future of Everything’, CityLab, November 19, 2012, http://www.citylab.com/
work/2012/11/real-estate-deal-could-change-future-everything/3897/. 
24 Ibid.
25 For instance, Lange provides examples of two urban development projects 
in the very same neighborhood: the LowLine, a 1.5 acre abandoned trolley 
terminal to be turned into an underground park, and the effort to fund 
a new Ping-Pong table for an existing (aboveground) neighborhood park. 
The first raised US$155,000, while the latter failed to secure the US$4,200 
needed. Yet, the Ping-Pong table could have been set up and useable in 
relatively short time; the LowLine Kickstarter financed none but a test of 
the skylights that would filter the daylight underground. ‘The consumable 




taged neighborhoods, and the renderings and promotion videos 
of their H Street, Washington, DC projects feature white, young 
professionals and advertise the street’s ‘thriving social scene’.26 
Overall, the current most prominent crowdfunding models op-
erate on a form of participation that is nothing more than dif-
fused monetary investments. 
The third industrial revolution is, according to Rifkin, char-
acterized by democratized manufacturing and distributed capi-
talism.27 It is a revolution driven by urbanized making.28 Yet, 
urban re-industrialization, unlike its predecessor, cannot have 
a foundation of heavy machinery and gigantic factories em-
ploying hundreds of workers making thousands of products. 
Instead, technologies like 3d printing could theoretically enable 
everybody to host their very own ‘factory’ on their bedside table 
and produce ‘one of a kind’ creations. Beyond the individual, 
the maker revolution could feature crowdsourcing and crowd-
funding. Yet, this type of play with ‘distributed capitalism’29 nev-
er questions the principles of capitalism. Crowdfunded urban 
development projects feature a further spectacularization30 and 
monetization of neighborhood development. Contemporary 
urban re-industrialization in this form is neither a progressive 
socio-political and economical project, nor does it lead to an in-
clusive and democratic society based on cooperation and sym-
biosis. The Creative City 2.0 as envisaged in this construct is a 
profit-generating machine dressed up in the noble concepts of 
democracy and participation. 
26 See https://fundrise.com/investments. 
27 Rifkin, ‘The Third Industrial Revolution’.
28 Anderson, Makers.
29 Rifkin, ‘The Third Industrial Revolution’.
30 Doreen Jakob, ‘The Eventification of Place: Urban Development and Ex-
perience Consumption in Berlin and New York City’, European Urban and 






This chapter takes its title from Aldous Huxley’s famous novel 
of the same name. Set in the very distant future of the year 2540, 
the novel outlines a world in which every being’s rank in society 
is predetermined at embryo-stage. Once in the world, ranks and 
happiness within one’s rank are then managed by a drug with 
the name of soma. Highly influential on many levels, the novel 
raises interesting philosophical questions around concepts such 
as manipulation, design, free will, and liberty and (pre-)deter-
mination amongst others. Given, for example, that the individu-
als in Huxley’s novel have been engineered before birth, are they 
truly responsible for their actions or are they merely the tools of 
their designers at the Hatchery and Conditioning Centre? And 
does the manufacturing process create individuals who are, as 
the American philosopher Gary Watson declares, ‘incapable of 
effectively envisaging or seeing the significance of certain al-
ternatives, of reflecting on [themselves] and on the origins of 
[their] motivations’?1
By referring to Huxley’s novel and some of the philosophical 
questions around freedom to act or lack thereof, this chapter 
explores two interrelated topics. On the one hand, I argue that 
despite current society not being engineered in the same way 
1 G. Watson, quoted in Kadri Vihvelin, ‘Arguments for Incompatibilism’, 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/. 
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as Huxley’s society, when it comes to the production of space 
it seems we are unable to see beyond the current systems and 
practices, in particular capitalism. Actions executed with the 
best and most radical of intentions are often used and coun-
ter-appropriated to reinforce the current state of affairs. This is 
where the exclamation mark after the title comes from. On the 
other hand, I also believe that brave and therefore bold actions 
are necessary to envisage and also produce alternate futures. 
The question mark in the title points, therefore, both to the per-
ceived and real probabilities of a non-capitalist production of 
space and its consequences.
The discussion in this chapter loosely follows the broad ques-
tions that were posed by the ‘Re-industrialisation and Progres-
sive Urbanism’ conference (held at Plymouth University in June 
2013) that was the force behind this book. It covers the possibili-
ties of re-industrialization and much more, but before continu-
ing any further I would like to clarify those key questions. In 
the call for papers, Dr. Krzysztof Nawratek, invited responses to 
questions about the possibility of imagining re-industrialization 
as a ‘progressive socio-political and economical project, aiming 
to create an inclusive and democratic society based on coopera-
tion and symbiosis that goes way beyond the current model of 
a neoliberal city’.2 
My immediate response, from my hopeful half, gave a re-
sounding ‘Yes!’ Yes, of course, re-industrialization could be 
imagined as a progressive project — and, even better, there re-
ally is no need for imagining this. Abundant examples of this 
exist already — not necessarily related to the issue of re-indus-
trialization, but certainly within the wider spectrum of spatial 
productions. There are, my hopeful half insists, plenty of small 
and large projects that contribute to the democratic and social 
production of space and do indeed challenge increasingly com-
modified and unjust developments.
2 Krzysztof Nawratek, ‘Re-industrialisation and Progressive Urbanism’ con-
ference, School of Architecture, Design and Environment, Plymouth Uni-
versity, June 13, 2013. The call for papers was issued on February 25, 2013.
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But then, of course, there is also my pessimistic and doubtful 
half, which quickly interjects with: ‘Well, I’m not so sure about 
your optimism — it actually does look rather grim at the mo-
ment’. We only need to look at the destruction of the welfare 
state in the UK and many other European countries, for exam-
ple, which happens within the general promise and premise of 
progress, greater participation and inclusion on a local level. 
Worst of all, much of this discourse and debate around this 
supposedly progressive notion of planning happens under the 
auspices of, and using the vocabulary of, the Left — and, even 
worse, without too much resistance from the Left, really. At the 
same time there is also, and I’m guilty of this too, a retreat into 
what you could call ‘the small-scale stuff ’. A retreat, you could 
say, into these little niches that make us believe that the world 
can be a better place. 
As a citizen I am keen to believe, but maybe I am only led 
or even conditioned to believe, that the world would indeed be 
a better place if only more of us would do the little things that 
matter. Things such as shop locally, recycle, engage in the lo-
cal transition town movement, grow our own vegetables, join 
the Green Party and Ecotricity, move my current account to the 
Co-operative Bank and my savings account to Triodos, and also, 
of course, join the local cohousing group. And so the list goes.
By switching accounts and changing my shopping habits, I 
tell myself, I’m not only acting on a hunch. There is real evi-
dence to justify these actions. I only need to look again at Na-
beel Hamdi’s book Small Change in which he argues that ‘intel-
ligent practice builds on the collective wisdom of people and 
organizations on the ground — those who think locally and act 
locally — which is then rationalized in ways that make a differ-
ence globally’.3 Hamdi goes on: ‘Good development practice fa-
cilitates emergence; it builds on what we’ve got and with it goes 
to scale’.4 And more: ‘in order to do something big — to think 
3 Nabeel Hamdi, Small Change: About the Art of Practice and the Limits of 
Planning in Cities (London: Earthscan, 2004), xviii. 
4 Ibid.
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globally and act globally — one starts with something small, and 
one starts where it counts’.5 
‘Phew!’ my hopeful half goes again. Thinking and acting 
locally is precisely what I do. If Hamdi emphasizes the impor-
tance, indeed the necessity, of the local — of each and every one 
of us doing what he or she can — not all can be lost.
But then, of course, my doubtful half is quick to point out that 
Hamdi is not only talking about the local on its own, by itself. In 
fact, he explicitly addresses the elephant in the room — namely 
the necessity of scaling up, or more concretely, the interdepend-
ence of the small and the large. Further, he talks about scaling 
up not just for the sake of scaling up, but scaling up as a means 
to induce wider, arguably social, changes. 
Let’s pick this up: social change. Social change is something 
that is being talked and written about a lot. ‘Small change’ 
(which is here used as equivalent to ‘local change’), it is often 
argued, leads to social change. Consequently, lots of instances of 
small change put together will eventually, but inevitably, change 
the way we produce, consume, exchange and also distribute. In 
effect, this powerful force of combined small changes will force 
the induction of much bigger and systemic change. 
The political economist Greg Sharzer is probably one of 
the most fervent opponents of this way of thinking. He writes: 
‘The localist form of citizenship may empower us, but it can-
not confront capitalism. Against a global network of power 
must emerge globalised forms of struggle’.6 Sharzer doesn’t have 
any sympathies for localism and localists. In his book No Local: 
Why Small-Scale Alternatives Won’t Change the World, Sharzer 
argues that localists would not choose to be localists if they had, 
I quote, ‘a greater understanding of how capitalism works’.7 
So, how does capitalism work?
5 Ibid., xiv.
6 Greg Sharzer, ‘Local Resistance to Global Austerity: It Will Never Work’, 
openDemocracy, January 3, 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourking-
dom/greg-sharzer/local-resistance-to-global-austerity-it-will-never-work. 
7 Greg Sharzer, No Local: Why Small-Scale Alternatives Won’t Change The 
World (Winchester: Zero Books, 2012), 2.
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Very simply put, capitalism is about the exploitation of wage 
labour and the reduction of social relations to commodity ex-
change or a series of commodity exchanges. Capitalist principles 
permeate our socio-economic system — on the large and the 
small scale. But, if we accept that the basic premise of capitalism 
is exploitation, it follows that it can never be fair. And neither 
can it be inclusive. Capitalism is effectively undemocratic. As 
such, it seems quite unsuited — as a socio-economic model — to 
drive any form of development. 
Obviously, it is easy to dismiss this critique of capitalism. I 
almost understand this possible dismissal. After all, what I am 
calling for — or at least what my hopeful half is wishing, but 
also calling for — is an overthrow of capitalism. And that, it is 
easily argued, is absolutely unrealistic; it is simply not going to 
happen. My hopeful half disagrees with this, but I also recog-
nize that a focus on individualized responses to and reactions 
against capitalism cannot provide a viable alternative to it. What 
is needed is a global, yet localized perspective and response to 
this problem. A response that is not set within the capitalistic 
framework because — as I said before — it is inherently unjust. 
What is needed instead is a new framework that doesn’t exploit 
but allows or affords equitable development. But, what might 
this look like?
In recent years — and in particular since the beginning of the 
most recent economic crisis — architecture and design profes-
sionals have become quite vocal about the capability of design to 
make a difference to the world. Many publications, exhibitions 
and events are investigating the social potential of architecture 
or architecture’s social production. For many, the mere usage of 
the term ‘social’ in relation to architecture or spatial production 
seems to conjure up a panacea for a profession whose practice, 
as the lawyer and urban planner Peter Marcuse argues, ‘has be-
come a training ground for cutting-edge design, cutting-edge 
not in a social sense or in a human sense, but in a sense of a mar-
keting device that will appeal to clients, that will appeal to those 
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with the money to hire architects’.8 But what is ‘cutting-edge’ 
social design? Does Marcuse refer to the multitude of participa-
tory programs to develop a local school, collaborative processes 
that go into the production of an urban garden with community 
space or the sweat equity that goes into the building of a new 
housing scheme?
It is easy to see the real difference these projects make and 
therefore become submerged in this turn towards, and the ad-
miration of, so-called ‘social architecture’. Social architecture 
comes with so much promise, so much hope about design’s po-
tential to, after all, truly contribute to society. It focuses and also 
cherishes approaches that, in the words of the feminist Donna 
Haraway, actively allow for ‘partial, locatable, critical knowledg-
es’9 and at the same time counter what has been portrayed by 
Mike Davis as an ‘unprecedented abyss of economic and social 
turmoil that confounds our previous perceptions of historical 
risk’.10 
However, we ought not to lose sight of the bigger picture. Yes, 
‘social architecture’ is popular because we can see the real differ-
ence these projects make on a micro-level. But if we are really 
honest, most ‘social architectures’ and so-called ‘responsible’ 
actions leave the centre, the predominant socio-economic and 
cultural system, unscathed. Doing good but incredibly isolated 
things, leads to the reproduction of smaller, but fundamentally 
still capitalist, versions of the same thing — and therefore fails to 
engage with such fundamental issues like socio-economic ine-
quality. And if you believe in global justice, like my hopeful half 
does, spatial development needs to confront capitalism through 
organized global socio-spatial movements which are framed 
8 P. Marcuse, ‘What Has to Be Done — The Potentials and Failures of Plan-
ning: History, Theory, and Actuality. Lessons from New York’, AnArchitek-
tur 14 (March 2005): 36–40.
9 Donna Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism 
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies 14 (1988): 575–99, 
at 584.
10 Mike Davis, ‘US Elections — the New Deal?’, Socialist Review 330 (November 
2008), http://www.socialist review.org.uk/article.php?articlenumber=10589. 
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by local readings and understandings of culture, practice and 
space. So, let’s stop the glorification of ‘social architecture’, and 
begin to construct, as well as enact, global narratives that will 
allow the formation of a wider alliance concerned with the just 
production of space. To be very clear, I’m not talking about the 
implementation of a supposedly ‘greener’ or ‘softer’ option of 
capitalism, but social forms of production that are not only col-
lectively produced but also socially appropriated. 
There is no need to start from scratch. The 1980s squatting 
movement in West Berlin highlights the powerful force of col-
lective action, collective production and social appropriation 
that led to a change in spatial politics. There also the various 
Latin American Residential Organisations, of which some help 
to organize and implement the actual construction and man-
agement of housing and others concentrate on training and po-
litical reform. And there are many more.
My doubtful half begins to tell me off again for being op-
timistic. However, and not only because I want to end with a 
hopeful note, the two examples mentioned — each on their own 
scale and with their obvious limitations — begin to draw atten-
tion to the real possibilities of a different economy and also to 
how social production can lead to processes and products that 




The Political Agency of 
Geography and the Shrinking City
Jeffrey T. Kruth
Traveling down Chester Road from downtown Cleveland, a 
beacon of architectural modernity can be seen reflecting light 
off the Norman Foster-designed medical campus, signaling that 
one has reached an urbanism vastly different from the one just 
traversed. An institutional heterotopia of sorts, the extensive 
campus stands in as a symbol for a coherent urban language 
amid a decaying landscape of vacant parcels and foreclosed 
homes. The region’s largest employer and primary economic 
driver since the 1980s, the Cleveland Clinic’s economic impact 
is roughly $12.6 billion, and by extension, its employees con-
tribute $5.9 billion to the Ohio economy.1 World renowned for 
its healthcare and research contributions, the Clinic and nearby 
institutions of the ‘med-ed’ complex — University Hospitals and 
Case Western Reserve University — provide an economic stabil-
ity in a city that has struggled to prove itself as resilient for more 
than a generation. 
In the surrounding neighborhoods of the University Circle 
area, there is a 25% unemployment rate and the city as a whole 
claims a whopping 33% poverty rate, or approximately 118,000 
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of its 396,000 residents. The population in the city proper 
has dropped by more than half in recent decades. Peaking at 
900,000 residents in the 1950s, the onslaught of de-industriali-
zation in the Midwestern United States leaves Cleveland stand-
ing as one of several poster children cities of the enigmatic ‘Rust 
Belt’. Additionally, the onset of the financial crisis in the mid-
2000s caused housing prices to drop by roughly 30%.2 Specu-
lative investors and poor appraisal practices have only added 
to the detrimental effects of a weak housing market. Approxi-
mately 20,000 vacant lots dot the landscape throughout the city, 
a testament to the city’s continual decline. Cheap land and taxes 
(approximately 36% of vacant land in Cleveland is tax-abated), 
push the boundary of development further into more affluent 
suburbs, leaving the inner city devoid of critical infrastructure 
and a solid economic tax base. The Clinic liberally expands to 
the suburbs, creating services in wealthier ones where many of 
their patients reside, furthering competition between the City of 
Cleveland and other municipalities for the externality benefits 
of a Clinic development. 
The anchor institutions of the ‘med-ed’ complex benefit from 
tax exempt status as non-profit organizations, while its spatial 
clout recently expanded through the creation of a special devel-
opment district — labeled the ‘Health-Tech Corridor’ — along a 
4.5-mile stretch between downtown and the University Circle 
area.3 This area prioritizes development for medical technology 
startups as well as the anchor institutions themselves. As the 
largest holder of vacant, tax-abated land in the city, the Clinic 
also takes advantage of city programs such as the Vacant Prop-
erties Initiative (VPI), which grants loans for the development of 
vacant land.4 A mere 8% of the city’s revenue comes from prop-
erty taxes, while 55% of it comes from income taxes, which is an 
2 A. Friedhoff and S. Kulkarni, ‘Metro Monitor — March 2013,’ The Brookings 
Institution, last modified March 20, 2015. 
3 ‘Cleveland Health-Tech Corridor’, http://www.healthtechcorridor.com/. 
4 City of Cleveland Department of Economic Development, Report 
to Council 2010, http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/ordredirect.
html?open&id=clev2010report.html. 
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inverted formula compared to many American cities, starving 
Cleveland of a solid tax base.5 Even in comparable Rust Belt cit-
ies like nearby Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, property taxes account 
for nearly double the income tax base.6
These spatial and policy tactics are indicative not only of po-
litical mismanagement at the local level, but also a neoliberal 
spatial ideology. In an age where financial capital is hardly de-
pendent on geography or even on workers, institutional cam-
puses have become a normative extension of a particular strand 
of neoliberal spatial ideology. In order to remain competitive at 
a global level, institutions in the ‘med-ed’ model must embark 
on a sort of geographic imperialism in order to capitalize on 
their suburban as well as their international markets.7 This mod-
el of the local gone global ensures that the Clinic remains com-
petitive at the international level. It is no longer just necessary 
to provide ground-breaking work in research or technology, it 
is also necessary to embark on a geographic campaign, erecting 
new campuses across the globe as a new form of imperialism. 
In this way, the Clinic and other anchor institutions fit into Mi-
chael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s concept of Empire, which puts 
forth the theory of a new hegemonic global geopolitical order.
As late capitalism expands into what Hardt and Negri refer 
to as a bio-political age (taking from Michel Foucault and oth-
ers), the tools for restructuring a critical class-based project ex-
ist within capitalism’s current logic. In the bio-political mode of 
production, work expands beyond the factory walls into daily 
and social life. Social relations, incessant innovation, knowledge 
power and privatization of the commons are central aspects in 
this mode of production. The city itself is central to bio-politi-
5 City of Cleveland, City of Cleveland 2012 Budget Book (2012), 57. http://we-
bapp.cleveland-oh.gov/aspnet/docs/get.aspx?id=988&file=2012Budget.pdf
6 Pittsburgh City Council, City of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania Budget 2011 (2011), 
http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/main/assets/budget/2011/2011-Operating-
Capital-Budget.pdf. 
7 McClain Clutter, ‘Cleveland: Medi-Plex City’, in Formerly Urban: Projecting 
Rust Belt Futures, ed. J. Czerniak, 50–69 (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 2013).
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cal production, and to some extent explains the movement of 
the masses of educated and wealthy classes back to cities in the 
United States. Creating a ‘playground’ for social production in 
gentrified neighborhoods allows for the constant re-invention 
of fads, ideas, technology and marketing strategies, while con-
stant social production further enables a self-disciplining soci-
ety and what Sharon Zukin calls ‘pacification by cappuccino’. 
The med-ed complex is one type of this system in action. 
In the Fordist mode of production, the city was developed for 
maximum infrastructural and economic efficiency (moving 
from ‘the City Beautiful’ to ‘the City Practical’), putting the 
constant process of urbanization at the forefront of a develop-
ment strategy. As industrial production fades into a knowledge 
and financially-based speculative economy, Marx’s formulation 
of the struggle between immobile property (such as land) and 
moveable property such as material commodities resurfaces 
as a potential point of political organization.8 As Hardt points 
out, ‘Property is becoming a fetter on the capitalist mode of 
production […] the more the common is corralled as property, 
the more its productivity is reduced; and yet expansion of the 
common undermines the relations of property in a fundamental 
and general way’.9 Following the Hardt and Negri line, capitalist 
production is returning to rent-based speculation and market 
dominance, as opposed to profitability based on the traditional 
means of production. That is, corporations and institutions are 
not necessarily seeking to enhance profitability by trimming 
workers’ wages, improving production time, or making supply 
chain management more efficient. Rather, prices reflect per-
ceived market value. And when a few institutions control a large 
share of a particular market, say vacant land, they can artificially 
control prices, which can prolong economic distress. This geo-
graphic campaign is, in a sense, central to the long-term stabil-
ity of the anchor institutions to build institutional capacity at 
8 Michael Hardt, ‘The Common in Communism’, in The Idea of Communism, 
eds. C. Douzinas and S. Žižek, 131–44 (London: Verso, 2010), 133–36.
9 Ibid., 136.
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a local and global scale. Not only does cheap land ensure that 
more resources can be devoted to the ‘bottom line’, it enables 
concentrated large-scale development, typically for the ‘creative 
class’, evidenced by the recent Uptown development by Stanley 
Saitowitz near the anchor institutions. In short, it is in the inter-
est of the anchor institutions to keep land prices low to ensure 
that development occurs as they see fit — a gross large-scale pri-
vatization of spatial production, enabled by city policy. 
Just a short ride from both downtown and the University 
Circle area, a large green house containing Green City Growers 
occupies a 4.4-acre (1.78-ha) site, holding the country’s largest 
urban hydroponic farm. Initiated in 2007, Green City Growers 
is one of three worker-owned cooperatives in the city called Ev-
ergreen Cooperatives. Based on the highly successful Mondrag-
on model from the Basque region of Spain, the Evergreen model 
offers the ‘one worker, one vote’ principle, with every employee 
being a worker-owner of the cooperative. A certain percentage 
of each worker’s earnings are placed into an internal account, 
making $65,000 available as a personal capital account at the 
end of eight years. The Evergreen Cooperatives are also putting 
in place a formal, centralized financing agency to help finance 
other cooperatives’ development.10 Although a for-profit enter-
prise, the cooperatives are worker-owned, sustainably focused 
and with the highest-paid employee’s salary capped, typically at 
a 3:1 ratio. 
Three primary businesses have been started by the Ever-
green Cooperatives and have come online since 2009, including 
the Green City Growers who grow hydroponic produce in the 
greenhouse, the Ohio Cooperative Solar, which installs photo-
voltaic panels on buildings and Evergreen Laundry, which is a 
sustainable laundry facility. The goal is to establish ten coopera-
tives over the next five years, eventually employing 500 people 
in living-wage jobs. Far from a grassroots, bottom-up approach, 
10 Capital Institute, Field Guide to Investing in a Resilient Economy: Evergreen 
Cooperatives Field Study (2012), 6, http://fieldguide.capitalinstitute.org/up-
loads/1/3/9/6/13963161/_fs2-evergreen_8pg.pdf.
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the Mondragon model exercised by the Evergreen Cooperatives 
takes the city’s anchor institutions as its starting point, both for 
funding and as their client base of their services. The Evergreen 
Laundry Cooperative serves both the Clinic and University 
Hospitals, cleaning their linens, while the largest client for Ohio 
Cooperative Solar has been the Cleveland Clinic’s expanding 
complexes.
The Evergreen Land Trust (coupled with the Evergreen Co-
operative Development Fund) was established to work with 
banks and local authorities to establish new sites for the devel-
opment of future Evergreen ventures. Assets are primarily di-
rected towards commercial development, structured in a way 
such that if the Evergreen business were ever to collapse, the 
Evergreen Land Trust would have the residual right to step in 
and buy back the building, reducing some of the risk associated 
with a new business.11 Discussions are currently underway to 
address issues like affordable housing development, which may 
carry fewer risks than commercial development and new busi-
ness startups. Ohio Cooperative Solar is also considering enter-
ing the demolition business for vacant homes in possession of 
the land bank to account for times of slow business, providing 
workers with further skill sets. 
If the Evergreen Cooperatives were to embark on this type 
of development venture, then it is here that a potentially coun-
ter-hegemonic political and spatial project resides. As the pro-
duction of space and the city become ever more important in 
a bio-political age, an inversion of the single-lot, single-owner 
model may provide context for an alternative form of develop-
ment — particularly after the subprime foreclosure crisis. In a 
shrinking city with an oversupply of housing stock and vacant 
land (the Cleveland Land Bank controls approximately 7,500 of 
the 20,000 vacant lots city-wide), an alternative regional narra-
tive could be developed through land ownership, applying the 
Evergreen cooperative model of ownership to land at a large 
11 Ibid., 18.
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scale, expanding political agency to local and perhaps regional 
politics. 
With this, there is an inherently embedded concern with ac-
tive and productive uses of land, beyond speculative land hold-
ing or the more profitable concentration of development of 
cheap housing or shopping malls. Applying the ‘buy-in’ model 
of Mondragon, space can be re-conceived as something which 
even persons of low and moderate income may buy into. Over 
time, this creates community wealth, a more stable economic 
landscape, and communal benefits. As opposed to singular va-
cant lots, which cause devastating effects on otherwise stable 
neighborhoods, risk is dispersed amongst multiple owners over 
multiple lots. The same ‘one person-one vote’ may likewise ap-
ply to land deals, under a larger umbrella of the Evergreen con-
stituency. The same principles of ‘people over profit’ could also 
apply, offering an ideological understanding of land as some-
thing beyond simply a monetized object. Through cooperative 
ownership under the umbrella of the Evergreen Cooperatives, a 
new production of ‘the commons’ results — offering new forms 
of knowledge, worker/owner solidarity, an alternative develop-
ment model and a new class of owners who were formerly ex-
cluded.12
With an already aggressive demolition schedule, the city may 
cede some of this work to a newly formed Evergreen business. 
Whereas building in the single-lot, single-owner model made 
economic sense for financiers and developers, it lacked a spatial, 
infrastructural or ecological logic. Through a strategic demoli-
tion schedule and creating property interdependence, building 
destruction may become a profitable venture for the Evergreen 
cooperatives. That is to say, through strategic planning in coop-
eration with the city, multiple lots may be assembled for owner-
ship by an Evergreen-like cooperative, which in turn densifies 
the sites and then creates more tax revenue for the city. The co-
operative owners of the densified sites could be tied remotely 
12 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 249–60.
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to other hedge spaces that are seeking to be assembled.13 This 
creates interest for them through a diversified portfolio and pro-
vides incentives for nearby owners to either join the co-op or 
sell, as market prices stabilize.
While organizing along traditional progressive lines is im-
portant, it is also about finding a political and economic alter-
native to current capitalist practices through a geographic and 
spatial production agenda. As David Harvey and others have 
suggested, class struggle is no longer tied to just the workplace 
but to almost all facets of life, and we must organize the city 
along geographic lines. The factory is no longer the sole site of 
capitalist production — it is now the city and everyday urban 
life. As public life appears to dissolve in a bio-political age, a 
shared cooperative development strategy would necessarily cre-
ate political stakeholders amongst the classes of those typically 
excluded from the public process.14 Micro-parcelization strat-
egies in India, increased worker cooperatives of the informal 
economy in the favelas of Brazil and public control over infra-
structural and natural resources in Bolivia are beginning to cre-
ate new strategies for organization across the globe. The shrink-
ing cities of the West must likewise embrace the geographic 
potential for political organization in the metropolis. 
Beyond the simple suggestion of housing cooperatives or in-
stitutional land banking, such an alternative is about the restruc-
turing of a progressive political project on two levels: first, by 
placing at the forefront the idea of the commons in a bio-polit-
ical era and second, by appropriating agency to neighborhoods 
through social ownership and organizing around the idea of ge-
ography to perpetuate the idea of the ‘right to the city’. This is 
especially important given the current development paradigms 
which solve the problems of the common through traditional 
neoliberal spatial fixes such as gentrification, privately owned 
13 Keller Easterling, ‘Take-Away’, in Perspecta 45: Agency, eds. H. Evans et al., 
157–60 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012).
14 David Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolu-
tion (London: Verso, 2012), 115–19.
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public space, large scale development for private interests and 
the control of vacant land by institutions. The task of architects, 
urbanists and progressive policy makers in the coming years 
will be to help develop a geographic project for communities in 
the twenty-first century using a spatial-economic logic that puts 




Beyond The Post-Industrial City? 
The Third Industrial Revolution, 
Digital Manufacturing and the 
Transformation of Homes into 
Miniature Factories
John R. Bryson, Jennifer Clark and Rachel Mulhall
The late spring 2013 issue of the SkyMall shopping catalogue 
heralded the emergence of the next technological or industrial 
revolution. The SkyMall catalogue is found on nearly every US 
flight and provides travelers with an opportunity to consider 
purchasing a range of new and novel products whilst onboard 
the aircraft. The late spring issue contains a $1,299 3d printer. 3d 
printers can be traced back to 1984, when stereolithography was 
developed by Charles Hull. This printing process enables a tan-
gible 3d object to be created from digital data. The SkyMall 3d 
printer is described as ‘[s]uper easy and simple to use. It works 
by building up plastic material in three dimensions to create a 
real object. It’s ideal for home, classroom and office and creates 
prototypes, models, toys … the list is endless’.1 The reference to 
home use highlights the ability of this technology to shift some 
manufacturing production from the factory to the home. It is 
worth noting that 3d printing can also involve printing with 
1 SkyMall, Late Spring Catalogue (Phoenix: SkyMall, 2013), 9.
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metal powders. Nearly everything can be printed, but there are 
restrictions in terms of size. For example, it is a simple process 
to print a new cover for a mobile phone at home, but it will 
never be practicable to print a complete car. This re-emergence 
of home-based manufacturing has important implications for 
cities, as it enables new forms of customized manufacturing to 
emerge. Home-based manufacturing is not a new process, but 
this new industrial revolution has the potential to return manu-
facturing to its roots within the home.  
Before the first industrial revolution, manufacturing was 
distributed in homes through a system of outworkers or via 
a process based on small craft-based production.2 In the me-
dieval European city, manufacturing was not isolated from 
homes — manufacturing was a home-based activity that was of-
ten undertaken by women and children during the day and men 
during the winter. During the nineteenth century the City of 
Birmingham, developed as the British Empire’s workshop of the 
world, but the history of manufacturing in this city commenced 
in homes.3 During the sixteenth century Birmingham was ‘a 
village of manufacturers’.4 Coventry, another important British 
manufacturing city, developed as a location for the manufacture 
of watches and ribbons, but both were manufactured in homes 
rather than in factories. The term ‘manufacturing’ is misleading. 
2 Thomas S. Ashton, An Eighteenth-Century Industrialist: Peter Stubs of War-
rington, 1756–1806 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961); W. H. 
B. Court, A Concise Economic History of Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965); Phyllis Deane, The First Industrial Revolution (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Marie B. Rowlands, Masters and 
Men in the West Midlands Metalware Trades before the Industrial Revolu-
tion (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975); Gillian Darley, Fac-
tory (London: Reaktion Books, 2003); John R. Bryson and Michael Taylor, 
‘Mutual Dependency, Diversity and Alterity in Production: Cooperatives, 
Group Contracting and Factories’, in Interrogating Alterity, eds. D. Fuller, 
A.E. Jonas, and R. Lee, 75–94 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).
3 J.D. Chambers, The Workshop of the World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1961); Bryson and Taylor, ‘Mutual Dependency, Diversity and Alter-
ity in Production’.
4 Artifex and Opifex, The Causes of Decay in a British Industry (London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1907), 2.
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It comes with the association of large factories, smoking chim-
neys, conveyor belts and production lines, but actually the term 
comes from the Latin ‘manu factum’ or ‘to make by hand’. Thus, 
‘manufacturing’ has a much more complex meaning than an as-
sociation between the production process and the factory. There 
are many ways in which products can be manufactured — from 
craft-based production through to the technical complexity of 
putting together a robot. Manufacturing also takes place in a 
variety of circumstances and contexts, differing widely in scale 
from factories to spare bedrooms. 
It was only during the latter part of the eighteenth century 
that a division began to emerge between the place of work and 
the place of residence. This division was driven by a requirement 
to control labour, especially as technological developments were 
beginning to replace simple home-based machines with much 
more complex machine tools.5 These new machine tools were 
expensive and required access to a source of power (water, char-
coal, coal, etc.) and also a workforce who could be increasingly 
managed and controlled to escalate productivity. Gradually, 
manufacturing located in cottages and homes was replaced by 
small factories often constructed in back gardens, and eventu-
ally these were superseded by the emergence of large specialist 
factories.6 The exact date of this transfer from manufacturing 
in homes to factories varies depending on the industrial sector 
and location. In Coventry (UK) the manufacture of ribbons dur-
ing the late nineteenth century was still predominantly a home-
based activity. A typical Coventry weaver’s house, at this time, 
consisted of a three- story building with the top story used as 
the ‘topshop’ or weaving loft in which there would be two or 
three looms.7
The first industrial revolution is associated with the emer-
gence of factory production, and much of this production was 
5 Rowlands, Masters and Men.
6 Darley, Factory.
7 John M. Prest, The Industrial Revolution in Coventry (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1960), 75.
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located in urban areas close to a source of power and labour. The 
second industrial revolution was based on the application of a 
spatial division of labour that spread manufacturing around the 
world driven by a search for lower production costs. This phase 
is associated with the deindustrialization of developed market 
economies, the emergence of post-industrial cities and the shift 
of production to emerging markets.8 However, there are debates 
emerging that posit the start of the ‘third industrial revolution’.9 
Rifkin’s third industrial revolution is founded upon ‘a new con-
vergence of communication and energy […] [in which] hun-
dreds of millions of people will produce their own green energy 
in their homes, offices, and factories and share it with each other 
in an “energy internet”’.10 There is another important technologi-
cal driver that has the potential to transform manufacturing and 
that is leading to a new industrial revolution which has the pos-
sibility to transform the geography of production. These new 
technologies include laser cutting and 3d printing or additive 
manufacturing, and are associated with the re-emergence of 
home-based manufacturing that has the potential to challenge 
the dominant post-industrial model. The future of our cities will 
be based on knowledge, information and new forms of manu-
facturing, and some of this activity will be undertaken in offices 
and factories, and some in homes. 
This new technological driver is a key issue in the trans-
formation of manufacturing and includes a number of related 
innovations that can all be classified under the term ‘digital 
8 J.R. Bryson, P.W. Daniels, and B. Warf, Service Worlds: People, Organisa-
tions, Technologies (London: Routledge, 2004); Barry Bluestone and Ben-
nett Harrison, The Deindustrialisation of America: Plant Closings, Commu-
nity Abandonment, and the Dismantling Of Basic Industry (New York: Basic 
Books, 1982); Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy 
(London: Sage, 2003); John R. Bryson and Grete Rusten, Design Economies 
and the Changing World Economy: Innovation, Production and Competitive-
ness (London: Routledge, 2011). 
9 Jeremy Rifkin, The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power Is Trans-
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manufacturing’. These new technologies have the potential to 
democratize manufacturing, as it can transfer the design and 
manufacture of particular products from monopoly capitalism 
to a form of distributed home-based, customized capitalism. 
This type of production will never replace the existing factory-
based mass manufacturing, but provides an alternative means 
for the production of small, often customized products, as well 
as creative art. In this chapter, we explore the emergence of 
digital manufacturing with a particular focus on 3d printing or 
rapid prototyping, and the impact that this could have on home-
based manufacturing and the post-industrial city. 
From subtraction to addition 
The history of much manufacturing is based around subtractive 
methods in which material is removed by cutting, drilling and 
other forms of machining. Subtractive manufacturing has been 
supplemented by technological developments that have given 
rise to additive manufacturing techniques, rapid prototyping 
or 3d printing.11 Additive manufacturing is a process in which 
a three-dimensional solid object is produced by laying down 
successive layers of material (liquid, powder or sheet materials) 
controlled by a digital file. The digital file can be produced by 
3d computer-aided design (CAD), model data, CT and MRI scan 
data, and data created from 3d digitizing systems. The devel-
opment of 3d printing means that it is now possible for com-
ponents and products to be developed using CAD and printed 
using a 3d printer. 3d printing is currently used in the aerospace 
11 T. Wohlers, Wohlers Report: Rapid Prototyping & Tooling State of the Indus-
try Annual Worldwide Progress Report (Fort Collins: Wohlers Associates, 
2001); Xue Yan and P. Gu, ‘A Review of Rapid Prototyping Technologies 
and Systems’, Computer-Aided Design 28, no. 4 (1996): 307–18; S. Kumar and 
J.P. Kruth, ‘Composites by Rapid Prototyping Technology’, Materials and 
Design 31 (2010): 850–56; Additive Manufacturing Special Interest Group, 
Shaping Our National Competency in Additive Manufacturing: A Technology 
Innovation Needs Analysis Conducted by the Additive Manufacturing Special 
Interest Group for the Technology Strategy Board (London: Technology Strat-
egy Board, 2012).
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industry to produce light- weight components, and in the medi-
cal devices industry to create customized dental implants, cus-
tomized insoles that match patients’ feet and also customized 
hip replacements. 
Unlike many emerging technologies, such as nanotechnolo-
gy and biotechnology, additive manufacturing is associated with 
manufacturing processes of both large and small firms. 3d print-
ing has developed as a central process technology in the ‘mak-
er movement’ with its focus on personalized, customized and 
craft-based production of consumer items such as jewelry and 
household goods. This relationship to the Do-It-Yourself (DIY) 
movement has connected additive manufacturing to e-retailing 
portals for craft-based production such as Etsy and the develop-
ment of ‘maker-spaces’, such as those managed by TechWorks.12 
TechWorks provides access to manufacturing spaces, including 
access to tools and machines for small-scale producers to proto-
type and produce batch items. The emergence of these new, flex-
ible and shared manufacturing spaces in cities, coupled with the 
expanding capabilities enabled by digital manufacturing and 3d 
printing, are beginning to alter the trajectory of urban manu-
facturing by enabling home-based makers to design new objects 
that can be printed either at home or by a specialist 3d printing 
company. Central to this new third industrial revolution is the 
emergence of distributed manufacturing facilitated by digital 
manufacturing and personalized or customized design. 
Innovations in additive manufacturing have the potential 
to shift manufacturing production away from capital intensive 
mass production based in large plants to a network of distribut-
ed manufacturing facilities that would focus on the production 
of mass customized products. Additive manufacturing comes 
with a number of benefits and these include: 
•	 A decrease in lead times from design to products ready for 
market.
12 For more information on Etsy or TechWorks, see www.etsy.com or www.
sktechworks.ca. 
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•	 A resource-efficient approach with no wastage.
•	 The ability to customize products.
•	 No requirement for specialist tooling. This reduces the scale 
of capital investment required to manufacture products.
•	 New developments in additive manufacturing are associated 
with rapid production throughputs.
•	 Limited defective parts.
•	 Parts and products can be designed to optimism functional-
ity rather than for effective subtractive manufacturing.
•	 The ability to develop a hybrid manufacturing process that 
combines the benefits associated with subtractive and addi-
tive manufacturing.
•	 The ability to produce parts with the same functionality as 
parts produced by subtractive manufacturing, but with fewer 
raw materials. These products are much lighter. 
•	 New products that can only be made by additive manufac-
turing. The layer process enables the manufacture of very 
complex shapes and there are few geometric limitations 
compared to subtractive manufacturing. 
There are a number of research challenges that need to be 
overcome with additive manufacturing; these include scaling 
up the additive manufacturing process and overcoming some 
difficulties with the surface finish of products produced by ad-
ditive manufacturing. The cost of 3d printers is declining and 
very small firms, individuals, schools and artists are now able 
to afford to purchase small 3d printers. The SkyMall 3d printer 
is an excellent example of the spread of relatively inexpensive 
digital manufacturing technologies to homes and offices. De-
velopments in additive manufacturing have the potential to 
transform manufacturing and to produce a new geography of 
manufacturing. In theory, additive manufacturing could elimi-
nate the subcomponent section of the supply chain.13 Thus, the 
emphasis would shift from cost-competition for the subcompo-
13 Jennifer Clark, Working Regions: Reconnecting Innovation and Production in 
the Knowledge Economy (London: Routledge, 2013).
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nents to pre-production elements including: 1) product design, 
2) process design (software) and 3) materials (especially quality 
and purity). Indeed, this shift would produce a very different 
production geography. In fact some manufacturing has already 
transferred from factories back to the home and maker spaces, 
enabling people to develop new products that can be printed 
at home or be printed by a specialist provider of 3d printing 
services. 
These developments will affect the expiry of key patents, the 
formulation of less expensive materials and the creation of ma-
chines that print at fast speeds. 3d printing makes it possible 
to produce light-weight structures that are extremely strong 
and optimism the relationship between material content and 
performance. This should lead to the development of entirely 
new businesses and business models. It is possible to argue that 
additive manufacturing is the most important technological 
development in manufacturing since the introduction of CAD. 
Developments in additive printing mean that individuals and 
small firms will have the capability to develop, design and print 
new products. 3d printers are being developed for domestic use, 
and it should become possible for an individual to purchase a 
product file that enables them to print a product at home. 
Contract providers of 3d printing services already exist, 
and increasingly individuals and firms will be able to purchase 
customized products that are printed locally. Individuals will 
be able to download a 3d file linked to a company which will 
then print the object. A good example of this type of ‘service’ is 
provided by Shapeways (a company based in New York) which 
provide 3d printing services on demand. This technological de-
velopment makes it extremely simple to customize products and 
to alter the relationship between manufacturing and consumers. 
Technically-minded individuals will be able to develop products 
that might be tested by companies that specialist in selling prod-
ucts that can be printed at home or by a provider of 3d printing 
services. This could lead to warehouse inventory levels being 
significantly reduced as more products could be printed close to 
the point of consumption. There are also important sustainabil-
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ity and climate change implications associated with 3d printing, 
as it makes it possible to localize and customize the production 
of many manufactured products. This could lead to the develop-
ment of a much more distributed geography of production, but 
with specific centers allocated for their design and development. 
In effect, places that retain integrated design and production ca-
pacities will benefit, especially those with experience of absorb-
ing process innovations.14 
Conclusion — from the post-industrial city to home-
based manufacturing 
The emergence of post-industrial cities or the shift towards a 
service world was associated with the transfer of manufacturing 
to low-cost locations.15 This transformed Western cities as their 
economies were increasingly based on property and land specu-
lation, financial services and business and professional servic-
es.16 Many of these new economic activities involved the man-
agement of fictitious capital — capital that only existed for these 
new service workers on balance sheets and had limited connec-
tions with real people or tangible products. The economic crisis 
that commenced in 2008 has challenged the emphasis placed 
in Western cities on services and led to a debate regarding the 
rebalancing of national economies towards manufacturing. 
Technological developments and the emergence of digi-
tal manufacturing provide a new driver that is transforming 
manufacturing. This new technology has the potential to con-
vert every home into a miniature factory. There are important 
limitations. At the moment, home-based digital fabrication is 
focused on the production of small products, toys and artworks. 
This still reflects a radical innovation, as before the introduction 
of 3d printing it was impossible to produce many of these prod-
14 Bryson and Rusten, Design Economies and the Changing World Economy; 
Clark, Working Regions.
15 Bryson, Daniels, and Warf, Service Worlds.
16 John R. Bryson, ‘Obsolescence and the Process of Creative Reconstruction’, 
Urban Studies 34, no. 9 (1997): 1439–58.
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ucts in a home setting. Digital manufacturing enables people 
to design and develop new products at home and to customize 
existing products. Products can be created at home and their 
digital files sent anywhere over the Web. This offers possibilities 
for home-based design and development, but printing would be 
undertaken by specialist 3d printing firms. The development of 
maker spaces may address this gap by enabling the printing of 
products in shared workshop settings located close to the home. 
At present, however, they are not widely available. 
We are at the start of a new technological era founded on 
combining digital fabrication with post-industrial, home-based 
workers. These new home-based workers may work elsewhere 
during the day but play with creating new products during the 
evening and at weekends. There could also be home workers 
who specialist in the creation of new digital files and are con-
tracted to companies or working for themselves to produce new 
products as well as new art. Additive tooling will not exceed 
more traditional machine tools, but could support such tooling 
through the development of hybrid manufacturing that blends 
subtractive with additive techniques. The start of the ‘third’ in-
dustrial revolution is returning some forms of manufacturing to 
the home and to the city. New forms of home work are emerging 
that will go hand-in-hand with services and workers who are 
currently able to work from home. These changes have impor-
tant implications for the design of our cities and homes — the 
home of the future must be digitally connected, but it must also 








A flurry of recent commentary calls for a renewed focus on 
wealthy countries ‘making things’.1 Such arguments are gener-
ally framed within discourses on national economic growth and 
ignore the spatial implications of re-industrialization. However, 
treating the promotion of industrial activities as a key compo-
nent of spatially-oriented urban development strategies offers 
promises to broaden the range of benefits delivered by a revived 
manufacturing sector. In realizing this potential, the built form 
supporting industry requires careful consideration. Shifts to-
ward consolidating industry within demarcated zones of utili-
1  Advocates look to the potential for manufacturing to ‘re-balance’ econo-
mies (see Peter Marsh. ‘Hopes for Growth in Manufacturing’, The Financial 
Times, May 29, 2011, https://next.ft.com/content/9627941a-8a13-11e0-beff-
00144feab49a); revive the fortunes of the ‘hollowed-out’ middle classes (see 
Don Peck, ‘Can the Middle Class Be Saved?’, The Atlantic, September 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/09/can-the-middle-
class-be-saved/308600/); and spur innovation and productivity growth (see 
Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Economic Development in His-
torical Perspective [London: Anthem, 2002]).
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tarian sheds in the urban periphery,2 while converting historic 
inner-city industrial buildings for the service economy,3 are 
problematic manifestations of conventional planning for indus-
try in today’s ‘post-industrial’ city. 
In response to inadequate attention to the built environment 
supporting emerging urban industry, I argue for a particularly 
‘conspicuous’ form of production that values the everyday vis-
ibility of industrial activities. I outline some key benefits from 
visible forms of industry and some supportive approaches to the 
planning and design of built environments. Firstly, however, it 
is worth briefly mentioning potential drivers of contemporary 
‘re-industrialization’ in cities to more precisely understand the 
types of production that might be made more ‘conspicuous’. 
Drivers of urban re-industrialization 
The revival of industry in post-industrial cities like London, 
Barcelona or Philadelphia will not involve a return to the modes 
of production or the built environment of nineteenth-century 
industrialization. A number of emerging trends suggest various 
pathways along which contemporary activities of manufacture, 
repair and craft may become more important elements of urban 
economies. Firstly, it is conceivable that the geographic disper-
sal of industry, both to rural locations and further afield to glo-
balized facilities distant from consumer markets, may in some 
cases be reversed. Recent ‘re-shoring’ of manufacturing in the 
United States points in this direction,4 with a US$1 billion initia-
tive by General Electric to re-shore household appliance manu-
2  Owen Hatherley, A Guide to the New Ruins of Britain (London: Verso, 2010).
3  S. Zukin, Naked City: The Death and Life of Authentic Urban Places (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); S. Zukin, Loft Living: Culture and Capital in 
Urban Change (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982).





facturing gaining widespread attention.5 Secondly, advanced 
manufacturing technologies including ‘3d printing’ and digital 
fabrication may facilitate a reorganization of the geography of 
production, with cost-effective smaller scale manufacturing fa-
cilities and ‘mass-customization’6 encouraging the integration 
of production within urban areas closer to consumer markets.7 
Finally, growing enthusiasm for craft and artisanal local manu-
facture may contribute to an expanded ‘boutique manufactur-
ing’ sector that deliberately locates in close proximity to inner-
city consumer markets.8 
Valuing visible industry 
Whether urban re-industrialization means a growing craft sec-
tor or a relocation of mass manufacturing, the quality of the 
built environment supporting these activities can strengthen 
the benefits resulting from a revived industrial sector. Currently, 
urban manufacturing businesses often occupy locations that are 
5  Ed Crooks, ‘GE Takes $1bn Risk in Bringing Jobs Home’, Financial Times, 
April 2, 2012, https://next.ft.com/content/21a46546-78f1-11e1-88c5-
00144feab49a. 
6  ‘Mass customization’ has gained currency as a concept in business and man-
agement literature since the early 1990s. For instance, see Joseph B. Pine 
II, Mass Customization: The New Frontier in Business Competition (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 1993). Jane Jacobs makes a much earlier 
reference to the idea in Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (London: Jona-
thon Cape, 1969), 245: ‘Mass-production manufacturing will no longer be 
regarded as city work. Cities will manufacture even more goods than they 
do today, but these will be almost wholly differentiated production goods, 
made in relatively small, or very small, organizations’. 
7  Neil Gershenfeld, ‘How to Make Almost Anything: The Digital Fabrication 
Revolution’, Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (2012): 43–57.
8  Recently formed advocacy organizations in a number of North Ameri-
can cities promote the potential of expanding urban artisanal production 
(alongside a broader interest in all forms of urban manufacturing) and in-
clude San Francisco-based SFMade, and Made in NYC. Examples of craft 
manufacturing in these cities include inner-city breweries, apparel, jewelry 
and furniture producers. See A. Arieff. ‘The Future of Manufacturing Is Lo-
cal’, The New York Times, March 27, 2011, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.
com/2011/03/27/the-future-of-manufacturing-is-local/?_r=0. 
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far from ‘conspicuous’. While advanced ‘re-shored’ manufac-
turing may return to urban rather than rural areas, it will most 
likely occupy sheds in segregated industrial zones. Artisanal 
manufacturing may be similarly hidden, using low-cost spaces 
in dilapidated remnants of nineteenth-century industrial build-
ings. Against this invisibility, a built environment that explicitly 
prioritizes public connections to industry can bring benefits in 
raising awareness of production processes, enabling social en-
gagement between producers and the public and enriching eve-
ryday experiences of being in the public spaces of the city. 
Awareness
Industry that is publicly visible supports a range of connections 
between consumers and producers of manufactured goods. For 
example, a furniture maker with its production process open to 
a busy street, or even a car factory with manufacturing visible 
to passing motorists, can connect passers-by to the processes of 
manufacturing. This visual presence of production can prompt 
understanding of the human labor,9 mechanical processes and 
energy required to produce the often taken-for-granted material 
goods of our industrial society.10 Eco-localists refer to the IMBY 
(in my back yard) effect of local production in establishing an 
everyday awareness of the human and environmental costs of 
9  Richard Sennett’s celebration of ‘The Craftsman’ sees this archetypal figure 
as representing ‘the special human condition of being engaged’: Richard 
Sennett, The Craftsman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 20. The 
visibility of the human work and practical skill of the craftsman might be 
‘honored’ and ‘acknowledged’ in the public realm.
10  The visibility of local production can help counter the ‘alienation’ of ur-
ban consumers from distant ‘manufacturing hinterlands’ — somewhat 
analogous to the alienation from distant ecological hinterlands obscured 
by infrastructural networks for food, energy and water. See Stephen Gra-
ham (ed.), Disrupted Cities: When Infrastructure Fails (London: Routledge, 
2009); N. Heynen, M. Kaika, and E. Swyngedouw, In the Nature of Cities: 
Urban Political Ecology and the Politics of Urban Metabolism (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature and the 
City (New York: Routledge, 2005).
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production,11 and the possibility of more considered consump-
tion behaviors.12 At the same time, more public forms of produc-
tion might act as a form of quality assurance, pressuring busi-
nesses to improve their environmental and social performance. 
Social/economic engagement
Beyond establishing a visual awareness of production processes 
among urban consumers, some forms of industry can also allow 
for social engagement through economic exchanges between 
makers and buyers. Small-scale industries supplying local cus-
tomers illustrate the possibilities of these types of relationships. 
Referring to ‘Reyd’s Bespoke Tailor Shop’ in London, Suzanne 
Hall describes the ‘respect’ that emerges in the direct encounter 
between producers and consumers:
This form of respect — the reciprocal recognition between 
maker and wearer — of the skill involved in making a be-
spoke garment is not a social relation that can exist in off-
the-peg fashion stores, where the product on display is sepa-
rated from its process of making.13
These relationships of respect and ‘reciprocal recognition’ add a 
richness to social experiences not possible within conventional 
consumer-retailer exchanges based around the sale of goods 
made in distant hinterlands. Furthermore, these direct connec-
tions with makers can strengthen local economies by orienting 
consumer spending toward local manufacturers rather than 
multinational corporations. 
11  Fred Curtis, ‘Eco-Localism and Sustainability’, Ecological Economics 46 
(2003): 83–102, at 93. 
12  Colin Hines, Localization: A Manifesto (London: Earthscan, 2000), 35.
13  Suzanne Hall, City, Street and Citizen: The Measure of the Ordinary (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2012), 86.
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Rich and distinctive urban experiences
The visibility and presence of industrial activities in the spaces 
of everyday life can provide rich and distinctive experiences for 
city dwellers. Stronger connections between productive process-
es and public space can contribute to a fuller sensory experience 
of urban life that counters the ‘erosion of the perceptual sphere’ 
accompanying too much ‘sanitized’ urban re-development.14 
The activity of industry, including the noise, smells and rhythms 
of human and mechanical production can be celebrated for the 
diversity and interest that they bring to city streets. While there 
may be conflict over what is treated as ‘nuisance’ or as adding 
vitality to the street, recent urbanism may well have gone too 
far in attempting to eliminate sensory confrontation. At worst, 
current post-industrial spatial conditions involve a sterile mo-
notony of glass office and retail frontages in prime spaces of 
the city, and the relegation of industry to equally monotonous 
sheds in well-defined suburban industrial parks. A re-industri-
alization that celebrates what Jane Jacobs termed the ‘jumble’ of 
the diverse and truly mixed-use street,15 can contribute to more 
distinctive and intriguing urban experiences. 
Visible forms of urban industry can further make everyday 
experiences of being in the city more meaningful by connect-
ing public life with the activities going on ‘behind the scenes’ 
of building frontages. Connecting the public realm with that 
of workplaces is a challenge not only for industrial activities, 
but also for the hidden and disconnected work done in offices. 
Making work more visible increases the legibility of the city 
and might introduce other ways of being in public — or loosely 
among others — in ways that are different to dominant modes of 
consumption-based public space.16
14  Mirko Zardini (ed.), Sense of the City: An Alternative Approach to Urbanism 
(Baden: Lars Müller Publishers, 2005), 21.
15  Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of American Cities (New York: Modern Li-
brary, 1961).
16  Steven Miles, Spaces for Consumption: Pleasure and Placelessness in the Post-
Industrial City (London: Sage, 2010); Demos, People Make Place: Growing 
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Spatial planning and design for visible urban industry 
Encouraging the visibility of industry requires a particular ap-
proach to spatial planning and design. It raises questions across 
scales about how different spatial arrangements — from the 
planning of urban regions to the configuration of rooms in a 
building — impact on the everyday visibility of industry. In the 
following section, I outline two elements of spatial policy and 
design that may support the emergence of a more conspicuous 
form of production. 
Beyond industrial zones
Urban-planning conventions that emerged from historical re-
sponses to the noxious ‘nuisances’ of nineteenth-century indus-
trialization have resulted in regulating-out particularly pollut-
ing or noisy industries from the densely inhabited parts of cities 
in advanced economies.17 Zoning regulations have encouraged 
remaining industrial activities (even those with limited external 
impacts) to locate in demarcated industrial areas, often deliber-
ately segregated from the spaces of everyday urban life. While 
this approach continues to make sense for a range of heavy in-
dustries, the type of activities driving contemporary re-indus-
trialization, such as digital fabrication and craft, are relatively 
clean and quiet, and their placement in the city should not be 
determined by planning approaches based on exclusive land-
use zoning.
Even current urban-planning strategies that encourage ur-
ban industrial activities continue to favor approaches based on 
the continuation of segregated industrial zones. In London, for 
instance, industrial land is valued by official planning policy, but 
the Public Life of Cities (London: Demos, 2005); Susan Christopherson, ‘The 
Fortress City’, in Post-Fordism: A Reader, ed. A. Amin, 409–25 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995).
17  The amelioration of negative impacts from industry has been central to the 
historical development of urban spatial planning practices. See Paul Hall, 
Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in 
the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).
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policy also attempts to consolidate industry in large-scale de-
marcated areas, predominantly on the outskirts of the city and 
less visible to everyday public life. This is despite 60 per cent 
of all industrial land being located in small parcels dispersed 
throughout the city — behind the high street or in neighbor-
hood workshops.18
Alternative spatial policies could encourage dispersed ar-
rangements of small industrial zones throughout the urban re-
gion. Better still, land-use zoning could be relaxed to allow light 
industrial activities to co-exist with other uses in more broadly 
defined mixed-use zones.19 These types of policies could create 
a more visible form of industry through integration and mix-
ing with residential and commercial uses.20 Such policies could 
bring industry closer to the spaces of urban residents’ everyday 
lives, allowing for more accessible connections between con-
sumers and producers, and between people’s homes and indus-
trial workplaces.
Transparent factories
Spatial planning at the city scale is essential for allowing new 
and existing industrial activities to locate in places closely con-
nected with the public life of the city. Planning at the city scale 
is not, by itself, sufficient to ensure the everyday visibility of in-
dustry. The design of individual buildings and the relationship 
between industrial activities and the public spaces of the street 
are also important for realizing the benefits of conspicuous pro-
duction. 
18  Greater London Authority, Supplementary Planning Guidance: Industrial 
Capacity (London: Greater London Authority, 2008), 34.
19  A change of industrial-zoning categories and introduction of industrial 
mixed-use zones has been recommended in Philadelphia in the United 
States. See Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation, An Industrial 
Market and Land Use Strategy for the City of Philadelphia — Executive Sum-
mary (2010), 17, http://www.pidcphila.com/images/uploads/resource_li-
brary/PIMLUS_Executive_Summary_Final_September_2010.pdf. 
20  As documented with some examples from London in Urhahn Urban De-
sign, Industry in the City: A Report for the London Development Agency and 
Greater London Authority (Amsterdam: Urhahn Urban Design, 2010).
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Visible industry need not involve extremes of ‘transparent 
factories’,21 but consideration of how industrial activities might 
contribute to the public life of the city deserves more attention. 
It is rare for current planning policy to place value on the form 
of industrial buildings, even in cases where policy pays careful 
attention to the provision of industrially-zoned land.22
In imagining contemporary re-industrialization based on 
high-tech manufacturing, distributed digital fabrication and 
the revival of craft, there are various ways in which these ac-
tivities might be made publicly visible. For instance, a degree of 
permeability in the interface between public and private space 
is important in connecting interior production spaces with ex-
terior public life. Rather than industrial premises having blank 
walls facing streets or being located along back alleys, industry 
could be valued for its contribution to achieving conventional 
urban design objectives of vibrant streets and active ground-
floor frontages. 
It is easy to imagine street-level workshops with open win-
dows and doors allowing glimpses of craft-type activities to pas-
sers-by. Furthermore, hybrid making-selling spaces can provide 
an intermediate semi-public retail space that directly links pro-
ducers with consumers. Simple design features at the building 
scale can expand the scope for interaction between industrial 
producers and the urban public. Open windows, large door-
ways and opportunities for signage are all useful. Likewise, it 
is important to prevent careless and inflexible design that often 
characterizes ground-floor commercial spaces in contemporary 
residential-led ‘mixed-use’ development. Awkward transitions 
between public and private spaces created by changes of level, 
steps and fences all prevent interaction between building and 
21  The name given to Volkswagon’s glass-clad car assembly plant in Dresden, 
Germany, constructed in 1992 and open for public tours.
22  See, for example, progressive urban industrialization strategies including 
Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation, An Industrial Market 
and Land Use Strategy, 17; Nisha Mistry, Newark’s Manufacturing Competi-
tiveness (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2013), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/NewarkManufacturingMay28.pdf.
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street, and reduce the flexibility of spaces for industrial uses. 
Exposing larger-scale mechanical, rather than craft, processes 
of production may present more challenges and may not offer 
businesses the same advantages from direct links with consum-
ers. Nevertheless, heightened visibility of such processes still has 
benefits for the legibility of the city, and exposing these types of 
activities may offer exciting design opportunities.
Further questions
This chapter has sketched an argument for the importance of 
paying attention to the built form that will support any future 
urban re-industrialization. Specifically, the concept of ‘conspic-
uous production’ is used to suggest ways in which the spatial 
planning of cities and the design of buildings accommodating 
industrial uses can support the public visibility and integration 
of industry within mixed-use urban environments. A number of 
questions emerge from this brief discussion and deserve a men-
tion. Firstly, the benefits of visible industry have in this chapter 
been framed primarily around advantages to a ‘consuming pub-
lic’. It will be important to further investigate how visibility ben-
efits producers themselves, especially when inconspicuousness 
may often be a deliberate strategy for manufacturers who may 
wish to avoid public scrutiny. Secondly, in focusing on advan-
tages to the public life of cities, this chapter has not dealt with a 
range of other benefits from re-industrialization, including em-
ployment, environmental and energy-use implications, and the 
promise of innovation and other economic advantages arising 
from urban production. Expanded versions of this chapter will 
need to consider how the concept of visibility may complement 
these arguments. Finally, while the chapter deliberately focussed 
on the reform of spatial and built environment conditions as 
a neglected aspect of the re-industrialization argument, a con-
sideration of changes to politico-economic and institutional 
conditions will be equally important in realizing the promise of 







This chapter explores Industri[us], an initiative that was set up 
in early 2011 by ‘Fluid’ (architects and urban strategists) and 
collaborators in order to highlight the growing opportunity of 
upcycling1 and its uses in urban regeneration and sustainable 
development. To begin, I explain the concept of Industri[us], 
its motives and its relationship to the theme of re-industriali-
zation and progressive urbanism. I also discuss and present the 
‘Festival of Up-Cycling’ in Canning Town which was delivered 
from May to September 2012 and was a prototype and test case 
for how up-cycling can contribute towards sustainable develop-
ment and have a role in urban regeneration. 
The basic premise of Industri[us] is to put a vacant site to cre-
ative interim use in advance of commercial development taking 
place. To do this requires collaboration with the growing com-
munity of designers and makers working with waste materials 
and needing better access to the market; the resulting network 
connects with a supply of waste materials, as well as providing 
1 Up-cycling is the making of desirable goods from waste materials — i.e., 
items and materials that people and industries throw away.
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a series of innovation and education programs. This approach 
to making use of essentially ‘useless’ and time- limited land is a 
reaction to a consideration of what isn’t working in cities today, 
in particular looking at high streets and town centers, and con-
sidering how improvements could be made through reflecting 
on social, economic and environmental values and transforma-
tions. It is also a response to the increasing loss of industrial 
activity from the urban condition and the steady movement 
towards a mono-cultural city. The project also seeks to enable 
communities to take ownership and control of their environ-
ment, address inequality, move towards self-sufficiency and, 
through participation and occupation, foster notions of public 
space that are both relevant and successful. 
‘Fluid’ works at the threshold between architecture, planning 
and creative practice, having been involved in urban projects 
since the 1990s and having developed a process of dynamic 
planning that is driven by community engagement and partici-
pation. The act of design engages with the social and cultural as 
well as the physical and is seen as a service, not just a product. 
The work engages with the macro-, meso- and micro-scales, 
linking big strategic thinking with small scale-change and in-
tervention, believing that the things that really influence and af-
fect the city are those at the level of infrastructure and human 
interaction. Industri[us] signifies an intent that has multiple 
readings: the connection with Industry and heritage, the idea 
of making and doing, the notion of hard work and the fact that 
we do it. 
Objectives
Industri[us] is about helping communities to get back on their 
feet and thrive. Through injecting short-term activity into an 
unused site and creating new businesses and jobs by harnessing 
waste as an economic opportunity, it seeks to bring about posi-
tive longer-term social, economic and environmental changes. 
As well as setting out to revalue waste materials, Industri[us] 
places the provision of training opportunities to help people 
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into employment and to connect the communities that are at 
the centre of its operations. Through this, a lasting skills base 
is built, strengthening local networks and raising aspirations. It 
is becoming widely accepted that to move towards a more sus-
tainable urban environment, our future high streets and town 
centers must be multi-functional social and cultural ‘institu-
tions’. To achieve this aim, a variety of changes need to occur 
that encourage activity, interaction and a range of experiences 
that are rooted in the interests and needs of local people and that 
provide opportunities and the infrastructure for local enterprise 
to support local institutions and meet the demands for a flex-
ible and innovative move towards change. By encouraging lo-
cal innovation and cultural expression and being a platform for 
creating new businesses, Industri[us] aims to directly addresses 
these objectives to re-think town centers in an economically 
sustainable way, creating a destination for a wider audience. At 
the same time, the project strongly promotes the ambitions of a 
‘low-carbon economy’ through self-sufficiency and local econo-
mies creating projects entirely from borrowed, used or re-usable 
materials.
Value
Industri[us] is a place of work, making, learning, playing, ex-
change, trade and interaction that offers a new model for the 
development of existing high streets. The value of ‘meanwhile’ is 
an underused resource in planning and development, offering 
critical creativity, opportunity and sustainability. Instead of top-
down masterplanning, the ‘meanwhile’ idea involves a more dy-
namic approach, working across disciplines in order to test and 
seed change for the long-term legacy of a site. This dynamism 
means exploring new forms of practice that cross boundaries 
between architecture, planning and art: such a collaborative 
method expands to include wider community participation in 
order to negotiate the social, economic and cultural aspects of 
the site. Investigating and animating vacant sites, the ‘mean-
while’ idea is as much about the space in between as the time 
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in between. More usually, these spaces are located in areas of 
transition, which itself generates creative enterprise and experi-
mentation. 
One of the ways Industri[us] attempts to engage with vacant 
sites and the local community is through The Meanwhile Pro-
ject. The aim of this project is to provide opportunities for de-
sign in its broadest sense, with the architect acting as an agent 
of change. It is a narrative and situation-based form of design 
where the ordinary can be transformed into the extraordinary. 
The process itself is as important as the product, comprised of 
illuminating moments of exchange, achievement, insight and 
learning, aimed at enabling and empowering communities and 
stakeholders.
The Up-cycling context
The scale of waste produced in London is vast. Of the 3,860,000 
tonnes generated in 2009 to 2010, 68% went to landfill or for 
incineration and just 32% for recycling or reuse. Only 6,000 
tonnes of waste were diverted away from landfill by reuse or-
ganizations in 2011; 40,000 tonnes is the Mayor’s target for 2015. 
A lot needs to be done to raise the profile and practice of reuse 
and up-cycling to hit this target.
Neither the current nor the potential value of the up-cycling 
market are easy to quantify because, as an emerging industry, 
figures are not readily available. However, both the National In-
dustrial Symbiosis Programme (NISP) in the UK and Chicago’s 
Waste-to-Profit Network are demonstrating the capacity of 
waste and reuse to create new enterprises and employment; in-
cluding old tyres turned into playground mats, restaurant cook-
ing oils turned into biodiesel, old uniforms turned into bags 
and glass scraps turned into countertops. Despite the economic 
downturn, the picture for emerging creative and innovative 
businesses looks relatively good. 
Meanwhile, the financial gain to manufacturers of putting 
their waste to new use is known to be considerable. Established 
brands such as Freitag and new brands such as Styling & Sal-
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vage have entered the retail mainstream. In addition, there are 
an increasing number of high-profile events focusing on fashion 
reuse, such as ‘super-swish’ clothes swaps. The emerging market 
for up-cycled goods demonstrates that such products can gener-
ate considerable value and that people are buying into the idea 
of ‘something created out of nothing’. Industri[us] aims to foster 
this creative transformation by providing enterprise opportuni-
ties for existing up-cyclers and facilitating others to enter the 
industry. It also creates a ‘hub’ by drawing together like-minded 
groups and through this critical mass forming a destination.
An ‘engine of change’
Conceived as a production line in an ‘engine of change’, popu-
lated by an evolving coalition of artists, entrepreneurs, social 
businesses, mentors and local people who all realize the value of 
waste, the concept of Industri[us] in practice is made up of three 
elements: the Engine Room, the Makeshift Market and the Spot-
light. The Industri[us] production line begins with the delivery 
and collection of materials suitable for reuse — from individu-
als, schools, markets, manufacturers — before they become part 
of the conventional waste disposal chain. The Engine Room is 
the brain of the Industri[us] operation and home to a range of 
innovative producers — from start-ups and those in need of a 
launch pad, to existing enterprises looking to expand or to co-
locate with others working in material reuse. Workshop spaces 
are provided for carpentry, jewelry-making and other small-
scale fabrication; while training and mentoring are offered for 
start-up creative businesses, linked with local professionals and 
groups through partnership schemes. Community groups and 
schools can come to the Engine Room for hands-on activities 
and learning.
Completed products are then delivered to the Makeshift 
Market — the Industri[us] ‘shopfront’. Here, products from the 
Engine Room workshops and other makers are displayed and 
sold in an ‘arcade’ — a demountable structure built from reused 
materials. Visitors can also learn workshop skills or how to 
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‘make-do-and-mend’, whilst also enjoying food stalls and out-
door entertainments. A central ‘think space’ provides an ideas 
forum and an ad hoc research base for up-cycling, while smaller 
spaces are available for themed activities and discussions. By 
offering up-cycled fashion, furniture, art and accessories — at 
competitive prices — Makeshift attracts a particular but grow-
ing type of consumer. It is a shopping destination, as well as a 
beacon of creative enterprise and green innovation, with the 
potential to be replicated on other sites. A variety of entertain-
ment events staged at Makeshift attempts to draw in a wider au-
dience and additional revenue, from makers’ fairs and fashion 
shows to fun science activities and DIY workshops. A weekly, 
seasonal and potentially annual calendar of events is the next 
stage of development and is established and curated by the local 
Industri[us] team.
The final part of the production line involved in Industri[us] 
is Spotlight. Spotlight is a place for public spectacle, with large-
scale installations designed to make people think twice about 
the nature of ‘waste’. A dynamic large-scale installation, Spot-
light acts as a highly visible signpost for Industri[us] and aims 
to prompt people to rethink the nature of waste.
The Festival of Up-Cycling
Industri[us] first came to life through the Meanwhile London 
‘Festival of Up-Cycling’ in Canning Town in the Olympic sum-
mer of 2012. Developed in collaboration with local organiza-
tions and delivery partners, the Festival provided work experi-
ence and paid training opportunities for young people and the 
long-term unemployed. It also supported existing up-cycling 
businesses and start-ups, making and selling products from fur-
niture and art to jewelry and fashion in order to create a show-
case and model for enterprise. The project was created entirely 
from borrowed, used or reusable materials, including pavers 
from the nearby Olympics roadworks to plants, materials and 
whole gardens reused from the Chelsea Flower Show. Two tem-
porary public squares were created on the Canning Town site, 
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along with a street ‘pop-up’ food market and a striking scaffold-
ing pavilion to house an up-cycling market and other associated 
events.
Industri[us] at Canning Town had two starting points — the 
amount of waste produced by or traveling through the London 
Borough of New ham (towards wharves for onward transporta-
tion to landfill sites) and the growing ‘community of interest’ in 
up-cycling (both locally and regionally) — turning waste mate-
rials and products into desirable and valuable objects for use 
and sale. This dovetailed with the Greater London Authority’s 
(GLA’s) vision for a Green Enterprise District, lead by the arrival 
of Siemens in the Royal Docks. In 2009 to 2010, only 15 percent 
of Newham’s waste went for recycling or reuse. However, the 
future looks brighter with the growth of local social enterprises 
promoting community recycling and generating employment 
through the resale of used products. 
The Festival of Up-Cycling gathered together makers, doers, 
traders and show people to create a destination through critical 
mass. It provided support and links with other green enterprise 
initiatives in the area and hosted a Green Pioneers Conference 
with the London Borough of Newham, University of East Lon-
don and Happold Consulting. The exchange that occurred at the 
festival through training and skilling in studios and workspaces 
brought with it the notion of the prosumer and reintroduced the 
world of making at the heart of a neighborhood. Newham is one 
of the most deprived boroughs in London, with unemployment 
rates at double the national average and almost a quarter of the 
population without qualifications or workplace skills training. 
However, with the UK’s largest population of under-twenty-five-
year-olds,2 it was through the staging of the Festival that the op-
portunity to tap into and help train a wealth of dormant talent 
was realized.
The Festival of Up-Cycling officially launched on July 27, 
2012 and, coinciding with the start of the London 2012 Olympic 
2 Figures sourced from NEF report on the 2012 Games and East London, April 
2008.
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Games, closed in early September. Located on Silvertown Way 
and opposite Canning Town Station, the site fronted onto the 
Olympics Spectator Walking Route which led down to ExCel. 
By day the Canning Town Giant, constructed entirely from re-
claimed wood from local businesses, and designed and erected 
by the Robot Art collective with help from local youth group 
Peacock Gym, created a local icon and visual marker for the 
project. By night, the Makeshift pavilion became an illuminated 
beacon.
A broad audience was sought from those with an interest in 
reuse and design, to those who wished to buy their lunch from 
the street food market, or to explore the makeshift market and 
showcase of up-cycled design and local goods for sale. A num-
ber of live music nights were staged, which attracted audiences 
from the local area and further afield. During its time in op-
eration, the Festival supported a number of existing up-cycling 
businesses and start-ups, who make and sell products from fur-
niture and art to jewelry and clothing.
Conclusion
Industri[us] is as much about the process of transformation as 
about an end result. So its short operational time was not as im-
portant as the fact that ten young local trainees gained employ-
ment following their involvement. Although the makeshift mar-
ket structure was dismantled in September 2012, ‘Fluid’ handed 
over the license for the site to their partners, Groundwork UK, 
who have continued to operate it as a Reuse Centre, supporting 
community events such as car-boot sales and retaining the Gi-
ant Canning Town Robot. In 2013, the site again received plant-
ing and materials from the Chelsea Flower Show continuing the 
landscaping of the large site to create a positive public garden 
whilst providing training and routes into employment for the 
under-skilled and long-term unemployed.
Industri[us] has inspired many other projects and has been 
used as a best-practice example for the development of interim-
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use strategies as part of regeneration processes, including in-




Working with the Neighbors 
Cooperative Practices Delivering 
Sustainable Benefits
Kate Royston
In our fast-moving, goal-driven society it’s easy to be insular, but 
considerable benefits can be gained from talking to, and work-
ing with, the neighbors. This can be particularly true across port 
industrial areas. Ports and their related industrial and amenity 
areas are critical economic and social components in their re-
gion. As hubs for industry, business, leisure and logistics, they 
are also resource-intensive and can pose environmental and so-
cial challenges. In the Netherlands, ports are vital to the national 
economy. Faced with increasing growth, limited space and ever-
tightening environmental constraints, innovative collaborative 
solutions have had to be developed to support port areas’ inten-
sification. One approach is industrial ecological thinking.
Industrial ecology thinking
Industrial ecology examines the way in which industrial systems 
can mimic natural systems, and in so doing reduce their impact 
on, and increase their harmony with, the natural environment. 
In natural systems, materials are part of closed cycles or circular 
systems. Industrial ecology seeks to take a systematic approach 
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to the ‘management of materials and energy flows through the 
human economy, including beneficial use of waste’.1
Understanding the materials, energy, water and other re-
sources being consumed to produce products and services is 
an important starting point for systematically looking at how 
industrial systems and processes can be re-designed, costs re-
duced and new opportunities grasped. Importantly, this could 
also support the pro-active management of the risks and vulner-
abilities we face from reducing resource availability.
IE evolution across Dutch Port areas
The practice of IE across Dutch port areas appears to have 
evolved from the Rotterdam area facilitated by a history of busi-
ness association (now represented by Deltalinqs), catalyzed in 
the late 1990s by government support to extend environmental 
improvement beyond mere compliance.2
IE and the Port of Rotterdam
A suggestion to test some of the lessons from Kalundborg in 
Denmark, where inter-firm co-operation began in the early 
1980s, led to the start of the Industrial EcoSystem (INES) project 
in 1994. A long-running project, INES gave rise to a number of 
influential co-operative opportunities which continue to evolve 
today. These include the Botlek steam-pipe network, with the 
1 Roland Clift, ‘Clean Technology and Industrial Ecology’, in Pollution: 
Causes, Effects and Control, ed. R.M. Harrison, 411–44 (Cambridge: The 
Royal Society of Chemistry, 2001).
2 René van Berkel, ‘Regional Resource Synergies for Sustainable Development 
in Heavy Industrial Areas: An Overview of Opportunities and Experiences’, 
2009, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270340749_Regional_Re-
source_Synergies_for_Sustainable_Development_in_Heavy_Industrial_
Areas_an_Overview_of_Opportunities_and_Experiences; Frank Boons, 
‘Self-Organisation & Sustainability: The Emergence of a Regional Industrial 
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potential to save 400,000 tonnes of CO2 per annum and deliver 
air-quality improvement, currently under construction.3
Now considered normal practice across the port industrial 
area, IE principles have been incorporated within the design of 
Maasvlakte II, the newest development area of the port, which 
will be serviced through the provision of centralized utilities.4 
Significant benefit is also being derived from the Organic CO2 
for Assimilation of Plants (OCAP) initiative, supplying 500 hor-
ticultural businesses over 1,600 hectares with residual CO2 from 
Shell Pernis.5 The horticulturists benefit from production and 
quality improvements and stable supply prices and are able to 
save 95 million cubic meters (m3)/per annum (pa) of natural gas 
and 170,000 tonnes/pa of CO2 emissions.6
Port of Moerdijk
The Port of Moerdijk, a leading light in eco-industrial park de-
velopment, has evolved from its beginnings as a petrochemical 
cluster. Established in the 1970s to link Shell Moerdijk via pipe-
lines to Shell Pernis (Rotterdam), there are numerous material 
flows between Shell and other cluster organizations.
In 1994, a study of environmental practices initiated by the 
provincial government led to an action plan to redevelop the 
area as an eco-industrial estate, beginning with collaborative en-
vironmental monitoring.7 Progress has been supported through 
3 Rotterdam Climate Initiative, Full Steam Ahead! Rotterdam Climate Initia-
tive: 2008 Report — Summary (Rotterdam: Rotterdam Climate Initiative, 
2009), http://www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl/documents/ samenvat-
ting%20Op%20Stoom%20EN.pdf; Port of Rotterdam, ‘Port Wants Steam 
Pipe For Co2 Reduction’, November 22, 2009, http://www.portofrotterdam.
com/en/News/pressreleases-news/Pages/20091126_01.aspx.
4 Port of Rotterdam, ‘Innovative Use of Space Looking for Environmental 
Advantages’, 2016, https://www.maasvlakte2.com/en/index/show/id/696/
sustainable-layout.
5 OCAP, CO2 voor de tuinbouw — Factsheet 2012, 2012, http://www.ocap.nl/
files/Ocap_Factsheet2012_UK.pdf
6 Ibid.
7 Haven van Moerdijk, ‘Port of Moerdijk’, 2016, http://www.havenschapmo-
erdijk.nl/en/. Haven Amsterdam, ‘Port of Amsterdam’; Harmen Veldman, 
personal communication to author, August 31, 2011.
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a multi-party steering group, with the businesses represented by 
their association (BIM). The Port Authority acts as co-ordinator 
and facilitator.8 
Over time, an increasing number of beneficial relationships 
have developed. Shell, the anchor tenant, supports a number 
of residual flows, including steam with the co-sited municipal 
incineration plant (Afvalverbranding Zuid-Nederland — AZN) 
and co-generation plant (Essent), and CO2 is piped to Omya 
(a neighbouring business — see fig. 1) where it is used, togeth-
er with CO2 from NV Slibverwerking Noord-Brabant’s sewage 
sludge incineration, in the production of calcium carbonate.
8 René van Berkel, ‘Regional Resource Synergies’; Haven van Moerdijk, ‘Port 
of Moerdijk’. 
Fig. 1: Sustainable Links at Moerdijk. Source: Moerdijk Port Author-
ity. Key: red dashed line — potential connections for residual heat, 
energy, water and CO2; white solid line — existing connections; yellow 
‘hatched’ area — expansion area (132 ha) for a chemical industry 
cluster
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A further detailed resource-flow assessment across the area 
identified more potential linkages and established the ‘Sustain-
able Links Moerdijk’ (fig. 1) program. Supported by an enabling 
agreement and funding instruments, it includes a vision to im-
plement an ‘Energyweb’ across the area, which is now well un-
derway.
Zeeland Seaports
At Zeeland Seaports, well-established industries such as Dow 
Chemicals have capitalized upon their residual resource streams 
through symbiotic linkages which have evolved over time; for 
example, pipelines have replaced haulage between Cargill and 
Nedalco. The importance of these connections was recognized 
by Zeeland Seaports and other stakeholders, and Valuepark 
Terneuzen (VPT) and Biopark Terneuzen (BPT) were established 
in 2007.9 
BPT’s aim is to attract more agro-industrial businesses sup-
ported by ‘smart links’ to interconnect resource streams (fig.2).10 
This would enable a ‘plug-and-play’ offer to be made to new 
businesses, reducing the risk for the new entrant as well as ena-
bling diversification for the port. The feasibility of the deploy-
ment of implementing a Multi-User Provider (MUP) pipeline 
concept across the whole area is being explored as part of the 
EU project Ports Adapting To Change (PATCH);11 and a pilot joint 
venture, Warmco, has been set up to deliver heat and 70,000 
tonnes pa of CO2 to a new development of horticultural produc-
9 Partners include Cargill, Nedalco, Yara, EcoServices, ESV Groep, Heros 
Groep, Rosendaal Energy, Valuepark Terneuzen (JV Zeeland Seaports & 
Dow Benelux), Gemeente Terneuzen, Provincie Zeeland and Zeeland Sea-
ports Port Authority.
10 D. Engelhardt, ‘Sustainability in the Bio/Agro Industry: A Case Study’, In-
stitute of Civil Engineers 163, no. 1 (2010): 3–8, http://www.icevirtuallibrary.
com/doi/pdf/10.1680/warm.2010.163.1.3
11 H. Holt, The Art of Green Patchwork: European Ports Collaborate to Innovate 
Ports Adapting To Change (patch), GreenPort, 2011; http://www.zeeland-
seaports.nl/nl/download/file:green-patchwork.htm 
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ers. The co-operation also extends across the border with the 
Ghent Bio Energy Valley in Belgium to form Bio Base Europe.12
Port of Amsterdam
A number of initiatives at the Port of Amsterdam (PoA) have 
evolved through its close links with the City government. Indus-
trial ecology is seen as an important component in enabling the 
City and PoA to achieve their jointly set targets to reduce CO2 
emissions by 40 percent by 2025.13
12 D. Engelhardt, Sustainability in the Bio/Agro Industry; ‘Bio Base Europe’, 
2011, http://www.biobaseeurope.eu/. 
13 Roselin Dey, ‘Amsterdam — Sustainable City in the Making’, Justmeans, 
May 26, 2010, http://www.justmeans.com/blogs/amsterdam-sustainable-
city-in-the-making; ‘For a Clean Society’, The Amsterdam Energy Company 
(AEB), 2016, http://www.aebamsterdam.com. 
Fig. 2: Biopark Terneuzen Smart links. Key: hitte = heat, biomassa = 
biomass, electriciteit = electricity, stoom = steam, zetmeel = starch. 
Source: Biopark Terneuzen, Benefits for business and the environ-
ment, Biopark Terneuzen, 2012, http://www.bioparkterneuzen.com/
nl/download/file:drieluikfolder-biopark-2012.htm.
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The Amsterdam Energy Company
The Amsterdam Energy Company (AEB) is a PoA tenant, op-
erated by the City of Amsterdam.14 Its two incinerators are co-
located with a waste water treatment plant. Feedstock includes 
municipal and commercial waste, and sewage sludge from the 
water treatment plant. 1 million MegaWatt Hours (MWh) elec-
tricity is output each year supplying the City, powering its tram 
and metro systems, street lighting and several buildings.15 Fur-
ther, Westport Warmte (WPW), a joint venture between the City 
and an energy company, takes heat from AEB and supplies local 
businesses and residents.16
Greenmills is also of interest. A partnership of businesses 
producing bio-diesel, bio-ethanol and bio-gas have co-located, 
taking in residual streams from port area food and animal feed 
producers and gaining logistical advantages and efficiency of re-
source use (including heat and water) through collaboration.17 
Surplus heat is distributed via a WPW connection,18 A resource 
mapping project called ‘Waste = Raw Materials in the Amster-
dam harbors region’ sponsored by the City and the Port Author-
ity ’) also identified organic phosphorous which is being used by 
ICI Fertilizers.19
Drivers, enablers and barriers
Industrial ecology is clearly an important factor in Dutch port 
development, for individual businesses and for the port estate 
and wider area as a whole. In Moerdijk, the co-operative prac-
tices have been particularly well-embedded within the area’s 
14 ‘Welcome to Amsterdam’s Waste and Energy Company’.
15 J. Lammers, Seaports as Turntables towards Sustainability: Policy Letter on 
Sustainable Seaports, Directoraat-Generaal Luchtvaart en Maritieme Za-
ken, Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008.
16 Haven van Amsterdam, ‘Port of Amsterdam’, 2011, http://www.portofam-
sterdam.nl/smartsite.dws?id=18493. 
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.; Veldman, personal communication to author. 
19 Ibid.; Veldman, personal communication to author. 
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management and partnership structures. Whilst differences can 
be seen in their evolution (timing and approaches) there are a 
number of common factors. These were compared to practices 
in the UK through a research study across twenty port opera-
tions in Southwest England.20 This highlighted that key drivers 
are much weaker. The strong Dutch regulatory pressure and 
government support to improve environmental conditions are 
less evident, whilst barriers are much in evidence. There is lim-
ited contact between businesses, and business associations link-
ing neighbors to common aims are rare. Co-operation around 
common interests such as planning and development, through 
multi-stakeholder partnerships, is also uncommon, This limits 
chances to develop trusting relationships. The limited public 
stake in the port realm is also a factor.
There are opportunities, but these need enabling. The role of 
facilitators and champions, such as anchor tenants, are essential 
to develop and sustain interest; infrastructure for knowledge 
sharing and information exchange, technical assistance and, 
importantly, an economic business case are also important in-
gredients.
20 K. Royston, Application of Industrial Ecology across Port Areas: The Potential 
to Leverage Commercial Advantage and Support Sustainable Development in 
SW England (MSc Thesis, University of Surrey, 2011).
Fig. 3: Felixstowe Skip Trailer. Source: Port of Felixstowe
145
working with the neighbors
Deepening collaboration over time
Research and practice show that collaboration can deepen over 
time from quick wins to wider co-operation as confidence grows 
between businesses. Larger infrastructure projects such as pipe-
line links may develop where the business case makes sense.
Quick wins are important for developing confidence between 
parties. They can be facilitated through tools, such as National 
Industrial Symbiosis Programme’s (NISP) Quick Wins work-
shops, which bring businesses together in a ‘resource speed-
dating’ exercise. They enable networking between neighbors 
and reward attendance through business gain.
The Port of Barcelona’s waste collection service is a good 
example of wider co-operation.21 In place for many years, the 
service collects several waste streams from tenants. The waste 
collection service is yielding benefits including improved waste 
management compliance and reduced waste to landfill. Simi-
larly, the Port of Felixstowe (fig. 3) has developed an innova-
tive skip trailer which enables segregated waste to be collected 
from vessels at the quayside.22 An email exchange with the port 
confirmed that the skip trailer has reduced collection costs and 
increased recycling rates.
Longer-term capital infrastructure, such as pipeline systems 
like the Botlek steam loop, require considerable investment and 
long term co-operative models to support a business case which 
may not yield immediate returns.
Not just for big industrial areas
Research and practice also indicate that opportunities do exist 
to exploit resources across small-and medium-sized port areas 
and their vicinities. This might include provision of shared fa-
21 Jaume Gonzalez, ‘Waste Management in the Port of Barcelona’ (presenta-
tion at EcoPorts Foundation Conference, Genoa, December 2006).
22 G. Reeve, email exchange with author, 2009.
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cilities, such as waste provision and exchange of resources be-
tween organizations. 
What is key is taking the time to gain a working knowledge 
and understanding of the businesses and organizations within 
the area; sharing information about needs, requirements and re-
sidual resources; understanding the area’s strengths, weakness-
es, opportunities and threats and how these can be countered 
and built upon collaboratively.
Fowey Harbour Commissioners provide a good example.23 
Recognizing the negative impact of declining china clay exports, 
they have joined with local stakeholders to explore options for 
utilizing the significant volumes of china clay aggregate (a waste 
from quarrying) as a sustainable construction material.
SevernNet
The research undertaken by Kate Royston led to a demonstra-
tion project across the Bristol Port estate area (fig. 4).24 From an 
initial meeting in 2009 with five pilot businesses, the initiative 
23 M. Sutherland, personal communication with author, 2009.
24 Royston, ‘Application of Industrial Ecology across Port Areas’.
Fig. 4: The Bristol Port Estate area. Source: The Bristol Port Company
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has grown and has engaged with more than 125 businesses and 
organizations across the area. Four of the pilot businesses (The 
Bristol Port Company, Siniat, ADM Milling and DS Smith Pack-
aging) are core members of the Champions Steering Group.
Many of the businesses involved meet regularly and have 
benefitted from learning from and exchanging with each other. 
There is a feeling of increased empowerment, for example, to 
manage waste resources more effectively, and significant cost 
savings have been achieved. Toyota GB Portbury has trans-
formed its waste practices and is close to zero waste to land-
fill. Business-to-business expertise is spreading in a number of 
areas — e.g. the deployment of LED lighting which can have a 
rapid payback — and there is a recognition that a lot more can 
be achieved.
The project is now established as a legal entity, SevernNet,25 
managed by a Champions Board. The agenda has been broad-
ened to rebuild and strengthen links between the industrial and 
residential communities and to deal with their key challenges, 
such as getting more local people into local jobs, securing better 
employee travel facilities and supporting more sustainable de-
velopment across the newly designated Avonmouth Severnside 
Enterprise Area.
Self-interest to shared interest
The key to the success of SevernNet, and similar initiatives, is 
the recognition that more can be achieved from working to-
gether in a spirit of shared interest, rather than just self interest.
The re-establishment of links and co-operation between di-
verse communities of interest is vital in securing a resilient and 
effective local economy. 
25 ‘SevernNet is a new enterprise bringing together businesses and community 
enterprises from Portbury, Avonmouth and Severnside’: www.severnnet.
org. 
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In summary
Ports and their cities face increasing pressure to find new ways 
of managing the challenges of intensification, congestion and 
spiraling resource costs. This also presents a great opportunity 
to embrace alternative approaches. Industrial ecology is in-
creasingly being demonstrated across the globe as a practical 
response, ideally suited to port city environments, leading to 
improved resource effectiveness, reductions in cost and envi-
ronmental impact, and the emergence of ‘greener’ industry and 
economic diversification.
To take advantage of these opportunities requires new 
ways of thinking and acting for business, getting to know each 
other, building trust and working co-operatively and collabo-
ratively. Getting started may not always be easy. It requires 
(a) champion(s), a facilitator and willingness for stakeholders 
to begin a process of positive engagement. Ideally, reaping the 
benefits also necessitates industrial ecology thinking to be em-
bedded within strategic and spatial planning and new develop-
ments. 
There is growing interest that the lessons being learnt could 
have wider application across Bristol and elsewhere, and oppor-
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Intoduction
The difference between (re-)industrialization in the past and 
present is that energy security and climate change now increas-
ingly frame the space in which such processes take place. There-
fore, there is an urgent need to rethink (re-)industrialization 
as part of a low-carbon future, rather than as something that 
perpetuates the current carbon-intensive mode of production 
and consumption. The aim of this chapter is to explore the con-
cept of low-carbon industrialization, which has recently gained 
significant traction in China as part of the rethinking process. 
More specifically, this chapter seeks to clarify the meaning of 
low-carbon industrialization, supported by examples from Chi-
na. The chapter also seeks to transfer lessons from China’s expe-
rience with low-carbon industrialization to the context of (re-)
industrialization. To anticipate the conclusion, this paper argues 
that both top-down and bottom-up initiatives can be important 
in low-carbon (re-)industrialization and that their appropriate-
ness depends on the market structure and technological charac-
teristics of the industry.
Following this short introduction, this chapter discusses en-
ergy security and climate change, which are the key challenges 
to (re-)industrialization. Next, it defines low-carbon industriali-
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zation and illustrates the concept with the development of pho-
tovoltaic, wind turbine and solar water heater industries from 
China. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the lessons 
learnt from China’s experience with low-carbon industrializa-
tion. 
Key challenges of re-industrialization: energy security 
and climate change
Improving energy security and tackling climate change are two 
of the greatest challenges of the twenty-first century. One of the 
key energy security concerns is peak oil, which refers to the 
peaking or plateauing of the production of petroleum. Although 
the timing of peak oil remains the subject of heated debate, 
mainly due to uncertainty over the size of ultimate recoverable 
reserves (especially in unconventional, but often controver-
sial places such as the Arctic), there is an increasing consensus 
that high-quality, low-cost conventional oils are declining and 
beginning to be substituted by low-quality, expensive sources 
such as Alberta’s tar sands and heavy oils in the Orinoco Delta.1 
Coupled with the increasing demand from developing coun-
tries, oil prices are more than likely to continue to rise. Another 
energy security concern is energy dependency upon politically 
unstable territories.2 Such concern has driven governments to 
implement policies to reduce dependency on imported energy 
by increasing the domestic supply of energy (which may or may 
not be renewable) and reducing demand through energy con-
servation measures.
Climate change refers to significant and long-term changes 
in the average weather patterns caused by the emission of green-
house gases (e.g., carbon dioxide and methane), mainly from 
the combustion of fossil fuels but also from non-combustion 
1 Gavin Bridge. ‘Geographies of Peak Oil: The Other Carbon Problem’, Geofo-
rum 41 (2010): 523–30.




sources such as non-energy industrial processes and agriculture, 
forest, and other land use (AFOLU). It is now generally accepted 
that the adverse effects of climate change include global warm-
ing, an increased likelihood and intensity of extreme weather 
events, and rising sea levels.3 The internationally institutional-
ized climate change target, first established by the Copenhagen 
Accord (UNFCCC, 2009)4 and subsequently ratified in the Can-
cun Agreements (UNFCCC, 2010),5 is to constrain global temper-
ature change to two degrees above the pre-industrial level. This 
temperature target could be achieved by a 450 ppm [parts per 
million] CO2 stabilization level. The long lifetime of greenhouse 
gases, particularly CO2, means that to achieve this target carbon 
emissions need to peak as soon as 2014.6
The two carbon problems are curiously contrasted, as noted 
by Bridge (2010), because energy security takes the form of flow 
constrictions and resource constraints, whereas climate change 
is fundamentally a problem of abundance and unrestrained flow. 
Nonetheless, energy security and climate change are connected 
by their relationships to the carbon-intensive mode of produc-
tion and consumption. Prima facie, the two carbon problems 
appear to have made (re-)industrialization less desirable and 
viable as an urban development strategy due to the perceived 
energy intensity and carbon intensity of industrial activity. Us-
ing a general equilibrium model developed by the World Bank, 
3 J. Houghton. Global Warming: The Complete Briefing (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004).
4 UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties (COP), Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 
2009. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Par-
ties at its Fifteenth Session (Geneva: United Nations Office, 2010), https://
unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/6911.
php?priref=600005735. 
5 UNFCCC, Conference of the Parties (COP), Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 De-
cember 2010. Addendum Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the 
Parties at its Sixteenth Session (Geneva: United Nations Office, 2010).
6 Chris Huntingford et al., ‘The Link between a Global 2°C Warming Thresh-
old and Emissions in Years 2020, 2050 and Beyond’, Environmental Research 
Letters 7 (2012): 014039.
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Mattot et al. (2011) estimated that even modest carbon control 
depresses industrial output by 3 to 3.5 percent and industrial ex-
ports by 5.5 to 7 percent for carbon-intensive countries such as 
China and India.7 Arguments have been made that developing 
countries should bypass industrialization in pursuit of a service-
oriented economy. However, it has also been argued that if the 
right path is taken, industrialization can contribute to the build-
ing of a prosperous, low-carbon future.8 Zhang calls for a re-
thinking of industrialization as part of this future. As the world’s 
largest carbon polluters, the concept of low-carbon industriali-
zation is rapidly gaining currency in China as part of the re-
thinking process. This paper now turns to examine this concept.
Low-carbon industrialization in China
There are in fact three meanings of low-carbon industrializa-
tion: (1) the decarbonization of existing carbon-intensive in-
dustries through energy conservation or carbon capture and se-
questration; (2) the development of high-tech, high value-added 
and low-emission industries (e.g. biomedicine and information 
technology) and (3) the development of industries that manu-
facture low-carbon energy systems and infrastructures, such as 
products in energy efficiency (e.g. building insulation materi-
als), renewable energy (photovoltaic and wind turbines) and cli-
mate adaptation. Because of the limitation of space, this chapter 
focuses on the third dimension of low-carbon industrialization, 
although it acknowledges that all three types are significant and 
useful responses to climate change. To further illustrate the level 
of complexity and variety even within this narrow definition of 
low-carbon industrialization, this chapter divides the abstract 
discussion into three examples: the photovoltaic industry, the 
7 Aaditya Mattoo et al., ‘Can Global De-Carbonization Inhibit Developing 
Country Industrialization?’, The World Bank Economic Review 26 (2011): 
296–319.
8 Zhang, L.-Y., ‘Is Industrialization Still a Viable Development Strategy for 




wind turbine industry and the solar water heater industry. These 
examples are carefully chosen to demonstrate the diverse path-
ways through which low-carbon industrialization develops and 
evolves.
The photovoltaic industry
Photovoltaic (PV) units convert sunlight into electricity by 
means of silicon-based materials. The PV production chain con-
sists of upstream production (i.e. purification of silicon, cast-
ing silicon into ingots, and slicing ingots into wafers), which is 
capital- and technology-intensive and downstream production 
(i.e. assembling silicon wafers into cells and modules), which 
is energy- and labour-intensive.9 Barriers to entry are high in 
upstream production but relatively low in downstream produc-
tion, where entire turnkey production lines can be purchased 
and run without much prior experience. This provides a suit-
able entry point for Chinese start-ups such as Suntech, Yingli 
and Trina, which entered the downstream PV industry in the 
early 2000s. These private companies have been able to com-
pete aggressively in the global market on a price basis, and have 
very quickly propelled China to be the world’s largest PV cell and 
module manufacturer. However, China’s position in upstream 
production remained weak until 2007, when China produced 
just 2.5 percent of the world’s silicon.10Recently, Chinese firms 
have accumulated sufficient capital and technological know-
how to venture upstream. By 2010, China had gained substantial 
market share in almost every step of the PV production chain: 33 
percent of silicon processing, 52 percent of ingots and wafers, 50 
percent of PV cells, and 28 percent of PV modules.11 China’s PV 
industry is export-oriented, with less than 10 percent of output 
9 Arnaud De La Tour et al., ‘Innovation and International Technology Trans-
fer: The Case of the Chinese Photovoltaic Industry’, Energy Policy 39 (2011): 
761–70.
10 Ibid.
11 Alim Bayaliyev et al., China’s Solar Policy: Subsidies, Manufacturing 
Overcapacity & Opportunities (Washington, DC:  GW School of Public 
Policy and Public Administration, 2011), http://solar.gwu.edu/research/
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absorbed domestically.12 The export orientation of the PV in-
dustry reflects the lack of domestic installation — by the end of 
2009, the cumulative installation of PV in China was 300 MW, 
equal to 3.3 percent of that in Germany.13
The development of the PV industry in China is largely a bot-
tom-up affair. Until recently, Chinese authorities have done little 
to support the industry.14 Rather, success is attributed to local 
entrepreneurialism, the recruitment of skilled executives from 
the Chinese diaspora, low energy and labour costs, and the sub-
sidy of PV in Europe through generous feed-in tariffs.15 The 2008 
global financial crisis and the reduction in PV feed-in tariff and 
installation subsidies among European countries created prob-
lems with overcapacity and diminished profits. In response, the 
Chinese government introduced a series of supportive policies 
such as subsidized credit from state-owned banks.16 Moreover, 
the government introduced direct subsidies and feed-in tariffs 
to boost domestic PV installation. Consequently, the cumulative 
PV installation in China skyrocketed from 300 MW at the end 
of 2009 to 3300 MW at the end of 2011, an increase by a factor of 
11 over two years.17 In 2012, the government promised to invest a 
further 15 billion RMB to increase PV installation by 5200 MW.18 
These policies have been instrumental in protecting the PV in-
dustry in China from collapse.
china%E2%80%99s-solar-policy-subsidies-manufacturing-overcapacity-
opportunities
12 Bernardina Algieri et al., ‘Going “Green”: Trade Specialisation Dynamics in 
the Solar Photovoltaic Sector’, Energy Policy 39: 7275–83.
13 Mo-Lin Huo and Dan-Wei Zhang, ‘Lessons from Photovoltaic Policies in 
China for Future Development’, Energy Policy 51 (2012): 38–45.
14 De la Tour et al., ‘Innovation and International Technology Transfer’.
15 Ibid.; Bayaliyev et al., China’s Solar Policy.
16 Jailu Liu and Don Goldstein, ‘Understanding China’s Renewable Energy 
Technology Exports’, Energy Policy 52 (2013): 417–28.
17 Sufang Zhang and Yongxiu He, ‘Analysis on the Development and Policy 
of Solar PV Power in China’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 21 
(2013): 393–401.
18 Eric Savitz, ‘China Solar Stocks Soar; Chinese Government Vows $2B in 
Subsidies’, Forbes, December 12, 2012.
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The wind turbine industry
A wind turbine generation system (WTGS) generates electricity 
by capturing kinetic energy from wind to power a generator. 
Unlike the PV industry, the WTGS industry is vertically integrat-
ed and highly concentrated. In the early 2000s, four companies 
from Europe and the United States controlled the WTGS market: 
Vestas, Gamesa, Enercon and GE Wind.19 Technical barriers to 
entry are high because the production of competitive WTGS re-
quires specialized labour skills and technical know-how.20 China 
forayed into the WTGS industry at approximately the same time 
as the PV industry, but through very different means. Foreign 
direct investment played a crucial role in the early days, with 
almost all leading companies investing in China.21 Foreign WTGS 
makers were attracted to China because of the rapidly growing 
wind-power market driven by supportive policies, including 
direct subsidies and feed-in tariffs. Moreover, the requirement 
that at least 70 percent of the materials be sourced locally to 
be eligible for subsidies and feed-in tariffs practically forbade 
foreign companies from exporting components and turbines 
directly from China.22 In short, the government created a condi-
tion that strongly incentivized foreign companies to establish 
production lines in China. In contrast to the PV industry, the 
WTGS industry in China is domestic-oriented, with very little 
export. The growth of the industry is thus inseparable from the 
strong, policy-driven growth in the domestic deployment of 
19 Liu and Goldstein, ‘Understanding China’s Renewable Energy Technology 
Exports’.
20 Zhen-Yu Zhao, et al., ‘Comparative Assessment of Performance of Foreign 
and Local Wind Turbine Manufacturers in China’, Renewable Energy 39 
(2012): 424–32.
21 Liu and Goldstein, ‘Understanding China’s Renewable Energy Technology 
Exports’.
22 Yuanchun Zhou et al., ‘Joint R&D in Low-Carbon Technology Develop-
ment in China: A Case Study of the Wind-turbine Manufacturing Industry’, 
Energy Policy 46 (2012): 100–108.
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WTGS, which became the world’s largest in terms of cumulative 
capacity in 2010.23
Another interesting feature of the WTGS industry in China 
is the rapid rise of domestic manufacturers, which surpassed 
foreign-owned companies in China’s WTGS market share in 
2007 and secured a market share of 87 percent in 2010.24 Joint 
research and development (R&D) projects are a key strategy 
of fast-track learning on the part of domestic manufacturers. 
Whereas the leading foreign companies invest directly in China 
to protect proprietary information, small-scale design and con-
sulting firms usually collaborate with Chinese WTGS manufac-
turers in joint R&D. The acquisition of human capital is crucial 
to the process of technological transfer through joint R&D. For 
example, when the Shanghai Electric Company (SEC) and Aero-
dyn collaborated to design two MW wind turbines, SEC sent 30 
engineers to Germany to receive professional training for one 
year.25 Through the training, the engineers obtained a basic 
capacity to design wind turbines and gained knowledge about 
Aerodyn’s technological foundation, such that they can collabo-
rate with Aerodyn experts to design WTGSs that would satisfy 
local climatic requirements. 
Solar water heaters
Solar water heating (SWH) is a type of solar thermal technology 
used to heat water from direct sunlight. China’s SWH industry 
has grown rapidly in the last decade. The annual SWH produc-
tion increased from 6.1 million square meters in 2000 to 42 mil-
lion square meters in 2009, making China by far the largest SWH 
manufacturer in the world.26 A complete production chain has 
formed from raw material processing to final product assem-
23 Global Wind Energy Council, Global Wind Report — Annual Market Up-
date (Brussels: Global Wind Energy Council, 2011), http://gwec.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Annual_report_2011_lowres.pdf.
24 Zhou et al., ‘Joint R&D in Low-Carbon Technology Development in China’.
25 Ibid.
26 Hu Runqing et al., ‘An Overview of the Development of Solar Water Heater 
Industry in China’, Energy Policy 51 (2012): 46–51.
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bly. Vacuum-tube SWH, which relatively is less technologically 
intensive, dominates the market. Because the technological bar-
riers are low, the industry is highly fragmented and competi-
tive. There are over 5,000 SWH manufacturers in China, most 
of them limited in production capacity and product quality.27 
Nevertheless, a batch of large and influential enterprises has 
emerged in the sector, including four enterprises with an output 
value of 2 billion RMB.28
The most striking feature of the development of the SWH in-
dustry is that it is an entirely local initiative, with little reliance 
on the foreign market (unlike PV), foreign investments (unlike 
WTGS) and government intervention (also unlike WTGS). The 
key to success is that the SWH industry is able to produce prod-
ucts that can compete with traditional fuel-based water heaters 
on a price basis without the help of government subsidies. Using 
a life-cycle cost analysis of vacuum-tube SWH, Han et al. (2010) 
found that a household can save 342–3321 RMB in fuel costs an-
nually, depending on household water use. Considering that 
SWHs are approximately 800–1,000 RMB more expensive than 
traditional water heaters, their payback period can be as brief as 
a few months. This economic competitiveness has led to a large 
domestic demand, with a 33 percent average annual growth rate 
of sales from 2006 to 2009.29
Conclusions: lessons from China
The key lesson learnt from the present analysis of China’s low-
carbon industrialization is that there are many pathways of de-
velopment. The PV industry was developed using the export-
oriented model, primarily targeting the European market, 
which was booming thanks to generous feed-in tariffs. The de-
velopment of the PV industry is mainly a bottom-up initiative, 
27 Jingyi Han et al., ‘Solar Water Heaters in China: A New Day Dawning’, En-
ergy Policy 38 (2010): 383–91.
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with little involvement from the government until recently. The 
WTGS industry in China was developed with the help of direct 
foreign investment, either as wholly foreign-owned companies 
or as joint R&D projects. In either case, there has been a suc-
cessful technology transfer to domestic companies, which now 
dominate the domestic market. The development of the WTGS 
industry is a top-down initiative, as government intervention 
is central, particularly in creating the conditions to attract for-
eign companies to China. The SWH industry was developed as a 
pure bottom-up initiative, with little involvement from foreign 
markets, foreign companies and government intervention. The 
success of the SWH industry lies primarily in its ability to out-
compete traditional water heaters without the help of govern-
ment subsidies.
To conclude, this chapter made two contributions to the 
discussion of (re-)industrialization in industrialized countries. 
First, it highlighted the imperative of rethinking (re-)industri-
alization in face of the two carbon problems; that of energy se-
curity and climate change. Second, this paper argued that low-
carbon (re-)industrialization can be achieved through multiple 
alternative pathways. Both top-down and bottom-up initiatives 
can be important, and the appropriateness of the model de-
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